[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. November 1913.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(10339.)

F.O. 424

FO 424/237

PART IX.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

CLOSED UNTIL 1964

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

237

January to March 1913.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	Sir G. Lowther ..	1125 Confidential	Dec. 28, 1912	Mesopotamian oil-fields. Transmits memorandum from commercial attaché on rights of Germans to	1
2	To Sir G. Lowther ..	3 Tel.	Jan. 2, 1913	Mesopotamian oilfields. Refers to No. 1. To report fully on German rights. What does Mr. Whittall's statement, that 75 per cent. of capital will be British, mean? (see No. 14)	2
3	To India Office ..	..	3,	Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf questions. Refers to Part VIII, No. 111. Transmits Part VIII, No. 164. Suggests no action can be taken till Turkish Government renew their demand for customs increase	2
4	Lieutenant - Colonel Sir P. Cox	13 Confidential	Dec. 13, 1912	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Refers to Part VIII, No. 141. Transmits copy of letter to Government of India requesting instructions respecting intimation to foreign consuls and others of establishment of lights at Bushire, Bahrein, &c...	2
5	Sir G. Lowther ..	1127	30,	Bagdad consular guard. Refers to Part VIII, No. 138. No objection to continued employment of Hindus (see No. 27) ..	4
6	„ „ ..	1128	31,	Arabs of Muntific. Refers to Part VIII, No. 168. Transmits despatch from consul at Bussorah reporting on relations between Ajeymi-bin-Sadun and authorities of vilayet	4
7	India Office ..	..	Jan. 3, 1913	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Refers to Part VIII, No. 172. Calls attention to Viceroy's telegram of 28th December (Part VIII, No. 172). Lord Crewe agrees that it would be advisable in any case to await reply to memorandum communicated by Sir W. Townley to Persian Government	5
8	Sir G. Lowther ..	1129	Dec. 31, 1912	Armenia. Refers to Part VIII, No. 136. Armenians seem to feel that time has come to deal with provinces affected by article 61 of Treaty of Berlin. Mission of Mgr. Ormanian to Europe. Minister of Interior's fresh scheme for improvement in six vilayets. Hopes entertained of Russia	5
9	„ „ ..	1130	30,	Armenia. Minister for Foreign Affairs says Cabinet have been considering measures for improvement of relations between Armenians and Kurds. Points which his Excellency considers essential ..	7
10	„ „ ..	1131	31,	Anti-Turkish agitation among Kurds. Transmits despatch from consul at Aleppo respecting (*cf.* with Part VIII, No. 168). Both Kurds and Arabs show marked friendliness to British. Inclination of Armenians towards Russia (see No. 36) ..	8
11	„ „ ..	1132	31,	Mesopotamian oilfields. Refers to Part VIII, No. 160. Concurs in conclusions arrived at by Mr. Hurst. No documentary evidence to prove that German rights under 1904 convention have lapsed. Germans should be pushed into the open. D'Arcy's local agent should maintain his claims ..	11

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
12	Sir G. Lowther ..	1133	Dec. 31, 1912	Eastern Anatolia. Refers to Part VIII, No. 156. Situation is one of effervescent anticipation. Activities of Russian agents in Mosul district. Transmits despatches from vice-consul at Van	12
13	India Office ..	..	Jan. 4, 1913	Oil. Acknowledges Part VIII, No. 162. Measures to which India Office will agree in order to prevent absorption of company. Question of use of oil by Indian railways (see No. 60)	15
14	Sir G. Lowther ..	8 Tel.	6,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 2. German rights apparently based on article 6 of 1904 convention	16
15	Anglo - Persian Oil Company	..	6,	Mesopotamian oilfields. Acknowledges Part VIII, No. 174. The matter will be submitted to Mr. D'Arcy and a further communication sent	16
16	Sir G. Lowther ..	8	4,	Inauguration of service of Messageri steamers to port of Djouni, in Lebanon. Transmits despatch from consul-general at Beirout reporting	16
17	„ „ ..	9	4,	Bagdad Railway. Refers to Part VIII, No. 154. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Adana reporting opening to traffic of 54 kilom. of line beyond Ulu Kishla	17
17*	India Office ..	..	8,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Transmits telegram from Viceroy proposing to approve certain suggestions made in enclosure in No. 4 (see No. 24) ..	17*
18	Sir G. Lowther ..	12 Tel.	8,	Murder of Mayor of Van. Vice-consul reports. Murder probably committed by Tashnags. Vali wishes to arrest and expel all the chiefs of this party, but commandant indisposed to assist him ..	17
19	To Sir W. Townley ..	5 Tel.	8,	Sheikh Shuaib. Better not to approach Persian Government on general question pending completion of lighting and buoyage scheme now in course of execution. In any case to await reply of Minister for Foreign Affairs to memorandum of 11th December (see No. 21) ..	18
20	India Office ..	..	9,	Persian Gulf. Transmits telegram from Viceroy giving views regarding naval and military position at mouth of Persian Gulf	18
21	Sir W. Townley ..	13 Tel.	9,	Lighthouse on Sheikh Shuaib. Refers to No. 19. Answer to memorandum is most unsatisfactory. Awaits instructions (see No. 30)	19
22	India Office ..	..	11,	Abu Musa. Transmits letter from Sir P. Cox, enclosing report from residency agent, Lingah, showing that Messrs. Wönckhaus are trying to get away all the oxide before the end of the year ..	19
23	„ „ ..	..	11,	Abu Musa. Transmits telegram to Viceroy, enquiring whether any oxide remained to be exported at the end of the year (see No. 52)	20

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
24	India Office ..	..	Jan. 15, 1913	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 17. Transmits telegraphic correspondence with Government of India respecting communication to consuls (see No. 30)	21
25	Memorandum communicated by India Office	..	16,	Trans-Persian railway and Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 20. Views of Government of India regarding naval and military position at entrance to Persian Gulf in connection with railway question ..	21
26	Sir L. Mallet to Councillor of German Embassy	..	17,	Abu Musa oxide. His Majesty's Government would be glad to receive Herr Wönckhaus if he wishes to set forth his objections to certain of His Majesty's Government's suggestions. Requests some written indication of the nature of these objections	24
27	To India Office ..	..	17,	Bagdad consular guard. Refers to Part VIII, No. 138. Transmits No. 5. Proposes to concur (see No. 50) ..	24
28	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox	15 Commercial	Dec. 24, 1912	Activities of Shell Transport Company in Shatt-el-Arab. Reports action taken by Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. ..	25
29	Sir G. Lowther ..	28	Jan. 12, 1913	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to Part VIII, No. 140. Tahsin Pasha's claim based not on concession, but on prospecting licence of 1898. After 1908 Council of State decide against validity, because of irregularities of the draft. Messrs. Murrieta's request can scarcely be entertained	25
30	India Office ..	..	17,	Lights in Persian Gulf. Refers to Nos. 24 and 17*. Lord Crewe thinks it advisable, under the circumstances, to proceed as suggested by Government of India. Refers to No. 21. Suggests requesting Russian Government to discontinue use of lights at Russian consulate. Concurs that question of Sheikh Shuaib be revived at discretion of His Majesty's Minister (see No. 46)	26
31	Sir G. Lowther ..	33	14,	Lebanon. Transmits two despatches from consul-general, Beirout, showing interest on part of Russia in affairs of. Acquisition by Russian clergy of two Greek Orthodox monasteries. Petitions for opening to steamers of a port in district of Koura (see No. 114)	27
32	„ „ ..	34	15,	Aleppo vilayet. Refers to No. 10. Transmits despatch from consul at Aleppo on degree in which disintegrating tendencies of committee policy have operated in that region	29
33	„ „ ..	36	15,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to "Persia," Part XXXII, No. 114. Two new Turkish representatives appointed. First meeting merely formal	31
34	„ „ ..	37	15,	Bagdad Railway. Is continuing efforts to ascertain *tracé* between Eregli and Euphrates. Gives exact position of Radju	31
35	To Sir G. Lowther ..	19	20,	Anti-Turkish agitation amongst Kurds. Refers to No. 10. To thank Mr. Fontana and approve his action. Transmits No. 36	32

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
36	To Sir G. Buchanan..	29 Confidential	Jan. 20, 1913	Anti-Turkish agitation amongst Kurds. Transmits No. 10. Enquires whether report as to Armenian deputation to European capitals has any foundation, and, if so, what will be attitude of Russian Government	32
37	Sir G. Lowther ..	42	18,	Ægean islands. Transmits despatch from consul-general at Smyrna reporting surrender of Chios to Greeks	32
37*	India Office ..	..	21,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Proposal regarding adjustment of expenditure on (see No. 47*)	33*
37†	To Sir G. Lowther ..	51 Tel.	23,	Turco-Persian frontier. Why are Russian Government raising question at this moment? (see No. 42)..	33†
38	To Sir F. Bertie ..	55	23,	Armenia. Conversation with French Ambassador. Does not think Armenian question should be raised till after peace is signed	33
39	„ „ ..	56	23,	Rumour of proposal to divide Asiatic Turkey into spheres of interest. Has informed French Ambassador that there is no truth in rumour	33
40	To Sir G. Buchanan..	40	23,	Rumour of proposal to divide Asiatic Turkey into spheres of interest. No truth in rumour	33
41	Mr. Greenway to Mr. Parker	..	23,	Mesopotamian oil. Specific grounds of claim of D'Arcy group to Bagdad-Mosul concession	34
42	Sir G. Lowther ..	41 Tel.	24,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 37†. Russian Ambassador has been constantly making representations. Possibility of matter being settled	34
43	To Sir E. Goschen ..	32	24,	Asiatic Turkey. Conversation with German Ambassador on subject of guaranteeing integrity of	35
44	India Office ..	..	24,	Persian Gulf. Transmits telegram from Government of India agreeing that advantage should be taken of existing opportunity to secure concessions	35
45	Sir G. Lowther ..	48 Tel.	26,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 42. Persian delegates have agreed to fifteen days' prolongation pending receipt of instructions from their Government ..	36
46	To Sir W. Townley..	42 Tel.	27,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 30. Enquires whether communication to consuls, suggested by India Office, would be opportune	36
47	To Sir E. Goschen ..	39	27,	Integrity of Asiatic Turkey. Conversation with German Ambassador. Does not think Russia has any designs on ..	37
47*	To Treasury ..	..	27,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Transmits No. 37*. Proposes to concur in India Office suggestion	37*
48	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox	179 Tel.	28,	Lighthouse at Fao. Skeleton iron tower, with red light, has been erected ..	37
49	To Sir G. Buchanan..	52	28,	Integrity of Asiatic Turkey. Has impressed on Russian Ambassador how strong is the German apprehension of a Russian move in Armenia	37

No	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
50	India Office ..	..	Jan. 28, 1913	Bagdad consular guard. Refers to No. 27. Agrees to approval of Sir G. Lowther's view	37
51	To Sir E. Goschen ..	42	29,	Integrity of Asiatic Turkey. Has informed German Ambassador of No. 497, "Turkish War," Part IV. Germany should impress on Porte importance of settling Turco-Persian frontier question	38
52	India Office ..	..	30,	Abu Musa oxide. Refers to No. 23. Transmits telegram from Viceroy respecting shipments up to 31st December, 1912. Wönckhaus's agent at Lingah has asked German consul at Bushire to get further respite for him, but consul's answer was not favourable	38
53	„ „ ..	..	29,	Language study in Persian Gulf. Transmits telegram from Government of India. Suggests authorising visits to ports where consular officers are established (see No. 67)	38
54	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	31,	Steam-ship enterprise on the Tigris. Refers to Part VIII, No. 118. Enquires whether understanding embodied in last paragraph may be assumed to meet with approval of His Majesty's Government, and requests to be kept informed of any changes in steam-ship services which may come to His Majesty's Government knowledge (see No. 68)	39
55	Sir G. Lowther ..	63 Tel.	Feb. 1,	Mesopotamian oil. Stock accepts representation on behalf of his firm, and is telegraphing to company date of his arrival in London	39
56	To Sir F. Bertie ..	84	1,	Integrity of Asia Minor. Conversation with French Ambassador regarding apprehension felt in Rome and Berlin	39
57	To India Office ..	..	3,	Erection by Turkish Government of light-house at Fao. Transmits No. 48. Step reported appears to be violation of *status quo* (see Part VII, No. 61). Suggests protest to Porte	40
58	Consul Crow ..	Telegraphic	4,	Lights in Persian Gulf. Details given by vali of light which will be shown at Fao 7th February	40
59	To Sir G. Buchanan..	63	5,	Dioptric lanterns for Bushire. Transmits Part VI, No. 134, and Part VIII, No. 143. To point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russian lights are more a source of danger than a benefit to shipping	40
60	To India Office ..	..	5,	Oil. Refers to No. 13. Reports conversation between Sir L. Mallet and Mr. Greenway	41
61	To Mr. Greenway ..	Confidential	5,	Oil. Objections of Admiralty to giving subsidy. Question of subsidy by Government of India. Trusts company will remain predominantly British (see No. 73)	42
62	Sir G. Lowther ..	82	2,	Reforms in Beirout vilayet. Refers to "Turkish War," Part IV, No. 304. Transmits despatch from consul-general on movement for introduction of reforms on principle of decentralisation	43

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
63	Sir G. Lowther ..	88	Feb. 4, 1913	Registration of property of sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah. Refers to Confidential Paper 9907, No. 83. Transmits despatch from consul at Bussorah reporting that the authorities have waived their objections to (see No. 124) ..	44
64	Sir G. Buchanan ..	86	3,	Armenian deputation to Europe. Refers to No. 36. Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard nothing of proposal. He admits there is a pro-Russian agitation amongst Armenians, but he has discouraged any idea of annexation	45
65	Sir G. Lowther ..	89	4,	Murder of Mayor of Van. Refers to No. 18. Transmits despatch from vice-consul reporting on. Tashnagists in Constantinople deny that the crime was committed by one of their number, which seems probable	46
66	„ „ ..	79 Tel.	10,	Hakki Pasha's mission to London. Hakki will start 11th February. He is to discuss - reply to be given to Part VII, No. 61 ..	47
67	To India Office ..	..	10,	Language study in Persian Gulf. Acknowledges No. 53. Agrees, providing Bussorah is not visited	47
68	To Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	10,	Steam-ship enterprise on the Tigris. Refers to No. 54. His Majesty's Government approve understanding embodied in last paragraph of No. 118, Part VIII ..	47
69	Sir F. Bertie ..	72	9,	French policy in Syria. New President has assured Syrian deputation that there will be no change in	48
70	India Office ..	..	10,	Shell Oil Company. Transmits copy of letter from Sir P. Cox reporting on activities of Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. in the trade of the Shatt-el-Arab	48
71	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox	Telegraphic	11,	Lights at Bushire. Gives details of lights established 9th February	49
72	„ „ ..	Telegraphic	11,	Lights at Bushire. Refers to No. 71. Has notified British shipping agents, but, in absence of reply to No. 4, has taken no further pronunciatory action	49
73	Mr. Greenway ..	Confidential	12,	Oil. Replies to No. 61. Question of subsidy from Admiralty or Government of India. Method of preserving British control. Suggests conference (see No. 80) ..	49
74	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox	2	Jan. 22,	Bahrein. Transmits despatch to Sir W. Townley regarding desirability of obtaining recognition by Persian Government of our protective rights in regard to Bahrein	51
75	„ „ ..	5	22,	Trucial chiefs. Transmits despatch to Sir W. Townley with regard to our present position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government in the matter of our right to protect in Persia subjects of the trucial chiefs of Oman	52
76	Sir G. Lowther ..	111	Feb. 13,	Situation at Van. Transmits despatch from vice-consul reporting on. Decrease of brigandage. Local reforms undertaken by vali. Opposition to him among Armenians, who appeal to Powers to take reforms in hand themselves	53

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
77	Sir G. Lowther ..	118	Feb. 13, 1913	Armenia. Reports release, unpunished, of Moslem murderers of a notable Armenian Catholic. Release due to agitation of members of committee	54
78	Mr. Greenway ..	..	17,	Mesopotamian oilfields. Transmits extracts from letter received by Mr. Nichols, showing that Mr. E. Whittall has recently put forward definite application on behalf of National Bank for the concession (see No. 87)	55
79	Sir G. Lowther ..	94 Tel.	17,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to "Persia," Part XXXIII, No. 279. Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised a settlement in twenty days	56
80	To Admiralty .. „ India Office	..	18,	Oil. Asks for views on No. 73	56
81	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	18,	Fusion of steam-ship interests on the Tigris. Hakki Pasha reversed favourable policy of Hilmi Pasha, causing useless trouble and expense and some loss of prestige. Suggests approaching Hakki Pasha during his present visit to England	56
82	To Sir G. Lowther ..	105 Tel. Confidential	20,	Mesopotamian oil. To arrange interview with Grand Vizier for Mr. Stock, and give him energetic support.. ..	57
83	India Office ..	..	20,	Oil. Refers to No. 80. Objection to subsidy. Will take part in conference, but sees no reason to modify views expressed in No. 13	57
84	Consul Crow ..	1 Commercial	Jan. 31,	Steamers for Persian Gulf. Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. are building four or five oil-fuel steamers for Marseilles–Bunder Abbas–Bussorah service. They are taking big risks and doing big business ..	58
85	Sir G. Lowther ..	131	Feb. 17,	Turco-Persian frontier. Refers to "Persia," Part XXXIII, No. 278. Transmits note to Porte. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs says matter will be settled in twenty days..	58
86	Memorandum communicated to Tewfik Pasha	..	24,	Mesopotamian oil. Virtual agreement in spring 1909 between Ottoman Government and D'Arcy group for concessions in vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad not completed owing to *coup d'Etat*. Urges recognition	59
87	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	24,	Oil. Refers to No. 78. His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to secure interview with Grand Vizier for Mr. Stock. Informs of urgent representations in No. 86	59
88	India Office ..	..	25,	Limits of Koweit. Transmits letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox respecting, with map	59
89	Sir L. Mallet to Hakki Pasha	..	26,	Navigation of rivers of Mesopotamia. Recapitulates rights of His Majesty's Government to	62
90	Sir A. Hirtzel to Mr. Parker	..	26,	Koweit. Transmits statement of basis of possible compromise as regards, to be used only in case of real necessity. Lord Crewe would refuse Turkish request for right of way for their troops	63

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
91	Admiralty	..	Feb. 26, 1913	Oil. Refers to No. 80. Observations on No. 73. Willing to join in conference. Encloses letter to Anglo-Persian Oil Company (see No. 106)	66
92	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	26,	Mesopotamian oil. Acknowledges and thanks for No. 87	67
93	Mr. Ashley (Board of Trade) to Mr Parker	..	27,	Statement from Turkish customs returns of imports of cotton piece-goods into Ottoman Empire during Turkish year 1326 ..	67
94	Sir L. Mallet to Hakki Pasha	..	27,	Refers to Nos. 48 and 57. Lighting and buoyage of Shatt-el-Arab. Surprise that a light is being shown from lighthouse at Fao. Confuses vessels and prejudices present negotiations	68
95	To Messrs. Murrieta and Co.	..	27,	Mesopotamian oilfields. Refers to Part VIII, No. 131. Informs of No. 29	68
96	India Office ..	..	27,	Turkish lighthouse at Fao. Transmits telegram from Viceroy respecting, giving Cox's view, with which he concurs ..	69
97	To Sir G. Lowther ..	116 Tel.	28,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 82. Necessity of prompt and energetic action. To keep Sir E. Grey informed by telegraph of results (see No. 101)	70
98	Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox	6 Confidential	9,	Buoying and lighting of the Shatt-el-Arab bar. Refers to No. 71. Précis of history of the buoyage since 1857	70
99	Sir G. Lowther ..	150	23,	Adana. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Adana reporting on the situation in that district	75
100	„ „ ..	156	25,	Arab unrest. Transmits telegram from consul at Bussorah on subject of a meeting of Arab notables there	77
101	„ „ ..	115 Tel.	Mar. 1,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 97. Has seen Grand Vizier and pressed claims of D'Arcy group. Promises enquiry, and will see Mr. Stock to-day	77
102	„ „ ..	118 Tel.	2,	German dredger for Bussorah. Refers to Part V, No. 21. Consul reports vali negotiating with Wönckhaus firm for small one	77
103	„ „ ..	119 Tel.	2,	Transport of material for Bagdad Railway. Refers to Part VII, No. 138. Learns from Sir R. Crawford that Bagdad Railway and Lynch have been approached for creation of permanent river transport company involving disappearance of flag (see No. 111)	78
104	„ „ ..	159	Feb. 25,	Views of Arab notables in Bussorah. Transmits despatch from consul. Hitherto hostile to committee and turkification, but now make non-party declaration, possibly with particularist aims	78
105	„ „ ..	121 Tel.	Mar. 3,	Mesopotamian oil. Reply of Porte to communication according to Part VIII, No. 160. Declares that there is no trace of application made on behalf of D'Arcy (see No. 112)	79

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
106	To Admiralty ..	Confidential	Mar. 3, 1913	Oil. Acknowledges No. 91. Has informed Mr. Greenway that before conference takes place Admiralty would prefer to await result of further letter to Anglo-Persian Oil Company	79
107	To Board of Trade ..	Confidential	3,	Hakki Pasha's mission to London. Refers to Part VII, No. 79. Hakki says Porte could not agree to proposal that duty on cotton goods should be limited to 13 per cent. *ad valorem*. Thinks this point should stand over for the present ..	79
108	To Mr. Greenway ..	Confidential	3,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 87. Respecting concessions in vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul, Sir G. Lowther has secured a satisfactory interview with Grand Vizier for Mr. Stock (see No. 118)	80
109	„ „ ..	..	3,	Oil. Refers to No. 73. Admiralty willing to take part in conference, but before doing so would prefer to await answer to letter enclosed in No. 91 (see No. 129) ..	80
110	To Sir G. Lowther ..	123 Tel.	4,	Dredging at Bussorah. Refers to No. 102. To inform Porte of reported negotiations with Wönckhaus. No operations to be undertaken till riverain commission formed (see No. 123)	80
111	„ „ ..	124 Tel.	4,	Transport of material for Bagdad Railway. Refers to No. 103. Lynch undertook not to commit himself without our approval. Board of Trade think three extra steamers should be granted to another firm (see No. 125)	81
112	„ „ ..	125 Tel.	4,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 105. Communicated to Mr. Greenway. Transfer cannot invalidate promise by Grand Vizier	81
113	Sir G. Lowther ..	164	Feb. 28,	Abortive public meeting at Beirout to collect subscriptions for National Defence Committee. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul respecting	81
114	„ „ ..	166	28,	Russia's new interest in Syria. Refers to No. 31. Transmits despatch from consul-general at Beirut giving further indications. Invitation of Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch to Romanof tercentenary	82
115	„ „ ..	168	28,	Trebizond. Transmits despatch from consul at Trebizond reporting on alarm caused among Christian population by distribution of rifles to the customs guards ..	83
116	„ „ ..	172	Mar. 1,	Disorders at Hajin and insult to British flag. Transmits report from vice-consul at Adana. Has approved proposed action ..	84
117	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	..	4,	Mesopotamian oil. Assurances given to His Majesty's Ambassador by Grand Vizier that Council had decided to grant concession made subsequent to transfer of said properties to Minister of Finance. Claims of Anatolian Railway Company therefore invalid	86
118	„ „ ..	Confidential	4,	Oil. Acknowledges No. 108. Transmits telegrams from and to agent at Constantinople (see No. 132)	87

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
119	Sir G. Lowther ..	125 Tel.	Mar. 5, 1913	Turkish troops in Hassa district. Transmits telegram from consul at Bussorah respecting	87
120	India Office ..	..	4,	Wireless installation at Debai. Refers to Part VIII, No. 152. Transmits correspondence. Government of India now definitely recommend Debai (see No. 147)	88
121	Consul Crow ..	10 Tel.	5,	Turkish troops in Hassa district. Gives particulars respecting from reliable source	93
122	Sir G. Lowther ..	130 Tel.	7,	Lynch. Refers to No. 111. Suggestion of that the three contemplated new steamers should be granted to a firm other than Lynch seems excluded by previous decision of Turkish Government	93
123	„ „ ..	131 Tel.	7,	German dredger at Bussorah. Refers to No. 110. Has arrived at Shatt-el-Arab. To be bought outright. To dredge irrigation creeks (not channel), state of which has long been grievance to merchants, British and other	93
124	„ „ ..	174	2,	Bussorah. Refers to No. 63. Consul reports that acting vali has been instructed by Minister of Interior to allow Tapu office to register property in names of Sheikhs Mubarak of Koweit and Khazal of Mohammerah	94
125	„ „ ..	177	2,	Fusion of river transport interests. Refers to No. 103. Details on Bagdad Railway Company's suggestion for agreement with Messrs. Lynch and Ottoman Nahrié Company involving disappearance of our flag	94
126	„ „ ..	179	4,	Buoying and lighting of Persian Gulf. Transmits report of consul at Bussorah on precarious condition of Turkish lightship "Kilid-el-Bahr" at Shatt-el-Arab ..	95
127	„ „ ..	180	4,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 105. Transmits text of Porte's note and note to the Porte from embassy to which it replies	95
128	„ „ ..	183	3,	Customs depôt at Bagdad. Refers to Part VI, No. 177. Transmits extract from letter from Sir R. Crawford urging settlement of question	96
129	Mr. Greenway to Mr. Parker	..	6,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 109. Transmits letter to Secretary of Admiralty respecting offer to supply oil fuel. This was answer awaited. Meeting should now take place	97
130	To Admiralty ..	..	10,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 109. Recent proposals of Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Foreign Office representative will not attend meeting unless their Lordships consider it necessary	98
131	To Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	10,	Navigation of Tigris and Euphrates. Refers to No. 81. Requests denial of rumours of combine with Bagdad Railway Company and a third party entailing disappearance of British flag, in view of assurances in No. 118, Part VIII ..	99
132	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	10,	Oil. Acknowledges No. 118. Has taken note of statement regarding loan ..	99

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
133	Anglo-Persian Oil Company	Confidential	Mar. 10, 1913	Mesopotamian oil. Mr. Greenway transmits letter from their representative at Constantinople	99
134	Sir G. Lowther ..	139 Tel.	11,	Oil. Refers to No. 105. Grand Vizier says there is another English company in the field. Suggests Mr. Stock should be furnished with documents	101
135	To Mr. Greenway ..	..	13,	Mesopotamian oil. Sir G. Lowther has had further interview with Grand Vizier, who mentions another English claim. Mr. Stock should be furnished at once with copies of all documents and résumé of negotiations between Mr. Nicol, the Porte, and Mining Department	101
136	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	13,	Mesopotamian river navigation. Refers to No. 131. Asks for details of rumoured combine. Unaware of inadequacy of transport arrangements	102
137	Sir G. Lowther ..	145 Tel.	14,	Arab unrest. Transmits telegram from consul at Bussorah reporting application of certain sheikhs for British protection ..	102
138	„ „ ..	146 Tel.	14,	Arab unrest. Refers to No. 137. Transmits telegram to consul at Bussorah to effect that His Majesty's Government cannot interfere in internal matters	103
139	„ „ ..	192 Confidential	10,	Mesopotamian oil. German syndicate in strong position, and will do its utmost to prevent D'Arcy getting concession. Pro-German tendencies suggests strong hint to Hakki Pasha. Unfortunate that Mr. Whittall, on board of National Bank, is in opposition	103
140	„ „ ..	147 Tel.	15,	Oil. Hakki Pasha's negotiations. Porte propose to put up oilfields to auction. Committee paper announces that negotiations in London will turn English public opinion in favour of Turkey	103
141	„ „ ..	197	13,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 117. Has no recollection of "promises" mentioned. Mr. Marling certain that they were not made to him either	104
142	To Sir G. Lowther ..	143 Tel.	17,	Arab unrest. Refers to No. 138. Will speak to Hakki Pasha..	104
143	„ „ ..	145 Tel.	17,	Oil. Refers to No. 140. Is sending memorandum to Hakki Pasha. What regulations are contravened by auction? (see No. 144)	104
143*	India Office ..	..	17,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Erection of lighthouse on Musandim promontory instead of on Little Quoin Island preferable strategically. Suggests arrangement with Sultan of Muscat ..	104*
144	Sir G. Lowther ..	151 Tel.	18,	Oil. Refers to No. 143. Regulations have no provision for adjudication, but merely for "permis de recherche" (see No. 151)	105
145	Memorandum communicated to Hakki Pasha	..	18,	Mesopotamian oil. Review of negotiations between D'Arcy and Ottoman Government in 1909. His Majesty's Government attach greatest importance to granting of concession. Requested to inform his Government	105

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
146	To Board of Trade .. „ India Office	..	Mar. 18, 1913	New customs depôt at Bagdad. Asks for observations on No. 128	105
147	To India Office ..	..	18,	Wireless on Trucial Coast. Refers to No. 120. Agrees that Debai preferable. Deprecates starting operations till negotiations with Hakki concluded	106
148	Sir G. Lowther ..	202	13,	Smyrna – Aidin Railway. Refers to Part VIII, No. 161. Company's Constantinople agent has received no instructions since January, when he was told not to press the matter for the moment	106
149	„ „ ..	203	15,	Bitlis. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on state of uneasiness prevailing in vilayet of Bitlis	106
150	„ „ ..	206	14,	Disquieting reports from consuls in Asiatic Turkey. Murders of Armenians and looting of Christian villages	108
151	„ „ ..	149 Tel.	19,	Oil. Refers to No. 144. May protest against auction if Mr. Stock agrees ..	108
152	To Admiralty ..	..	19,	Conservancy of Shatt-el-Arab. Refers to Part VII, No. 252. "Captain of Port" preferable, but suggests "Inspector of River Conservancy"	108
153	Sir G. Lowther ..	214	18,	Bagdad Railway. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on suspension of work on ..	109
154	„ „ ..	219 Confidential	17,	Armenia. Armenian view of suggested guarantee by Europe of integrity of Asiatic Turkey	109
155	„ „ ..	157 Tel. Secret	22,	Arab unrest. Substance of No. 142 telegraphed to His Majesty's consul at Bussorah. Latter's reply..	110
155*	India Office ..	..	22,	Lighting and buoyage of Persian Gulf. Refers to No. 143*. Discusses question of erection of lighthouse on Musandim promontory	110A
156	„ „ ..	..	22,	New customs and general warehouses at Bagdad. Acknowledges No. 146. As His Majesty's Government have decided not to participate in company for Bagdad–Bussorah extension, there is no reason for delay. Protection of goods ..	110
157	To Sir G. Lowther ..	151 Tel.	25,	Oil. Refers to No. 151. Should approach Grand Vizier again	111
158	„ „ ..	152 Tel.	25,	Arab unrest. No. 155 puts matter in different light. Consul should be more careful	111
159	Sir G. Lowther ..	227 Confidential	20,	Oil. Reports interview with Mr. Whittall, representing Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate. Latter urges advantages of amalgamation	111
160	„ „ ..	165 Tel.	26,	Oil. Refers to No. 157. Grand Vizier says German group will anyhow get most valuable oil districts in virtue of Bagdad Railway concession	113
161	To Sir G. Lowther ..	89	26,	Arab unrest. Refers to No. 137. Question mentioned unofficially to Hakki Pasha ..	113

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
162	To Board of Trade ..	..	Mar. 26, 1913	Customs depôts at Bagdad. Transmits No. 156, with observations on Sir G. Lowther's despatch respecting	113
163	To India Office .. „ Board of Trade	..	26,	Mesopotamian river navigation. Refers to Nos. 25, 136 and 164. Suggests informing Hakki Pasha that His Majesty's Government would not consent to such an arrangement	113
164	To Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	26,	Lynch. Refers to No. 136. Enquires whether His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople may be informed that company do not view arrangement with favour (see No. 178)	114
165	Koweit Draft Agreement	..	..	Koweit draft agreement between Great Britain and Turkey respecting rights of Sheikh of Koweit	114
166	India Office ..	..	27,	Koweit. Transmits telegram from Resident, Bushire, regarding boundaries of ..	115
167	To India Office ..	..	27,	Koweit. Transmits draft agreement. Asks whether India Office concur	116
167*	To Sir G. Lowther ..	157 Tel.	28,	Mesopotamian oil. Refers to No. 160. To inform Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government are averse to amalgamation	116*
168	Sir G. Lowther ..	231 Secret	23,	Arab unrest. Refers to No. 155. Transmits paraphrases of telegrams	116
169	„ „ ..	233	24,	Bagdad Railway material. Refers to "Persia," Part XXXI, No. 473. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah respecting Russian enquiries concerning	117
170	„ „ ..	234	24,	Bagdad Railway material. Refers to Part VIII, No. 158. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting that Messrs. Lynch are unable for the moment to carry out the full terms of their agreement, and that material is being carried by other tugs	118
171	„ „ ..	236	24,	Arab unrest. Refers to No. 100. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah regarding demands for decentralisation on part of Arabs	118
172	„ „ ..	238	24,	Arab unrest. Transmits, with comments, despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout. Proposes decentralisation reforms in that vilayet	120
173	„ „ ..	239	24,	Oil. Refers to No. 134. Has again pressed Messrs. D'Arcy's case. Grand Vizier urges amalgamation	121
174	„ „ ..	172 Tel.	28,	Arab unrest. Transmits further telegram from consul at Bussorah	122
175	„ „ ..	174 Tel.	29,	Arab unrest. In view of No. 158, consul at Bussorah asks if he should inform sheikh that His Majesty's Government cannot help them in way proposed	122
176	„ „ ..	241	26,	Arab unrest. Refers to "Turkish War," Part VI, No. 308. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem reporting further on dissatisfaction among Bedouins in the Beersheba district	122

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
177	Sir G. Lowther ..	245	Mar. 27, 1913	Mosul. Transmits despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul on the subject of British influence in that district ..	123
178	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	29,	Mesopotamian river navigation. Refers to No. 164. No foundation for report of inability to carry railway material. Knows of no scheme for formation of permanent transport company. Transmits letter to Deutsche Bank	125
179	To Mr. Greenway ..	Confidential	31,	Oil. Asks for observations on Grand Vizier's statements as recorded in No. 150 ..	126

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. May 1913.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

Part IX.

[16] No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1913.)

(No. 1125. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a memorandum from the commercial attaché to this embassy, reporting on the subject of the rights of the Germans to the Mesopotamian oil-fields.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum by Mr. Weakley.

(Confidential.)

I SAW Mr. Edwin Whitall this morning on the subject of the rights of the Germans to the Mesopotamian oil-fields. He said that, for the private information of the embassy, he would state that a company had recently been formed for acquiring the rights over all the petroleum-fields in Turkey in Asia and to work them. The group consisted of the Royal Asiatic Company, the Batavian Company, the Deutsche Bank, the National Bank of Turkey, the Shell Transport Company, as well as other firms interested in petroleum, and this new company had taken over the rights of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways in respect of the 20-kilom. zone on either side of the railway lines conceded by the conventions, as well as those over the petroleum-fields which had already been acquired by the Deutsche Bank. He was a director of the new company, and was associated with Mr. Gunther, the sub-director of the Anatolian Railway Company, in looking after the new company's affairs in Constantinople.

D'Arcy had been working for a number of years to obtain the concession of the Mesopotamian oil-fields, but beyond a verbal promise which, Mr. Whitall understood, Nichols had got from Hussein Hilmi Pasha when Grand Vizier, D'Arcy's negotiations had not led to anything. (In fact, D'Arcy had done nothing for the last two or three years, and it would seem as though he had retired from the field altogether.) Mr. Whitall had written to London suggesting that D'Arcy might be approached with a view to his joining the new company, which was practically a British concern, as he thought that about 75 per cent. of the capital would be British. Mr. Whitall thought some negotiations had already taken place with D'Arcy, and that there had been some hitch, but he had no knowledge of what had occurred.

With regard to German rights to the concession of the Mesopotamian oil-fields, Mr. Whitall said he was thoroughly conversant with the question, as he had all the

dossier dealing with the subject. If the information required on the matter was purely for the information of the embassy, he was prepared to give all the details, but if it was to be used, it was only natural, that as a director of the company, he was unable to say anything. He would, however, state that the Germans had carefully followed all the phases of the question, and taken such steps has had appeared necessary to protect their rights, which were absolutely secure, more than this he could not say. Nichols, whilst in Constantinople, had obtained an idea of the drift of the correspondence which had been exchanged between the Government and the Germans, but Mr. Whitall did not think Nichols had seen any of the documents, nor had he obtained copies of them. Nichols, however, had no knowledge of the correspondence exchanged subsequently, after he had left Constantinople.

E. WEAKLEY.

December 27, 1912.

---

[16] No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 2, 1913.

YOUR despatch No. 1125 of 28th December: Mesopotamian oilfields.

Please report fully what are the rights of the Germans.

Our present information is to the effect that the new combination is not predominantly British. I should like to know precisely what Mr. Whittall means by his statement that 75 per cent. of the capital will be British.

[55374] No. 3.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 3, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 23rd November, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Marquess of Crewe, copy of a despatch received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reporting the result of private enquiries made of the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the reply of the Ottoman Government to the British memorandum of the 18th July last.

Sir E. Grey is of the opinion that no action can usefully be taken until the Turkish Government renew their demand for the customs increase, which, he is given to understand, is likely to occur at no distant date.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

---

[456] No. 4.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 4, 1913.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, December* 13, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 9, dated the 24th November, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Government of India, requesting instructions regarding the intimation to foreign consuls and others of the establishment of gas-buoys and lights at Bushire, Bahrein, and elsewhere.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure in No. 4.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, December* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to address the Government of India on the subject of the communication, if any, to be made to foreign consular officials at Bushire of the establishment of lights at various points in the Gulf.

2. In 1905 the commander of the R.I.M.S. "Investigator," after readjusting the buoys in the Shatt-el-Arab, asked me to notify foreign consuls at Muscat, Bushire, and Bussorah by telegraph of the new positions. I requested the Government of India to give me instructions on this point, and was informed that there seemed to be no objection to copies of the notice sent to agents of British steam-ship companies being communicated to foreign consuls. These instructions, however, did not reach me in time, and accordingly, as explained in my letter dated the 18th June, 1905, I took no specific steps to acquaint my consular colleagues, but the notice to mariners had already been shown informally to the agent of the Russian steam-ship line and the director of customs.

The position has considerably developed since then, and it therefore seems best to ask for fresh instructions.

3. Notices to mariners regarding the establishment of lights will have to be issued shortly in respect of the following items of our scheme:—

(1.) Tanb lighthouse.
(2.) Bahrein gas-buoys.
(3.) Shatt-el-Arab gas-buoys.
(4.) Bushire and Bunder Abbas gas-buoys.

I will deal seriatim with each of the above.

4. *Tanb Lighthouse.*—In this case we are establishing a light on territory owned by the Chief of Shargah, with his express permission and consent. There seems, therefore, no objection to our communicating, when the time comes, a copy of the notice regarding the lighthouse as issued to British shipping companies simultaneously to foreign consular representatives at Bushire for communication to their nationals.

5. *Bahrein Lighted Buoys.*—The special position which His Majesty's Government occupies in regard to Bahrein is generally recognised by foreign Governments, other than Turkey and Persia, and there therefore seems no objection to the political agent, Bahrein, notifying the establishment of gas-buoys both to British and foreign shipping companies in his jurisdiction.

6. *Gas-buoys on Shatt-el-Arab Bar.*—Our position here is as stated in the note of His Majesty's Government of the 18th July, 1912, to the Porte, and it therefore seems reasonable that we should adopt the same line of action as in the case of Tanb lighthouse.

7. *Gas-buoys at Bushire and Bunder Abbas.*—Our position in regard to these buoys is still somewhat indefinite; should His Majesty's Government decide to seek a general recognition of our prescriptive right to control buoyage and lighting in the Gulf, as suggested in my letter dated the 13th October, 1912, it seems reasonable that we should adopt, in the case of these lights also, the action suggested in the previous cases discussed; and, in addition, an intimation of the establishment of these particular lights might be sent to the local Government (as in the past, when buoys were laid in the harbour by Government) and also to the Customs, for the information of the commander of the "Persepolis" and of the customs launches.

If they sought to enter into correspondence or raise an issue, we must be prepared to make an explicit assertion of our prescriptive rights in the matter.

8. It is expected that the gas-buoys at Bahrein and Bushire will be established within the next three weeks. I therefore solicit a telegraphic reply with reference to paragraphs 5 and 7 of the above.

9. In order to save time, I am sending a copy of this letter to His Majesty's Foreign and India Offices and to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, in continuation of previous correspondence.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

---

[430] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1913.)

(No. 1127.) *Constantinople, December 30, 1912.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 571 of the 19th instant, respecting the Bagdad consular guard, I have the honour to inform you that I see no objection to the continued employment of a Hindu detachment. In view of the rather prevalent idea among ignorant Turks that almost all India is Mahommedan, and that "the English there rely solely on Islam," it would seem well, as pointed out by the political resident in Turkish Arabia, that the Moslems of the Bagdad regions should see that there are also loyal and smart Hindu sepoys in the Indian army.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[431] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1913.)

(No. 1128.) *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1113 of the 25th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting on the relations between the Ajeymi-bin-Sadun and the authorities of the vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 54.) *Bussorah, December 7, 1912.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Ajeymi-bin-Sadun, in reply to the vilayet letter, stated that "he had not cut the stick of obedience" as reported, and that the reason he approached Bussorah was—first, to settle his tribes of Beni Malik and others in the pasture lands; and, secondly, because he had heard from Nassriyeh and Khamissieh that orders had been issued by the vilayet declaring him to be a robber, and forbidding the villagers to supply him and his men with provisions. He stated that he was astonished at this treatment, as he had no rebellious intentions.

Ajeymi also addressed a friendly letter to Seyyid Talib Bey, asking for his good offices with the Government.

The vilayet would apparently have some grounds for declaring Ajeymi to be a robber, in view of the latter's treatment of his cousin Mizied Pasha, as reported in my despatch No. 50 of the 24th October last.

The messengers dispatched by the vilayet, who visited Ajeymi's camp, recommended the local authorities to be on their guard against surprises as long as Ajeymi remained in the neighbourhood. A mazoata, signed by the Christian priests and notables of Bussorah, was telegraphed to the authorities at Constantinople, approving the measures taken for the defence of the town and praising the zeal of Seyyid Talib Bey.

Brigadier-General Ali Reza Pasha, commander of the 13th Army Corps, has now arrived at Bussorah from Bagdad as acting vali, and brought with him 367 men of the 109th and 111th regiments, 2 mountain guns and 12 gunners included in those numbers. His Majesty's ship "Sphinx" left on Wednesday for Mohammerah on her way to Bombay. The town is perfectly quiet, and there seems no reason to anticipate any trouble.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

---

[500] No. 7.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 4.)

Sir, *India Office, January 3, 1913.*

IN continuation of my letter of the ~~2nd~~ 31st December, 1912, I am directed to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegram of the 28th December as to the desirability of obtaining from the Persian Government a general recognition of the right of His Majesty's Government to control the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf.

The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Government of India that, unless a really favourably opportunity offers, as to which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is in the best position to judge, it will be better not to approach the Persian Government on the general question pending the completion of the lighting and buoyage scheme now in the course of execution. It would seem advisable in any case to await the reply of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the memorandum communicated to him on the 11th December last, as reported in Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 635 of the 15th idem, regarding the proposed lighthouse on Sheikh Shuaib Island.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

---

[570] No. 8.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1913.)

(No. 1129.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

IN my despatch No. 1036, Confidential, of the 4th December, I had the honour to comment on a certain movement—the reflex of the main current of recent events in the Balkans—among the Armenians. They would seem to feel that now that article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin has eventuated in the freeing of the Macedonians, the time has come to deal with the provinces affected by article 61 of the same treaty. Recent despatches from His Majesty's consular officers at Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, &c., would point to an increase in these expectations of the Armenians; while their communities in Geneva, Paris, Marseilles, America, Egypt, and notably in the Caucasus, would seem to cherish the hope that the present chapter of Balkan history will not be closed by Europe without the commencement of a better era for the Asiatic provinces inhabited by the Armenians.

Here in the capital—though for obvious reasons the movement is not so overt as, *e.g.*, in the Caucasus—the Armenian community, numbering over 150,000 souls, is also preoccupied with the immediate future of their "millet" (nation). On an intimation from the Armenian Catholicos, George V, or supreme spiritual head of the Armenian Church, who resides at Etchmiazin, in the Caucasus, it has been decided to appoint as bishop of the Armenian communities in Europe Mgr. Ormanian, who was Patriarch during the last twelve years of Abdul Hamid's reign, and who was unceremoniously deposed by the violent agitation of the Tashnag Armenians, allied to the Committee of Union and Progress, shortly after the inauguration of the Young Turkey régime in 1908. False charges of simony and corruption were trumped up against him, and now that the majority of the Tashnags have broken off their alliance with the Committee of Union and Progress, owing to its failure to carry out any of its promises and undertakings to the Armenians, the Armenian patriarchate and the National Assembly are taking steps to exonerate and rehabilitate Mgr. Ormanian before he proceeds to Europe, where part of his mission will be to make known and plead the cause of the Armenians in European centres. Although over 70 years of age he is hale and vigorous, and is conversant with French and Italian. In his youth he studied for the Roman Catholic Church, and spent some twenty years at Rome. Owing to differences with the Vatican he reverted to the national or Gregorian Armenian Church, of which he has written a rather able history in French, translated into English by G. Marcar Gregory, V.D. He was eight years Bishop of Erzeroum, and is well acquainted with the conditions in that vilayet, as also those of Van, Bitlis, and the adjacent regions. Some of the extreme Tashnags are still opposing his rehabilitation, but it is expected that they will fall into line.

The son of Boghos Nubar Pasha is reported to have endeavoured to enlist the sympathies of M. Poincaré in th Armenian cause and to have also spoken on the subject

to Rifaat Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, urging that the reforms of 1895 should be put into execution by the Porte of its own initiative. On receipt of Rifaat Pasha's reports on the subject, Reshid Bey, the Minister of the Interior, with the sanction of the Council of Ministers, drew up a fresh scheme for the improvement of the conditions in four of the six Eastern Anatolian vilayets, and a Ministerial commission, composed of the Grand Vizier; Gabriel Effendi; the Minister of the Interior; and Damad Sherif Pasha, Minister of Public Instruction, has discussed the matter with four prominent Armenians, viz., Mgr. Ormanian; Diran Kelekian, formerly Secretary-General of the Patriarchate, and now chief editor of the "Sabah" newspaper; Gulpenkian, an Armenian established in England; and Dr. Djavarian, deputy for Sivas. These Armenians urged that the scheme should apply not to four, but to the six, vilayets to which the 1895 reforms were applicable, viz., Erzeroum, Van, Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir, and Sivas; and this was agreed to in principle, it being also decided to divide the six provinces into two groups, the first comprising Bitlis, Van, and Erzeroum, with head-quarters at the latter town, and the second Sivas, Diarbekir and Kharput (also called Mamouret-ul-Aziz), with head-quarters at Kharput. The valis of the six provinces would be abolished, and each province reduced to a sanjak with a mutessarif as governor, while each of the two groups would be administered by a commission sitting at the head-quarters and composed of seven members, to wit: two Armenians, two Moslems, and two foreigners, with a third foreigner as president, the latter preferably English. The gendarmerie and police would be officered by Europeans, while there would also be European judicial inspectors. The military forces in each group of provinces would be under the command of a marshal, who would also be inspector-general. The Armenians consulted by the commission further advocated that the local revenues should be assigned to the provinces, that the tribite, called "khafir," levied by Kurdish chieftains from Armenian villagers, in addition to the Government taxes paid by them, should be definitely abolished; that the pleadings in the courts should be optionally in the local languages, Kurdish and Armenian, while Government offices would also accept petitions in these languages; that no converts to Islam should be accepted under the age of 21 years, and that lands of which Armenians had been dispossessed by Kurds during and after the massacres of 1896–97 should be restored to their original owners, the present occupants being indemnified if necessary.

While these matters were under discussion at the commission, the Armenian Patriarch and community informed the Government that the four Armenians consulted by the commission were not representative, as they had not been chosen by the National Assembly of the Armenian "millet." It would appear that while the Patriarch and his council are loth at the present stage to appeal to foreign Governments, the four Armenians in question and a section of the community would prefer that a Government scheme should be drawn up and that an endeavour should be made to induce Europe to have the matter discussed and sanctioned by the meeting of Ambassadors in London or a European Congress, should it be decided to convene one to give the *imprimatur* of Europe to the changes of the Treaty of Berlin resulting from the Balkan war. There is, however, in Armenian circles a growing conviction, based on the bitter experiences of the last odd thirty years, that the Turkish Government is incapable of executing real reforms in non-Turkish Ottoman provinces, that a general European guarantee, even on a Lebanon basis, as suggested in the enclosure in your despatch No. 560 of the 11th instant, cannot, owing to international divergences of interest and rivalries, be effective, that the time is gone by for palliatives based on *status quo* theories and that nothing short of autonomy or the cessation of direct Turkish administrative rule in such provinces will meet the necessities of the present time. The holders of these views would prefer to see Europe give a mandate to Russia, as was given to Austria in 1878, to take in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to introduce reforms in the six vilayets under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The Turco-Russian railway agreement as to the basin of the Black Sea and the corresponding self-denying arrangement as to the north-eastern provinces of Asia Minor accepted by Germany at Potsdam, seem to them to have simplified such a solution from the international stand-point. Many thinking Armenians are of opinion that rivalry between Russia and England has only resulted in wholesale massacre and decades of grinding and crushing misrule, while the fact that the two Powers are now on friendly terms is conducing towards a drastic and final settlement of Macedonian and other Balkan problems, and should, they think, be of hopeful augury for the future of the Armeno-Kurdish provinces of Asiatic Turkey. They were suspicious of Russia in 1878 and hoped much from England when article 16 of the Treaty of San Stephano was converted into the 61st article of the Treaty of Berlin and England took over the administration of Cyprus. England's efforts of the last century,

and after the Sassun massacres in 1894, to ameliorate the state of things in Armenia were fruitless partly owing to the coldness and indifference of Russia and her suspicions that England was aiming at the creation of a buffer state of anti-Russian leanings as in the case of Bulgaria under the Stambulof régime. This attitude of mind of Russia and her aversion from reforms under British auspices were, they feel, largely responsible for the untoward result of the reforms of 1895 which were heralded in by massacres of from 80,000 to 100,000 Armenians and were succeeded by fifteen years of draconian methods spelling even a worse extensive "elimination" of the Armenian element. They notice that while the Armenians in the Caucasus enjoy security, become prosperous, and now number close on 2,000,000, those in Turkey, who in the ordinary course would have increased to 3,000,000 to 4,000,000, have been reduced by massacre, forced emigration, decrease of the birth-rate owing to enforced separation of parents during years, &c., to about 1,750,000. Russia has recently been more friendly disposed towards the Armenians, and her geographical proximity to the Armenian plateau gives her a position of advantage for affording protection to its inhabitants, while, as Lord Salisbury stated in a public speech, the British fleet cannot cross the Taurus.

The Armenians, perhaps, come nearest to the Turks of the many races in the Ottoman Empire, and in the past have rendered great services to the Turkish State. They threw in their lot wholeheartedly with the Turks in the change of régime in 1908, and were all the more disheartened by the massacre of some 15,000 at Adana in 1909, a massacre which, they say, they have excellent proof were directly organised by the Committee of Union and Progress. They have now lost hope in any Turkish régime, and feel that nothing short of most drastic treatment of their problem will ensure them security of existence and the opportunity of progressing under modern conditions.

Armenian records show that some 90,000 were massacred under Sultan Mahmoud in the beginning of the last century, and that some 45,000 were massacred at the time of the Crimean war. The Hamidian system aimed at uprooting them from the soil, destroying the peasantry, and driving them into the towns. They have a hope that under Russian ægis many would return, and that they may be able to rebuild their race on the nucleus of peasantry still left in Eastern Asia Minor. As in the case of the "reforms" of 1895 for the six vilayets, the Armenians in the vilayet of Adana and in the north of the province of Aleppo, numbering over 150,000, have not as yet been included in the scheme now under consideration at the Porte. They are under the spiritual jurisdiction of the Catholicos of Sis, and are the remnant of the descendants of the inhabitants of the Armenian State which, under the princes of the Rupenian dynasty, existed in Cilicia during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries until the country was annexed to Egypt. Cut off by the Taurus range from the provinces of the Armenian tableland, they differ by tradition and historical association from their countrymen in the Van, Bitlis, &c., districts. As the Bagdad Railway traverses Cilicia and the Germans have been interesting themselves in other enterprises in those regions, it is surmised that, in the event of a threatened break-up of the Ottoman State, Germany might be led, as in the case of her vested rights in Morocco, to give a direct affirmation to her special interests there. The Armenians have not forgotten that the Bagdad Railway concession was obtained by the German Emperor from the ex-Sultan at the time that the former demonstratively condoned the Armenian massacres, and many of them say the concession was obtained "at the price of Armenian blood." They would consequently not be disposed to welcome a German advent into Cilicia and the adjoining country.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[571] No. 9.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1913.)

(No. 1130.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 30, 1912.*

I SPOKE to Gabriel Effendi Noroundounghian to-day on the subject of the reply given by Sir L. Mallet to Sir Charles Schwann, M.P., about the Armenians, in the sense of your despatch No. 560 of the 18th instant.

I had already taken an opportunity of a visit I paid to the Sheikh-ul-Islam some time ago to tell his Highness what an excellent effect the message sent by him to the

authorities in Asia Minor enjoining forbearance and good treatment of the Christian elements had had.

Gabriel Effendi to-day said that the Cabinet had recently been considering the general question of the measures to be taken to improve the relations existing between Armenians and Kurds and for the amelioration of the lot of the former. His Excellency said that Armenians were satisfied that the present Government was sincerely desirous of introducing measures in their favour, but they were apprehensive as to the stability of the existing Cabinet, the kind of Government that might succeed it, and especially as to the danger that an Ottoman Parliament with Turcification tendencies might not condemn any project on decentralisation lines. In his Excellency's opinion what was primarily necessary was a first-rate gendarmerie, reliable courts of justice, and a commission which could establish the amount of compensation in land or in money to be given to the victims in those cases where the land could not be restored to their proper owners, and above all the putting into execution of any scheme that might be drawn up and sanctioned.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[572] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6, 1913.)

(No. 1131.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo on the subject of anti-Turkish agitation which is manifesting itself among the Kurds. It is interesting to compare this despatch and its enclosures with the extract from the despatch from the acting vice-consul at the Dardanelles, forwarded to you in my despatch No. 1118 of the 25th December. Both accounts agree that the relations between Kurds and Arabs on the one hand and Turks on the other are strained, and both emphasise the, to us, embarrassing fact that the Kurds and Arabs show marked friendliness to the British.

In my despatch No. 1036, Confidential, I drew attention to the other marked characteristic in the situation in Asiatic Turkey, the gradual inclination of the Armenians and even of the Tashnackist element, towards Russia. In Tashnackist circles here it is said that at a meeting of Armenians recently held in the Caucasus, it was decided to hold an Armenian conference, and to send a deputation of leading Armenians to plead the Armenian cause in the European capitals. The names of the deputies are even mentioned, and include those of Prince Abalmalik Lazaref, M. Loris Melikof, and M. Nubar, son of the late Nubar Pasha. I am told that the Prince is a person of great wealth, and holds a position at the Russian court, and that M. Loris Melikof, who is believed to be the son of the famous general, bears a name that carries great weight in Russia. The rumours that have so far reached me are too vague to enable me to state whether the gentlemen have actually been approached, but it seems certain that they would not mix themselves up in any pro-Armenian agitation unless it had the active support of the Russian Government. His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh could doubtless ascertain whether there is any truth in the rumours that connect their names with an active Armenian movement.

I only refer here to the Armenian question as it seems possible that two irreconcilable movements in Turkey in Asia may develop on lines which may prove very inconvenient to ourselves. The Arabs and the Kurds on the one hand with a strong leaning towards Egypt and Great Britain, and the Armenians on the other, under the tutelage of Russia. The Russian threat to Turkey that should she resume hostilities against the Bulgarians, in certain circumstances, she may have to reconsider her neutrality, may not be without its bearing on the latter movement.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Consul Fontana to Sir Gerard Lowther

(No. 78. Confidential.)
Sir, *Aleppo, December 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 47 of the 1st and 48 of the 2nd instant, reporting the arrival at Biredjik of the eldest son of the late Ibrahim Pasha, of Veran Shehir, with 4,000 Hamidieh cavalry, the flight of the Christians from the town, the project of the other Milli Kurds and horsemen to join Ibn Ibrahim should he give the signal, and the intention of the Hamidieh, as expressed by themselves, to come to Aleppo to plunder the town, I have the honour herewith to transmit the copy of an interesting letter addressed to me from Beyrout by Mr. Woolley, the director of the excavations undertaken by the British Museum at Jerablus, dealing with the Kurdish movement which he believes to be, or likely to become, a serious one.

As soon as I received the information set forth in my telegram No. 47, I called on the Governor-General and communicated to him in confidence the chief points contained therein. He promised to telegraph to the Minister of the Interior recommending that the Hamidieh, if not urgently required at Constantinople, should be sent back to their homes. But he subsequently informed me that no reply had been returned to his telegram, and that the Hamidieh were proceeding quietly on towards the capital.

Two reasons are suggested for the drafting of these irregular cavalry troops to Constantinople. The one is that the Government are withdrawing them from their own district so as to lessen the danger of trouble there at this crisis, and the other that they are to be employed in suppressing any revolutionary movement on the part of the young Turkish party at Constantinople, of which Ibn Ibrahim is alleged to be the bitter enemy.

I have not so far heard of any depredation committed by the Hamidieh regiments after leaving Aintab, though there, as well as at Biredjik, they seem to have taken what they wanted from grocer's and other shops without payment. Each regiment is accompanied, it seems, by a Turkish officer. The likelihood of the conclusion of peace, and of the retention of Constantinople by the Ottoman Government is calculated to discourage the Hamidieh and the other Kurds from any widespread and perilous movement or rising for the time being. Were, however, any active movement contemplated among the Arabs in order to deliver Syria from the Ottoman rule, the Kurds would probably join them, if only in the hope of plundering the towns. The Arabs of Aleppo and of the district in general seem sincerely desirous to rid themselves of the present Government, and to obtain a British or Egyptian protectorate over Syria. Secret meetings are being held, and this is some idea of transmitting to His Majesty's Government a monster petition, signed by thousands of local Arabs, begging Great Britain to take over the administration of the country.

I have, &c.
R. A. FONTANA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Mr. Woolley to Consul Fontana.

(Extract.) *Beirout, December 5, 1912.*

AS you know, the Milli Kurds have not forgiven the death of their old leader Ibrahim Pasha, who was poisoned by the Young Turks. Recently one of his sons—named, I fancy, Abdul Hamid—died suddenly at Diarbekir, and this also is attributed to poison, and will further irritate the Kurds. Ibn Ibrahim Pasha is said to be more capable, more powerful, and more ambitious than was his father, and he is certainly looked up to by the Kurds as their common leader. He has rebuilt his father's capital, Veran Shehir, which the Turks had destroyed. Mr. Lawrence, some time ago, was shown by the Sheikh of the Harran the vaults of the old crusader's castle there stocked with 8,000 to 10,000 Martini's and ammunition; all the confederacy was, of course, equipped by Abdul Hamid as an irregular army of Hamidieh, and they are well supplied with rifles and ammunition which, though not of a modern type, are as good as the Turks would be likely to use against them. The Sheikh of the Harran told Lawrence that these weapons would be used when Ibn Ibrahim Pasha went to Aleppo to avenge his father. From what we have been told by Buscawi Agha, both when he was stopping

with us and when I was over at his place, this vengeance is to be taken fairly soon, and is to be part of a bigger move. He, and the leaders like him, talk freely of getting rid for good and all of the Turkish Government. They believe that the opportune moment has come, or is coming, and that the power of the Central Government at Stamboul is broken for good. They talk of a conspiracy into which have entered the Khedive of Egypt, the Shereef of Mecca, the Sheikh-es-Senussi, and Ibn Rashid, whose object is to expel the Turks and to set up an Arab Sultan, apparently at Bagdad as capital. The Kurds say that they are not strong enough to set up a Sultan of their own, and would "Arabism"—they are certainly on good terms with their Arab neighbours. We hear that since the terms of peace with Italy were made known, there have been secret meetings of the leading Arabs in Aleppo, Damascus, and elsewhere, condemning Turkey's betrayal of the Arabs, and proposing to turn out the Turks and take over the Government; how far this is true we do not know, but it agrees with the statements made by the Kurds as to Arab co-operation.

In our part of the country the news of Turkish defeats and the rumoured fall of Stamboul were received with undisguised satisfaction. As long as the Sultan was also the Khalif, the religious bond held the Kurds and Arabs to the Empire was strong, but with Abdul Hamid's deposition this bond was snapped. The only Khalif recognised is the Shereef of Mecca, and the new Government's at a Pan-Islamic rally has wholly failed. The Bulgarian victories have not even raised ill-feeling against foreigners.

If a smash comes it is undoubtedly the Kurds who will take the initiative. They frankly state their intention of rising and spoke of hostilities as imminent; in fact, they are already on the move. But their plans seem to be clearly enough concealed.

During the war the Kurds have not raised a finger to help the Turks; the few so-called volunteers who joined did so with orders from their chiefs to desert as soon as they had had rifles served out to them. Now they have in a body volunteered for service at the front, and have actually risen in arms to make good their words. In private they continue to talk treason, and say that they have not the slightest intention of joining against the Bulgarians or of helping the Government. They all (so far as we have talked to them) agree that their objective is Aleppo, and they all freely talk of looting that town and of sacking the German railway (Bagdadbahn, sections Aleppo–Jerablus) and of killing the engineers. Individuals have told me precisely what loot they hope to get out of a particular German settlement, and they are rather annoyed because they believe that Shahin Bey's son has gone to Aleppo (where I saw him this week) to mark out the best houses for plunder. But if asked directly why they are going to Aleppo, they say, "To eat."

The facts are that Ibn Ibrahim Pasha, with 4,000 men, having been reported as on his way to Bitlis to repel Russian aggressions, suddenly turned up at Biredjik, where he was a week ago, with his men well in hand.

Dereg (or Derai), who, with 845 men, was in Biredjik twelve days ago, moved to Nisib, where his men did some small looting; and when they met the Government's doctor, sent by the Aleppo authorities to accompany them, Dereg, finding that he was an Armenian and a Christian, shot him in the street, where his body was still lying when Mr. Lawrence was there two days later. Incidentally, Mr. Lawrence found that the Kurdish hill villagers north of Nisib were in a state of great excitement, running round with fire-arms and looking for another Christian to kill. It was only the fact that Mr. Lawrence was in disguise that saved him from serious trouble. In Nisib and Biredjik the Christians are all in hiding. From Nisib Dereg went to Aintab, where he does not seem to have done any harm. He left there the other day, and we have not heard of his movements. Musta Pasha, with a force estimated at from 7,000 to 9,000 men, is marching slowly westwards from the Tigris (Gezoiret-ibn-Omar). Busrawi Agha and Shahin Bey have not yet moved, but are awaiting orders from Ibn Ibrahim. It is noteworthy that the blood feud which has lasted for years between the clans was suddenly patched up about a fortnight ago, and these two now prefer to be friends, whereas when I was with them during Bairam the followers of the one did not venture into the country of the other. Busrawi can put some 2,000 men into the field; Shahin, 1,200. All these numbers refer to mounted men, armed with Martinis. A vastly greater number could be called out, and, if foot soldiers were taken also, then Busrawi ought to lead out about 20,000 men (if he can arm them all), and the others in proportion. All these men are wild fighters in their own way and deadly in street fighting. They would not be any good against good European troops.

At present, as you see, the Kurds in the field are just wandering about. They are more or less in hand, each force is accompanied by a Turkish officer, and they claim to be loyal volunteers. As such they have to be fed at Government's expense, or at any

rate are licensed by the Government to feed at the expense of others. This, I believe, is one of their objects. The awful winter of two years ago frightened them as well as impoverishing them greatly, and, so long as they live well at Government cost, they are not likely to make trouble, but will be glad to tide so cheaply over the winter. Moreover, not all their forces are yet under arms, and perhaps the conspiracy is not yet ripe; also they are still waiting on news from Europe, and if that should favour the Turks, the whole trouble may yet pass over and the Kurds retire harmlessly to their houses. Personally I do not think they will, but it is possible. Personally, too, I think that the reasons above given will keep them in check for a while unless an accident happens; at least until they see what the winter is going to be like.

It seems that their idea is to wander about (possibly they may go to Zeitoun) until their forces are out, and quietly to concentrate in Aleppo. Probably until the last moment they would pass as volunteers, and when they are all there—and when their men could no longer resist the temptation—would sack the place.

Apart from the idea of avenging Ibrahim Pasha, the leaders have chosen Aleppo as their first place of attack with a view to securing field-guns, for they are perfectly aware of the need of artillery if they are to fight with Turkish regulars. As to their chances, you know that most of the artillery at Aleppo is served by Kurds, who would go over at a word; there are a few Christian soldiers there, practically no Turks; the mass are either Kurds, who would at once rejoin their tribal chiefs, or Arabs, who would, in so far as they are drawn from the coast towns, run away, and, in so far as they come from the interior, join the Kurds. The Arabs of our own villages, Aneizet and Beny Seyyid, openly state that they would join in the rising as soon as the signal was given, and they would materially strengthen the revolutionary party. I have very little doubt that they could sack Aleppo and drive the Turkish officials out of North Syria; but greatly doubt whether they have the cohesion or the powers of organisation to build up anything on the destruction which they would cause. On the other hand, a certain foresight was shown by Busrawi's remark to us that it was too late to do away with the railway, but it might be made to serve Arab rather than German interests by acting as a link to tie more closely the Kurds and Arabs of the north with those of Bagdad and the Yemen. The whole country is Anglophil, and the leaders certainly very much so, nor do they intend violence against foreigners as such. Only the engineers on the German railway are marked out for murder. This is due to their personal unpopularity. The moral effect of the construction of the line has been bad; it has for the first time introduced to the country Arab, a low class of European—Greek and Italian foremen, &c.—and some of the higher German officials have earned the hatred of the people by their arrogant and even brutal treatment of them. But it is almost certain that if they were killed the leaders would not have their men sufficiently in hand to prevent a more general massacre, in which not only native Christians but all foreigners would be involved.

---

[573] No. 11.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January 6, 1913.*)

(No. 1132.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

I HAVE read with interest the minute by Mr. Hurst on the subject of the German claims to oil concessions in Mesopotamia which you were good enough to forward to me in your despatch No. 575 of the 23rd of this month, and am in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Hurst.

I would point out that we have never had any documentary evidence from Mr. Nichols to prove that the German rights under the 1901 convention have lapsed. The impression has always been that the Germans have based their claim on their convention with the civil list, and certainly the last article of that agreement, which gives the Germans a preferential right, would in itself dispense with the necessity of a new arrangement.

The Germans should, in my opinion, be pushed into the open in this matter, and this could be done by Mr. D'Arcy, whose agent ought to be here to maintain his claims to the oilfields, and to insist upon the fulfilment of the promises which he has, as he maintains, received.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[574] No. 12.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 1133.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1083 of the 17th instant relative to the state of affairs in Eastern Anatolia, I have the honour to report that whereas, as yet, there has been no serious disturbance in these districts, the various discontented elements would all seem to be anxiously awaiting the outcome of the present European and Turkish crisis. The state of Eastern Anatolia may, indeed, be summarised as one of effervescent anticipation, and it is impossible to predict to what lengths this excitement may not go in a few months time.

Towards the end of November the Rev. Knapp, who has been in charge of British and American interests at Bitlis, manifested some anxiety as to the safety of Europeans and Christians in that district. The danger, it appears, was expected to be brought on by the desire of the Tashnagists and the members of the Committee of Union and Progress to discredit the Government by provoking disorders and possible massacres. Bitlis was, at the time, without troops, and the weakness of the central authorities had recently been emphasised by their allowing a certain notorious Moussa Bey, whom they had only just banished from the district, to make a public and even triumphal return to his own village.

By the beginning of December the position at Bitlis seems, however, to have improved, and the anxiety on Mr. Knapp's part, at least, to have been diminished by the protection of American interests having been entrusted to the Russians. It is noticeable in this connection that Mr. Knapp would appear to regard Russian intervention as the only possible solution to the question of the continued disorders in Eastern Anatolia, and that he expresses a hope "that the Great Powers may be sufficiently disinterested to give such a mandate to Russia, at least, until the present danger is past."

The weakness of the Ottoman authorities in Bitlis was further illustrated by their favourable reception of the notorious Said Ali, the supposed murderer of the Tashnagist leader Raphael, and by the commission to his "protection" of practically the whole of the Hizan region.

In the district of Mosul, with the exception of a few minor incidents, order has been well maintained by the acting governor, Essad Bey. Mr. Honey also reports the continued activity of Russia and Russian agents in this district. The head of the Nestorians, Mar Shimun, has, it appears, been promised Russian protection, while the important Kurdish Aga, Sadik of Neri, has also placed himself in Russian hands, an example which is about to be followed it seems by the Sheikh of Bazan.

As regards the Turko-Persian frontier, Mr. Honey reports that the Turkish troops have been withdrawn from the whole of the debateable zone, with the exception of a few soldiers which have been retained at Bané and Serdesat. The Russians moreover have, it appears, occupied Tergavvar.

In this connection I have the honour to enclose copies of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, which also contains much interesting information regarding the position of the Armenians and other Christian races in the Van district, and which strikingly illustrates the general attitude of Turkish provincial public opinion towards the disasters of the present war.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I have the honour also to enclose copies of a further despatch which I have this moment received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van reporting on the assassination of a prominent Kurd by Armenians as a revenge for the murder of the Tashnagist leader Raphael.

G. L.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Van, December 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a report on the present situation in the vilayet of Van.

During my absence a new vali, Ahmed Izzet Bey, has replaced Hakki Bey, who fell with the Young Turk party. Izzet Bey is a Kurd by origin, and as such, should be able to exercise an influence over the Kurd population which has been denied previous valis. Since his arrival, with the exception of one incident—the assassination of the Tashnagist "Raphael"—the country has been remarkably free from disturbances and brigandage. Most of the Armenian notables speak in his favour. The Tashnagists of course are not content, but it should be borne in mind that though the leaders of this party make a great deal of noise, and are responsible for most of the accounts of Armenian affairs which appear in the Constantinople and European press, they do not represent the opinion of the mass of the Armenian people either in this vilayet or elsewhere.

What impressed me most on my return to Van is the complete absence of any form of effervescence or fanaticism on the part of the Turks as the result of their recent misfortunes in war. The Mussulman population is fully informed as to the state of affairs, but is completely apathetic. The majority appear to have lost entire confidence in the capability of this Government, or indeed of any Ottoman Government to govern and administer the country. Illustrative of this I may mention that I recently received a telegram from Adeljivas bearing the signatures of fifty Mussulmans saying that their lives were in danger and imploring the assistance of the British consulate. In conversations I have had with educated Turks, the view has been continually expressed that the only means of saving Turkey is to obtain the services of British administrators—doubtless French ones when talking to a representative of France—for every branch of the Civil Service throughout Turkey. And they maintain that such a proposal would be accepted by the Turkish people.

Turning now to the Christian population, there seems to be a very general idea, and I may say hope, that when the Macedonian question comes up for settlement on the conclusion of the war, the Powers will review the whole situation of the Christians in Asia Minor, and take the necessary steps to guarantee an improvement in their condition. This idea is based firstly, on the misconception that the Balkan war is being waged on humanitarian grounds to redress the grievances of the Christian subject peoples of Turkey, and secondly, on the belief, for which there certainly appear to be some grounds, that there is a possibility of a Russian occupation of this and the neighbouring vilayets, either as territorial compensation, or on the pretext of protecting the Christian races. The possibility of a Russian occupation is being considerably talked about. The grounds for this belief are: the large augmentation of Russian troops in Persia, the withdrawal of the Turks under the compulsion of Russia from the Nevahi-Sharkie, and subsequent occupation of those districts by Russian troops, the numerous Russian agents, among them Abdul Rezzak, who for long past have been endeavouring to gain the sympathy of the Kurds towards Russia, and the recent journey of my Russian colleague to the Nestorian country, where he remained some days the guest of Mar Shimun, and promised political protection to his people. My own impression is that for some years past Russia has been preparing the way for some future day when it may be thought desirable and feasible to unite the Armenian race under Russian rule.

The Armenian race as a whole, though preferring to remain a nationality under Ottoman rule, could they but be allowed to develop and prosper, would accept Russian rule as the lesser of two evils. All hope they once had in the benefits from the Ottoman constitutional Government has been entirely killed, and though they recognise that Russian rule would mean absorption, an absorption which would destroy their existence as a national entity, they would accept this, the lesser evil, confident of the individual prosperity which would accrue to them.

The Tashnagist party, however, would not welcome the arrival of the Russians in Armenia. They have no intention of relinquishing their nationalistic ideals, and have had experience of the relentless way in which revolutionary propaganda is suppressed by the Russian Government. Nevertheless, Vramian, ex-Armenian Tashnagist deputy for Van, in an interview with the vali, told him in words that amounted to a threat, that should the condition of the Armenians not be bettered, a state of affairs might arise which would compel Russia to enter the country. What he meant to imply was that the Tashnagist party would create such disturbances as would cause a massacre of Armenians, and a subsequent entry of Russian troops. At the present juncture the Tashnagists, so they inform me, have put aside for the moment the idea of an autonomy, but are endeavouring to interest the Powers in their welfare to the extent of their obtaining from the Ottoman Government guarantees for the betterment of their conditions. Such guarantees to comprise the appointment

of Christians to the departments of justice, finance, gendarmerie, &c., in numbers at least equal to those of the Moslems. From what I have observed here, such an arrangement would not by any means guarantee any improvement in the lot of the Armenians. The Armenian officials in the courts of justice at Van are notoriously more corrupt than their Mussulman colleagues.

To sum up the present situation, I do not think there is any cause for fear as to the safety of the Christian population of this vilayet. Should disturbances arise the Tachnagist party will be responsible for it. The local authorities should have no difficulty in dealing successfully with any such disturbances if they wish to.

The Persian Frontier.—As your Excellency is aware, in October last Turkey evacuated the Nevahi-i-Sharkie, thus giving Russia control of the three passes into Mesopotamia, which according to reports are indefensible from the Turkish side of the mountains. The Turkish troops belonging to the 11th Army Corps were withdrawn to Deir, Bashkala, and Diza. The Turkish officials have been replaced by Persian ones. The inhabitants are said to be glad to be released from the robbery and oppression of the Turks. The Russian garrison in Persia is reported to have been greatly increased. At Igdir I was informed that the Caucasian railway had been reserved for a fortnight exclusively for the despatch of troops and munitions to Persia. Sixty thousand is the number of troops currently believed to have been sent. The Turkish authorities estimate the total number of Russian troops in Persia at 30,000. A complete division is said to have been sent to Khoi. No reliance can be placed on any of these reports. It is known by the Turkish military authorities that there are in Persia three brigades (eighteen battalions) of Russian chasseurs, but beyond that all information is vague. Travellers report the presence of Russian troops in the districts recently evacuated by the Turks.

The Nestorians.—Shortly before leaving Van I heard a report with regard to Russian agents having been sent to Julamerk with the object of enquiring into the feasibility of establishing an orthodox mission in that place. In reply to an enquiry I made as to the truth of this, the English missionary at Kudshanis tells me that Mar Shimun had informed them that his "millet" were dissatisfied with the mission on account of their being unable to give them political protection, and that it was their intention to turn to "another nation" for help. A few weeks later my Russian colleague journeyed to Kudshanis and stayed a day or two with Mar Shimun. Mar Shimun declined to give the missionaries any information as to what passed between him and the Russian consul, but the latter told them that he hoped to be able to give some help to Mar Shimun, and that he would suggest to his Government the placing of a consular agency in Julamerk. From Kudshanis the Russian consul travelled through the principal Ashiret districts, and was reported to have made lavish promises to the maliks. He then went on to Urmi. In Van it was said that he purchased numerous firearms which he took with him to present to the maliks. I do not know if it is considered desirous to exclude Russian influence from Tiari, but if this is so it could no doubt be done. The fact of Mar Shimun having relations of this kind with Russia can hardly fail to be prejudicial to the work of the Archbishop of Canterbury's mission.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16).
Van, December 16, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that a few days ago a certain Kurd of some influence, named Hajji Yakoub, together with his five companions and a gendarme, were murdered by the Armenians of a village in the Karkar district. This is a sequel to the murder of the Tashnagist Raphael.

Raphael was a Tashnagist school inspector. He and an Armenian priest, who accompanied him, were assassinated at Karkar on the 24th October last by, the Armenians stated, the emissaries of Said Ali, a notable of the Bitlis vilayet. This double assassination caused a great stir among the Armenians of those parts who, instigated by their Tashnagist chiefs, trooped into Van in some thousands to make a demonstration, and to demand guarantees from the vali for their safety. The vali

caused eighteen persons suspected of being implicated in the murders to be arrested. Of these all but three have now been released. Said Ali was not arrested as the vali said that it was not possible to find the very slightest evidence proving his implication. The Tashnagist Armenians were very discontented at this, and vowed that they would take the law into their own hands.

On the 9th December, Hajji Yakoub with five companions, went to a certain Armenian village to collect tithes. He took with him one gendarme for protection. On their arrival at the village they were attacked by a party of about fifty armed Armenians, who massacred the entire party. There is no doubt whatever that this act was intended as a retaliation for the murder of Raphael, and with the sanction also of their party chiefs.

Naturally the news of this event caused a great effervescence among the Moslems, and fears were entertained of a descent by Kurds on Armenian villages. The vali took, however, the necessary steps to prevent such an occurrence.

In a letter addressed to me recounting the incident, the vali says, "I am sure that you will concur that the above crime was premeditated exclusively with a view to destroying the peace and security which had been established in this country since the last two months, and further to nullify the efforts which I have been making to strengthen the good relations between the various elements of which the population is comprised."

Contrary to what might be expected, the Armenians are not in fear of any massacres resulting from this crime. They know that the Ottoman Government dare not allow what they consider Russia would seize as a pretext for sending her troops into the country. The Tashnagists who do not really wish to see a Russian occupation take advantage of the Turkish fears.

I have, &c.
L. MOLYNEUX-SEEL.

---

[722] No. 13.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 6.)

India Office, January 4, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th December, regarding the future of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in relation to the commercial and political position of this country in Persia and the Persian Gulf.

It now appears that there is a considerable probability that without financial support from His Majesty's Government the company will sooner or later be absorbed by the Shell Transport Company, into whose hands the British concession in Persia will presumably pass. The Marquess of Crewe recognises that this result will probably be attended by grave disadvantages to British interests in southern Persia, and ultimately in the Persian Gulf. He therefore agrees with the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that all possible support which is not of an exceptional character should be afforded to the company—for example, by means of the measures described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of their letter of the 24th December—though he does not feel certain that such support would suffice to avert their ultimate absorption. But having regard to the general situation in Persia, he does not consider that Indian interests outside the British sphere warrant him in recommending the exceptional measures desired by the company, or in throwing any additional charge on Indian revenues on that account. He would, of course, on general grounds greatly deplore the extinction of British influence in the neutral sphere; but he recognises that that is a matter the responsibility for which must rest mainly on your department, and in his opinion the vital interests of India are sufficiently safeguarded so long as the British sphere remains intact, and British power is supreme at sea and controls the entrance to the Gulf.

On the question of the use of oil by Indian railways, Lord Crewe is addressing the Government of India, and can express no opinion until he receives their reply. In the meantime it is open to the company to put a definite tender for the supply of oil before the Railway Board in India, who will then be in a position to work out the problem of the substitution of oil for coal on a commercial basis.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

---

[810] No. 14.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 2nd January.

German rights are apparently based on article 6 of the 1904 convention. They claim the right of preference, inasmuch as neither Civil List nor Minister of Finance have refunded them their expenditure plus interest, and they appear to have safeguarded such rights by protest, &c.

Messrs. Whittall reckoned [? group omitted] company as British, though from your telegram No. 608 of 12th September last year this would appear not to be the case.

---

[909] No. 15.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received January 7.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, January 6, 1913.

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, which has only just come into my hands as I have been absent from England.

I am obliged for the information that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople advising that he is making a communication in writing to the Turkish Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government hope that the concession for the Mesopotamian oil-fields will not be given to concessionnaires other than Mr. D'Arcy, and that Sir G. Lowther states that he is of opinion that these representations would be more efficacious if made whilst negotiations are being carried on with the Mining Department on behalf of Mr. D'Arcy, and accordingly suggests that a representative should be sent to Constantinople to resume negotiations with the department.

From this I conclude that, notwithstanding the contrary view expressed to me at a recent interview, Sir G. Lowther considers the present moment a favourable one for endeavouring to secure the concession. This being the case, I will discuss the matter with Mr. D'Arcy during the next few days and communicate with you again.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY, *Managing Director.*

[1026] No. 16.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 4, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general a Beirout reporting on visit of a French Messageries Maritimes steamer to the port of Djouni in the Lebanon.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 85.)
Sir, *Beirout, December 27, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 25th instant a Messageries Maritimes steamer with the French consul-general at Beirout and several members of his staff proceeded to the Lebanese port of Djouni, presumably to inaugurate the regular service of these steamers to that port under the new concession granted by the Porte in the protocol of investiture of the new governor of Mt. Lebanon.

[1158] No. 17*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 7th January, 1913, regarding the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf.

India Office, January 8, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 17*.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January 7, 1913.*

PERSIAN Gulf: Buoying and lighting.

Please see letter from Resident, Bushire, dated 13th ultimo, of which a copy was sent direct to you. It is proposed to give him authority to act as proposed in fifth and seventh paragraphs of that letter. Acceptance of notice by Foreign consulates without comment will strengthen our position, while protest by any of them will afford us specific grounds for presenting Persian Government with demand that our prescriptive right of buoying and lighting coast of Gulf shall be recognised formally.

M. Couget was received by the municipal authorities amidst the acclamation of the inhabitants, and speeches full of gratitude towards France and towards himself personally were pronounced.

The steamer embarked a few passengers, principally emigrants, and after a stay of three hours returned to Beirout.

This precipitate action on the part of the French is much commented upon locally and is generally viewed as intending to impress upon the Lebanese the debt they owe to France for any benefits accruing to them in connection with the appointment of their new governor and the preponderant rôle she intends pursuing in the affairs of this district.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[1027] No. 17.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1068 of the 15th December last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the opening to traffic of 54 kilom. of the Bagdad Railway beyond Ulu Kishla.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 17.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Adana, December 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 47 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report for your Excellency's information that 54 kilom. of the Bagdad Railway line beyond Ulu Kishla were opened to traffic on the 21st instant. Trains now run from Ulu Kishla viâ Chifteh Han and Bozanti to Kara Punar, a few kilometres from Bozanti.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[1168] No. 18.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 8, 1913.*

VICE-CONSUL at Van reports that the local mayor of the town has been assassinated, probably by Tashnags; that the vali wishes to arrest and expel all the chiefs of this party; that an ineffectual attempt to do so might be fraught with serious trouble; and that military commandant is indisposed to assist the vali.

Vice-consul suggests that I should endeavour to get stringent orders sent to commandant to support the vali, but after consulting my French and Russian colleagues, who have received reports of the incident, I have hesitated to take the step suggested, as the matter is a delicate internal one, and some of the Tashnag leaders may be foreigners.

---

[500] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 635 of 15th December: Lighthouse on Sheikh Shuaib.

Unless really favourable opportunity offers, it will be better not to approach Persian Government on general question pending completion of lighting and buoyage scheme now in course of execution. It would be advisable in any case to await reply of Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to memorandum communicated to him on 11th December.

[1283] No. 20.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 8th January, 1913, regarding the Persian Gulf.

India Office, January 9, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 8, 1913.

WE have not had time to consider as fully as we could have desired question referred to in your telegram of the 3rd instant of naval and military position at mouth of Persian Gulf. Our views, however, are these:—

It is assumed that Trans-Persian Railway will touch the coast at Bunder Abbas either with main line or by a branch.

On this assumption, security of naval control of Persian Gulf requires, in our opinion, either—

1. Holding positions on Hormuz, Larak, and Kishm Islands in order to command approaches to, and so make secure, anchorage in Clarence Strait. Simultaneously, rights (apparently possessed by us in virtue of treaty of 1891 with Muscat) of pre-emption on Musandam peninsula must be enforced; or

2. Establishment of a naval station at Khor Kawai, with a simultaneous ensuring of our positions in respect of three islands mentioned above. This would be effected either by their actual occupation or by an agreement with Persia; or

3. To secure anchorage in Clarence Strait, at same time setting up at Khor Kawai a coaling station. This course is combination of alternatives 1 and 2.

Considered from strategic point of view, first course admits of provision of a good anchorage with plenty of room; it provides also what is probably best position from which to control the waters of the Gulf. On the other hand, to defend the anchorage, considerable force would be required to command the different channels of approach, and, further, there is a lack of good harbour which could be used as a coaling station.

By second course a more easily and efficiently defensible position is afforded. For coaling station we could use harbour at Khor Kawai. On the other hand, there is much less space in the anchorage, while strategic position is not so good as that of Clarence Strait as Persian littoral is not dominated.

The most effective control of Gulf would be afforded by third alternative, which, however, involves more extensive defensive measures. Also it appears unnecessary, for the purpose we have in view, that position on both shores should be occupied—compare analogous cases of Aden and Gibraltar. Probably effective control could be obtained by having on one shore a securely established base, together with, on the opposite shore, either flying naval station or rights of pre-emption.

We cannot at present estimate extent of defences and number of military

garrison which would be necessitated by the above or any other measures designed to give us naval control of waters of Gulf. For purpose of Trans-Persian Railway, we think, on the whole, that the first course suggested is preferable, but there are patent obstacles to getting Persia to come to an agreement with regard to Henjam, Kishm, Larak, or Hormuz. As regards the former, the establishment of telegraph station has strengthened our position, and, if it is found impossible to concert an agreement with Persia, it might be feasible unobtrusively to establish ourselves by other methods on the three other islands. Does not the treaty with France, 1862, as interpreted in Bandar-Gisseh case, prevent us obtaining from the Sultan a lease of Khor Kawai whereby we would be able to set up there a coaling station or a naval base? Otherwise there should be little difficulty in inducing His Highness to grant us such a lease if found necessary.

[1262] No. 21.

Sir W. Townley to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tehran, January* 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 5 of 8th January: Lighthouse on Sheikh Shuaib.

Answer to my memorandum is most unsatisfactory, merely stating that Persian Government are ready to negotiate on the basis of projects submitted to my predecessor on 8th February, which was found unacceptable.

As it was clear that the memorandum emanated from a subordinate source I did not intend to return to the question before the new Cabinet was formed.

I will now await instructions.

[1837] No. 22.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th December, 1912, relative to Abu Musa oxide.

India Office, January 11, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bushire, November* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to the letter dated the 15th December from His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Count Metternich, in which was intimated His Majesty's Government's consent to Messrs. Wönckhaus shipping all the oxide lying already mined at Abu Musa, provided that the final shipment was made before the 31st December, 1912, I have the honour to attach a copy of a report received from the residency agent at Lingah, showing that Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. are doing their best to get away all the oxide before the year expires.

2. I venture to enquire what the position is as regards the second memorandum of His Majesty's Government, dated the 6th December, 1911. It would seem that if the German Government have not yet replied to it, and if in the meanwhile Messrs. Wönckhaus have been permitted to possess themselves of all the available oxide by the end of the year, the latter will be in a strong position for assuming an uncompromising attitude in their negotiations with His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22.

Residency Agent, Lingah, to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox.

Lingah, October 26, 1912.

I BEG to state that I inspected the two heaps of oxide near the mine in the Abu Musa Island on the 23rd October, 1912. Most of them have been taken to the sea-shore by the labourers of Hassan-bin-Someich, and all the two heaps will be brought to the shore by the end of October. The heap of oxide near the mine called Hadhra, which was near the sea, has also been removed and placed in bags. The quantity placed in bags up to now comes up to 9,000 (nine thousand) bags and the rest remains loose, and they (the labourers) are awaiting more empty bags, which Hassan-bin-Someich has promised to send at an early date. According to the information given to me by Hassan-bin-Someich, he has arranged to ship 5,000 bags of oxide to Bombay by the sailing vessel "Shah Jahun," and proposes that the vessel should call at the island in the beginning of November to ship the 5,000 bags. He is also negotiating to arrange for a steamer of the Bombay and Persia Company to ship the remainder of the oxide.

Enclosure 3 in No. 22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, November* 19, 1912.

MY letter of the 3rd November.

Since our second memorandum was delivered there have been no local signs that any attempts to collect further evidence with a view to rebutting it have been made by the Germans, so if no reply has been received by His Majesty's Government, their delay must be due to other reasons. In the meantime they are receiving considerable windfalls by the sale of oxide mined before Wönckhaus's connection with Abu Musa was established, and not in fulfilment of any of his contracts. If therefore no reply has been received, it may be advisable to explain to His Majesty's Government that the position is apparently as above, and to express hope that no further concessions will be accorded if the German reply is delayed or is received in an uncompromising shape.

[1839] No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd January, 1913, regarding Abu Musa.

India Office, January 11, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 23.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, January* 2, 1913.

ABU MUSA.

Please see letter from Cox of 3rd November and your telegram of 2nd December. Please let me know whether any oxide remained to be exported at the end of the year.

[2194] No. 24.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams regarding the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf.

India Office, January 15, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 7, 1913.

PERSIAN Gulf: Buoying and lighting.

Please see letter from Resident, Bushire, dated 13th ultimo, of which a copy was sent direct to you. It is proposed to give him authority to act as proposed in fifth and seventh paragraphs of that letter. Acceptance of notice by foreign consulates without comment will strengthen our position, while protest by any of them will afford us specific grounds for presenting Persian Government with demand that our prescriptive right of buoying and lighting coast of gulf shall be recognised formally.

Enclosure 2 in No. 24.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, January* 9, 1913.

LIGHTS in Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram dated 7th January.

Please say whether the lanterns at Bushire have been installed and are already working; if they have not, would it not be well to hold up the communication to the consuls till it is possible to include them?

Enclosure 3 in No. 24.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 12, 1913.

LIGHTING of Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your telegram of 9th instant. The lights of the Residency, Bushire, will be set up not later than 15th of this month. Notice to consuls should, we think, be issued immediately and should include lights referred to above.

[2393] No. 25.

Memorandum respecting the Entrance to Persian Gulf.—(Received at Foreign Office, January 16, 1913.)

(Secret.)

THE Government of India, on being asked for their views on this subject in connection with the proposed Trans-Persian railway, replied as follows:—

Telegram from Government of India to Secretary of State, dated January 8, 1913.

"(Secret.)

"Your telegram of the 3rd January. Naval and military position at entrance to Persian Gulf. Short time has prevented our considering case as fully as we should have wished, but following are our views:—

"On assumption that either main line or branch line of Trans-Persian railway will

touch coast at Bunder Abbas, we consider following alternatives are necessary to secure naval control of Gulf :—

"(*a.*) To secure anchorage in Clarence Strait by holding positions on Hormuz, Larak, and Kishm Islands to command approaches to the anchorage, at the same time to enforce rights of pre-emption on Musandim Peninsula, which we appear to possess under Muscat treaty of 1891 ; or

"(*b.*) To establish naval station at Khor Kawai, securing at same time our position in regard to islands of Hormuz, Larak, and Kishm, either by agreement with Persia or by *de facto* occupation ; or

"(*c.*) A combination of above, viz., to secure anchorage in Clarence Strait and also to establish coaling station at Khor Kawai.

"From strategic standpoint first alternative would provide fine spacious anchorage and probably best position for control of Gulf waters. Defence, however, of anchorage would involve disposal of considerable force to command various approaches, and there is no good harbour for use as coaling station.

"Second alternative provides a position which could more easily and efficiently be defended, and harbour at Khor Kawai could be used as coaling station. Anchorage is, however, much more restricted and position is less favourable than Clarence Strait, and does not dominate Persian coast.

"Third alternative would give most effective control, but would make greater demand for defence. Nor [? from] analogy of Gibraltar and Aden would it appear necessary for the purpose in view to occupy position on both shores, and it is probable that our control could be made effective by secured base on one shore with rights of pre-emption or flying naval station on opposite shore. The above or any measures to ensure naval control in Gulf waters will involve defences and military garrison, extent and number of which cannot now be estimated. On the whole, for the purpose of Trans-Persian railway we prefer alternative (*a*), but there are obvious difficulties in the way of securing any agreement from Persian Government in regard to Hormuz, Larak, Kishm, or Henjam. In regard to Henjam, our position has been strengthened by the establishment of a telegraph station, and we might unobtrusively, if an agreement with Persia is impossible, establish our position on Hormuz, Larak, and Kishm by other means. With regard to Khor Kawai there should, if necessary, be little difficulty in inducing Sultan to grant us a lease which would enable us to make a naval base or coaling station there, but are we not estopped by treaty of 1862 with France as interpreted in the Bunder-Gisseh case ? "

Notes.

The Government of India have been told that they have another week, and have been asked to supplement the above if they wish.

In the meantime the following remarks are offered :—

The question of the best sites for a naval base and kindred purposes was carefully examined during the years 1900–4, and in 1903 Lord Curzon went over the ground personally with Rear-Admiral Willes. The places now mentioned by the Government of India are those which by general admission we should occupy ourselves or prevent any one else from occupying, and it is perhaps not necessary further to examine the evidence as to their respective merits. The difficulty is how to secure them.

1. The places on the south coast of the entrance are on the promontory of Musandim. Until the end of 1904 His Majesty's Government were of opinion that the evidence of the Sultan of Muscat's ownership of the promontory was sufficiently vague to justify them in ignoring it if they thought fit, and flagstaffs were actually erected in November 1904 on Telegraph Island, Sheep Island, and the Maklab isthmus. But in February 1905 it was decided (on the recommendation of the Committee on Imperial Defence, Mr. Balfour presiding) not to maintain the staffs on the two latter for reasons of policy, but to rely on Lord Lansdowne's declaration in the House of Lords, of the 5th May, 1903, for the protection of our interests. Lord Lansdowne's declaration was re-affirmed by implication in Sir E. Grey's despatch to Sir A. Nicolson, of the 29th August, 1907, which was published with the Anglo-Russian convention). Lord Morley finally ordered that the flagstaff on Telegraph Island should not be maintained in 1908. In the meantime, further evidence regarding the Sultan of Muscat's ownership had come to light, which caused a change of view, and in the counter-case which His Majesty's Government

presented before The Hague Tribunal, on the occasion of Muscat arbitration, it was admitted that "from Ras Dibba to Tibba (Tibet) the coast forming the promontory of Musandim is claimed by the Sultan, who has certainly before and since 1864 exercised authority on that coast by his vali and in other ways, and his rights on the coast are recognised by the Sheikh of Shargah and the Joasmi."

The effect of this admission is to bring the promontory of Musandim within the scope of the Anglo-French declaration of 1862 ; and as in 1899 His Majesty's Government successfully protested against French action in obtaining the cession of land at Muscat (Bunder Gisseh) for a coaling station as contrary to that declaration, it has always been held that we were precluded from ourselves obtaining the cession of Musandim. [It should be mentioned in this connection that the status of Telegraph Island differs rather from that of the promontory itself and the other islands, in that it had been occupied by the Eastern Telegraph Company in 1865, and remained in occupation for four years.]

If this view is still held, the position appears to be as follows : On the assumption that if we occupy one side of the entrance to the Gulf we need only to "sterilise" the other :—

(*a.*) If we occupy the north side, we must rely on Lord Lansdowne's declaration for the sterilisation of Musandim (except as regards Telegraph Island) ;

(*b.*) If we want to occupy Musandim, we are precluded by the Anglo-French declaration, except as regards Telegraph Island.

It will be remembered that we can buy the French out of Muscat by paying their price, *i.e.*, the Gambia, the cession of which has hitherto been resisted by the Colonial Office.

But the Government of India now refer to the Muscat treaty of 1891. Articles 4 and 5 of this make it lawful for British subjects "to acquire by gift, purchase, ... or any other legal manner, land, houses, and property of every description." The suggestion therefore presumably is that a British subject should acquire a lease of the promontory, or suitable parts of it, with a view to preventing its occupation by a foreign Power. Two questions arise :—

(*a.*) Would this be consistent with the interpretation of the Anglo-French declaration referred to above ? It should be noticed that, in conversation with M. Cambon on the 15th February, 1899, Lord Salisbury, in making his protest against the lease of Bunder Gisseh by the French Government, said : "According to my reading of the engagement of 1862, it is not competent for France, as a State, to accept a lease. . . . . This view, of course, would not apply to a lease given to a French citizen in his private capacity." (Telegram to Sir E. Monson, 15th February, 1899.) Again, on the 22nd February, when Lord Salisbury adhered to his view as to the action of the French Government, M. Cambon, while not accepting it, said that "a suggestion which I [Lord Salisbury] had made on a previous occasion, and repeated again, that it might be taken in the name of a French citizen, was made difficult on the present occasion because the English newspapers had appeared to dictate such a course in a somewhat threatening manner." (Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, 23rd February, 1899.) From this it is evident that (though a different solution was eventually reached) both parties regarded a lease by a private "man of straw" of a site for a coaling station as consistent with the declaration of 1862. (N.B.—These were conversations only : there is no French opinion in writing.)

(*b.*) Would the lease by a private individual give us the necessary control over the waters of the various khors in which the fleet of another Power might anchor ? Presumably, when relations became strained, our ships would take the precaution to be there first, and, provided no fortifications are necessary, that would be sufficient ?

2. On the north side of the Gulf the position is as follows :—

At Basidu, at the extreme north-west point of the island of Kishm, we have had a station since 1820, when it was granted by the Sultan of Muscat, who at that time claimed the island. The barracks have fallen into decay, there are no permanent defences, and the small coal depôt is in process of transference to Henjam. A native agent resides there and flies the British flag. Admiral Willes was of opinion that Basidu is of no practical value for naval purposes.

On the island of Henjam we have a concession for a telegraph station granted by the Shah in 1865. The limits of it have not been defined, and as recently as 1906 the Persian Government have maintained that no land was conveyed at all. His Majesty's

Government, however, hold that Persian acquiescence in our occupation from 1868 to 1880 must be regarded as equivalent to a formal concession of the land occupied. A wireless installation has recently been authorised there as part of the Persian Gulf scheme.* Further, in April last His Majesty's Government authorised the transfer to Henjam of the coal depôt formerly maintained at Basidu, and 5,000 tons of coal are being deposited there. So far the Persian Government have not protested. Admiral Willes thought that Henjam was more suitable than Basidu as a signal station, but could not be transformed into a naval station.

The Government of India make no suggestion as to how a further cession or lease of these islands, and of Larak and Hormuz, is to be obtained from the Persian Government.

A. H.

January 1913.

Lord Lansdowne's Declaration of May 5, 1903.

In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal.

Extract from Sir E. Grey's Despatch of August 29, 1907.

In order to make it quite clear that the present arrangement is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of Great Britain, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to draw attention to previous declarations of British policy, and to reaffirm generally previous statements as to British interests in the Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.

[2531] No. 26.

Sir L. Mallet to Councillor of German Embassy.

SIR LOUIS MALLET presents his compliments to the Councillor of the German Embassy and, with reference to the conversation which took place on the 9th instant relative to the question of the red oxide mines in the island of Abu Musa, has the honour to state that, if Herr Wönckhaus will be good enough to adopt the proposal that he should visit this country in order to set forth his objections to certain of the suggestions for a settlement in the last British note, representatives of His Majesty's Government will be very happy to receive him.

Sir L. Mallet ventures at the same time to suggest that it might assist discussion and facilitate an early settlement if His Majesty's Government were furnished, previous to Herr Wönckhaus's arrival, with some written indication of the nature of the objections which he desires to raise to the British proposals.

Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.

---

[430] No. 27.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th ultimo, relative to the relief of the Indian guard of His Majesty's consulate-general at Bagdad, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject,† to whom a copy of the communication in question was forwarded for his observations.

* The other stations are Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein, and Dubai (or Zora). † No. 5.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to the agreement of the Marquess of Crewe, to express to Sir G. Lowther his concurrence in the view expressed in his Excellency's despatch.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[2660] No. 28.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18, 1913.)

(No. 15. Commercial.)

Sir, *Bussorah, December* 24, 1912.

IN connection with the apprehensions expressed to His Majesty's Government by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), as to possible coercion by the Shell Transport Company (of which Sir Marcus Samuel is the chairman), I have the honour to report that Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. have already commenced activities in the trade of the Shatt-el-Arab.

The British steam-ship "Ayr," now loading at Bussorah, was consigned to Asfar and Co. (Mr. Asfar is a Chaldean under French protection) by Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co., and the steamship "Cambyses," now about to arrive at Bushire for the Anglo-Algerian Line (Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.), has been chartered for her homeward voyage by the same firm.

I have authoritative information that an Armenian in London of the name of Karkas [?] who till recently had the entire management of the Mesopotamian business of the British firm of Andrew Weir and Co., has suddenly left them and been taken over by Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. From the same source I hear a rumour, doubtless exaggerated, that Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. are about to build or purchase a number of vessels for the Persian Gulf trade.

In view of the charter of the steam-ship "Cambyses" to Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co., relations between this company and Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (who are on the other hand intimately connected with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Bussorah and Mohammerah under the style of Messrs. Strick, Scott, and Co.) are a matter of some interest.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[2636] No. 29.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 12, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 565 of the 13th ultimo, in which was enclosed copy of a letter from Messrs. Murrieta and Co., as also a copy of a document prepared by Count Ostrorog, bearing on the question of Tahsin Pasha's concession, and on the subject-matter of which observations are invited.

From information we have, it appears that Tahsin Pasha's claim is based on a "permis de recherches," or prospecting licence—and not on a concession—which was issued to him by the Bagdad authorities in 1308 (1313) on instructions from the Ministry of Mines. The licence, which permits prospecting operations for one year only, authorised Tahsin Pasha in general terms to prospect for petroleum in the vilayet of Bagdad, and was not drawn up in accordance with the mining regulations. The omission of certain details in the licence, required by those regulations, does not, however, seem to have affected the validity of the document at the time; for Tahsin Pasha was able during the same year to carry out prospecting work for over seven months, but was obliged to discontinue his investigations in consequence of the issue of an Imperial iradé by Sultan Abdul Hamid, which granted the concession of all oil-fields found in the Empire to the Ministry of the Civil List. Tahsin Pasha's "permis de recherches" was ignored, and his right to continue prospecting work during the unexpired term of his licence was arbitrarily swept away by the issue of

this iradé, and besides his right under the mining regulations to put in a demand for the concession of the mines and oil-fields explored was cancelled. Tahsin Pasha does not seem to have been able to take any steps, but is said to have entered a protest against the agreement made in 1904 between the Civil List and the Anatolian Railway Company regarding the survey and eventual working of the oil-fields of Mosul and Bagdad, and at the same time claimed his rights.

On the change of Government in 1908, the right over the oil-fields was withdrawn from the Civil List, and passed under the control of the Ministry of Mines, and Tahsin Pasha seems then to have brought his claim to the notice of that department. His claim was referred by the department to the Council of State for a decision, but unfortunately for Tahsin Pasha all the documents relative to the case were lost or burnt in the fire which broke out and destroyed part of the building of the Sublime Porte. A great deal of time was necessarily taken in procuring copies of the lost documents, and in the reconstruction of the *dossier*, but this having been done, the Council of State proceeded to the examination of the whole question. Although on two occasions the council seem to have been ready to recognise the justice and validity of Tahsin Pasha's claim, the final decision of the Council of State has been given against Tahsin Pasha on the ground that the "permis" issued to him was irregularly drawn up, and that whatever rights Tahsin Pasha may have acquired under that "permis" were annulled by the Imperial iradé. Tahsin Pasha has, I hear, appealed against this decision, and has petitioned the Grand Vizier, so that his case will now be examined by the Council of Ministers.

With regard to the request made by Messrs Murrieta in their letter, that assistance might be afforded by His Majesty's Embassy for establishing Tahsin Pasha's rights, I would beg to point out that the question at issue is not, as far as I am aware, one between a British subject or company and the Turkish Government, but one in which a Turkish subject is endeavouring to obtain the recognition and restitution by his own authorities of certain rights granted to him in 1908 under a prospecting licence. It has not transpired from the correspondence, nor have I understood that Messrs. Murrieta or the group interested have been officially recognised through their head agents as principals in the matter, or that the official negotiations for the recognition of rights acquired under the licence have been conducted in their name or by them. These negotiations throughout have been, I understand, carried on by Tahsin Pasha, or on his behalf and in his name, and under such circumstances it would, I think, be impossible for His Majesty's Embassy to intervene.

The opinion given by Count Ostrorog on the question of the validity of Tahsin Pasha's rights seems to be a correct exposition of the legal aspects of the case, and should prove useful in the negotiations which Tahsin Pasha has now entered into with the Porte.

I would add that from recent information it appears that Tahsin Pasha has entered into no negotiations with any person or company for the sale of his rights, and is bound to the syndicate represented by Mr. Thomson.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[2695] No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 18.)

India Office, January 17, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite reference to the Viceroy's telegrams of the 7th and 12th January, 1913, as to the proposal to notify foreign consular officers of the establishment of lights, &c., at various points in the Persian Gulf. It is understood that a copy of Sir P. Cox's despatch, dated the 13th December, 1912, referred to in the Viceroy's telegram of the 7th January, has been sent to the Foreign Office direct.

2. It will be seen that the Government of India propose (1) that a communication should now be made to foreign consuls at Bushire, and simultaneously to the local Government and customs authorities, as to the new gas buoys at Bushire and Bunder Abbas, and the two dioptric lanterns at the Bushire residency; and (2) that the political agent, Bahrein, should inform British and foreign shipping companies within his jurisdiction of the gas buoys established off that island. As regards the Tamb lighthouse and the Shatt-el-Arab lights, no immediate action is necessary.

3. The Marquess of Crewe desires to advert in this connection to the question of obtaining general recognition from the Persian Government of British rights of control over the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf, which formed the subject of correspondence ending with my letter of the 3rd January, 1913. It would no doubt be more satisfactory, if it were practicable, to obtain such recognition before formally notifying foreign Governments through their consular officers of the measures recently taken to improve the lighting of the Gulf. But this course would necessarily entail delay, and might even, in view of the unsatisfactory attitude of the Persian Government as instanced by their action in regard to the Sheikh Shuaib lighthouse, reported in Sir W. Townley's telegram No. 13 of the 9th January, 1913, involve the postponement of the proposed notification for an indefinite period. In all the circumstances his Lordship considers it advisable to proceed at once in the manner recommended by the Government of India, and subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he would propose to give instructions accordingly.

4. With regard to the Bushire lanterns, which, it will be seen, were to be installed on the 15th instant, I am to invite reference to your letter of the 13th June, 1912, and to request that Sir E. Grey may now be moved, if he sees no objection, to invite the Russian Government to discontinue the use of the lights at present attached to the Russian consulate at Bushire.

5. With reference to your letter of the 13th January, 1913, I am to say that Lord Crewe concurs in Sir E. Grey's suggestion that, in view of the formation of a new Cabinet at Tehran, His Majesty's Minister should be instructed to use his discretion in reopening the question of the proposed lighthouse on Sheikh Shuaib island. Should the new Cabinet prove more amenable than their predecessors in regard to this project, it will be for consideration whether the "really favourable opportunity" postulated in my letter of the 3rd January, as a condition of approaching the Persian Government on the general question of our rights of control, may not be held to have arisen. Lord Crewe attaches special importance to this point, in view of the possibility that the proposed notification to the local Persian authorities at Bushire in regard to the buoys, &c., may lead to the general question being raised by the Persian Government on their own initiative in a form that might place us at a disadvantage in pressing for the recognition of our prescriptive rights.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[2814] No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey. (Received January 20.)

(No. 33.) *Constantinople, January 14, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE received two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, copies of which I have the honour to enclose, which reveal some interest on the part of Russia in the affairs of the Lebanon.

In his first despatch, Mr. Cumberbatch reports the acquisition by the Russian clergy of two Greek Orthodox monasteries in the Lebanon, and in the second he forwards copies of petitions for the opening to steamers of a port in the Greek Orthodox district of Koura (Lebanon).

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 86. Confidential.) *Beirout, December 30, 1912.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that in accordance with arrangements made with the Russian church authorities, supported by the Russian consulates-general at Beirout and Damascus, the Greek Orthodox patriarch of Antioch has recently transferred the Greek Orthodox monastery of Mar Elias near Schowair, in Mount Lebanon, to the Russian church, and about forty Russian monks have been installed there.

It is also reported that two Greek Orthodox monasteries in the Koura district of Mount Lebanon are to be similarly handed over to the Russian church.

The ostensible object is said to be a desire to improve the state of these monasteries which had fallen into a very dilapidated state through want of money to maintain them, but in the Greek Orthodox community of Beirout the real object of the Russian church in securing these monasteries is to strengthen its control, and that of the Russian authorities over the affairs of the Greek Orthodox church in Syria in anticipation of the waning of the influence of the œcumenical patriarch at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Beirout, January* 3, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of two petitions addressed to me by the inhabitants of Shikka and Enfeh, two small seaport towns in the Greek Orthodox district of Koura in the Lebanon, soliciting that the same rights as have been accorded to the Maronite port of Djounieh and to the Druse landing place in the Bay of Nebi-Younous, by the Protocol of the new Governor's appointment, should be extended to the Greek Orthodox port of Shikka.

I understand that this demand is being strongly supported by my Russian colleague, and it must be admitted that the Greek Orthodox of the Lebanon have a right to claim the same privileges as have been accorded to the purely Maronite port of Djounieh and to the Druses and Moslems of the southern portion of the Lebanon should they desire to take advantage of the favourable position of the Bay of Nebi-Younous to construct a small harbour there.

Shikka is not quite as large a town as Djounieh, but it has a good harbour, and the shipping business of the port is not less than that of Djounieh.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 31.

Telegram addressed to Consul-General Cumberbatch.

Enfeh, December 18 (31), 1912.

(Translation.)

DEPRIVING the north of the Lebanon of a port for merchant steamers is contrary to the belief the inhabitants have of the interest you take in them. We solicit equality with the others because the position of our district, its prosperity and its important commerce and the great number of passengers, necessitate the existence of a port for steamers, and especially as in the village of Shikka there has always been, and still is, a Custom house.

In the name of the public interest we solicit your assistance for realising our hopes.

[Sixty-seven signatures follow.]

Enclosure 4 in No. 31.

Telegram addressed to Consul-General Cumberbatch.

Enfeh, December 18 (31), 1912.

WE are very thankful for the interest you take in our interests. The interdiction of steamers to enter our port where there is an office for the Custom house and another for the Public Debt is contrary to justice and equality. The zeal you have always shown to us will never allow us to be deprived of rights which the constitution gives us, and especially our port which is the port of all the north of the Lebanon.

(The inhabitants of Shikka.)

[2815]

No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 15, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1,131 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, which throws further light on the working of the minds of the Arabo-Kurdish tribesmen of northern Mesopotamia, and the degree in which the disintegrating tendencies of the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress have operated in those regions.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 32.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Aleppo, December* 29, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78, Confidential, of the 14th instant, transmitting the copy of a letter addressed to me by Mr. Woolley, concerning the movements of the Kurdish chiefs in the region east of the Euphrates, I now have the honour to submit certain further information on the same subject imparted to me by a correspondent at Ourfa.

On the 14th instant 300 troops, spoken of as Nizam, left Ourfa, and were the next day followed by 500 men, under the command of Abdul Kerim Bey, son of Musto Pasha, from the region of Jeziret-ibn-Omar. These 800 men were to unite to form a cavalry regiment. They were well mounted, uniformed, and armed, and provided with good road equipment. Each of Abdul Kerim's troops received three gold piastres a day whilst at Ourfa, in addition to ordinary rations. The entire force was composed of Arabs and Kurds, was placed under the command of Shukri Bey, ex-commandant at Ourfa and at Mardin.

Abdul Kerim Bey, who is said to be clever and capable, belongs to the great Kurdish family of Beder Khan. His most important relatives are Abdul Rezak Bey, now on the Persian frontier, and Hessan Midhat Bey and Beder Bey, who are said to be now at Stamboul. According to a Turkish newspaper published at Ourfa, a revolt recently occurred among the Kurds on the frontier, who expelled various Turkish officers and officials from their posts by force. Abdul Rezik Bey and Said Khan were the leaders in the revolt, and they were captured by the military authorities, and sent under strong escort to the Government House. They were rescued, however, by bodies of armed Kurds, who made a fierce attack upon the Turkish soldiers forming their escort. Abdul Rezak, who is a very powerful chief, received from the ex-Sultan a pension of £T. 100 per month, which hardly sufficed to defray the cost of continual hospitality to his friends and retainers. This pension was reduced, after Abdul Hamid's deposition, to £T. 10 per month, and Abdul Rezak then applied for a remunerative Government post, which was refused him. He is now said to have formed some plan for the autonomy of the great Kurdish tribes, whereby he would govern his own region, and Ibn Ibrahim Pasha and Dereg Bey would rule in theirs. Ibn Ibrahim (Khalil Bey) is a close friend of Abdul Rezak. Khalil Bey and Dereg Bey both declared, whilst at Ourfa, that they deeply regretted having volunteered for active service, and hoped to receive orders to return home. Khalil Bey seemed quite ready to proceed to Constantinople, where his younger brother, who accompanied him, was to undergo military training, but he did not wish to fight in the present war. Khalil Bey received two telegrams from the Sultan whilst at Ourfa.

In my despatch No. 73 of the 18th ultimo I had the honour to report to your Excellency upon the situation at Zeitoun. At the beginning of this month Mgr. Nerses, the Armenian Murakhass at Aleppo, received instructions to proceed to Zeitoun, and to use his influence towards improving the relations of the Zeitoun Armenians with the Turkish authorities. The Murakhass called upon me before leaving, and informed me that he proposed urging the Mutessarif of Marash to recommend that an amnisty should be granted to the deserters, whether Moslem or Christians, now lurking in the Zeitoun regions, as he could think of no better plan to relieve the Zeitoun Armenians of

the responsibility thrown upon them by the authorities for the presence of deserters and robbers in their neighbourhood. And he added that he intended to call on the French consul at Aleppo, and request him to instruct the French vice-consul at Marash by telegram to proceed to Zeitoun as soon as the Murakhass reached his destination, in order that he might ascertain in person (at the same time as Mgr. Nerses) what was passing in the town and district, and so be in a position to report in full the actual state of affairs. M. Laporte informed me later that, in conformity with an urgent request made to him by the Murakhass, he had instructed the vice-consul to proceed to Zeitoun and make enquiry on the spot, as desired by Mgr. Nerses. The vice-consul, however, excused himself on the plea of ill-health, and, as far as I am aware, has not so far performed the journey to Zeitoun, which is one of only eight or nine hours. M. Laporte has told me that he regrets that the French vice-consul at Marash, M. Eddé, is an elderly man and a native Syrian, and that a younger man, and a Frenchman, would have been better fitted at the present moment for the post. My French colleague has been kind enough to show me a letter received some ten days ago from M. Eddé, the tenure of which was as follows :—

Some Armenians say that they know that Nazaret (the Armenian leader of the band mentioned in his former letter) is compromising the Armenian community at Zeitoun, but that they must defend him and his band, as they will sooner or later have to look to such men for their personal protection. Mgr. Nerses is (according to M. Eddé) the chief of the conspirators, and a dangerous man, void of conscience, and his visit to Zeitoun is likely to set the country on fire. The Mutessarif of Marash was contemplating a tour to Anderen, Ghuksun, Zeitoun, Elbistan, and Bazarjik. The kaïmakam of Zeitoun was contemplating flight, but the kaïmakam of Harem had been appointed to take his place. The acting kaïmakam of Elbistan is worthless, and the kaïmakam of Ghuksun very bad. Daizadeh, the Naib-el-Eshraf at Marash, preached in the mosque there a sermon meant to excite Moslem fanaticism, and at about the same time similar discourses were delivered at Elbistan and elsewhere. Khalil Pasha, the commandant at Aintab, visited Zeitoun, and passed a day there in connection with the murder by soldiers of an Armenian named Mardiros. The Elbistan redifs, to the number of 700 men, expected to arrive at Zeitoun or at Marash. The redif battalion of Marash was to proceed to Hajin. A band of Moslem deserters wounded a Zabtieh escorting recruits on the Aintab road. The twelve mountain guns destined, as I reported by telegram, for Zeitoun have reached Marash.

M. Eddé appears to be on very good terms with the Mutessarif of Marash, and to entertain deep respect for the present Vali of Aleppo. And it is significant that his description of Mgr. Nerses as "the chief of conspirators" is a mere reiteration of the phrase used by the vali to my Russian colleague, stigmatising the Armenian Murakhass. I have suggested to M. Laporte that Mr. Eddé might be invited to specify the grounds upon which he bases his sweeping condemnation of Mgr. Nerses as a dangerous conspirator, whose presence at Zeitoun is calculated to set the place ablaze, as it is essential, in the interest of all parties that this very grave charge should be either substantiated or refuted. M. Laporte entirely agreed with me in this.

The kaïmakam of Aintab, concerning the necessity for whose removal I telegraphed to your Excellency, has been dismissed, and the kaïmakam of Killis has been chosen to succeed him. Things are therefore now quieter at Aintab. The kaïmakam of Antioch, an ignorant, worthless person, is also to be removed. His Majesty's vice-consul at Alexandretta writes that Nafi Pasha Jabri Zadeh, ex-deputy for Aleppo, is working with the vali, with whom he is on intimate terms, for the nomination of his son, Akif Bey, as kaïmakam of Alexandretta. The Jabri Zadeh family have a very bad reputation in those parts. Mr. Catoni further states that Akif Bey, whilst recently acting kaïmakam at Alexandretta, displayed great incapacity, and that his definite nomination there would be a calamity for the district, and he adds that Said Bey, the present kaïmakam, is the right man in the right place, and begs me to bring this matter to the notice of your Excellency in the hope that Said Bey may be confirmed in his post. M. Laporte, or his vice-consul at Alexandretta, is dissatisfied with Said Bey, and is upholding the candidature of Nafi Pasha's son, as, he tells me, feeling confident that, if appointed, Akif Bey will give satisfaction as far as French interests are concerned.

It would seem desirable, in view of the unrest among the Kurdish tribes, that either one of His Majesty's vice-consuls should be appointed and proceed to Diarbekir as soon as may be possible, or, failing this, that the Armenian dragoman now in charge of the vice-consulate there should be furnished with a Government telegraph code to enable him to telegraph important and urgent messages to Erzeroum or to this

consulate. A French vice-consul was hurriedly despatched to Diarbekir a few weeks ago.

I have, &c.
R. A. FONTANA.

[2816] No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that shortly after the prolongation of three months, to begin from the 25th October last, of the period fixed for the deliberations of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, as reported in my despatch No. 899 of the 22nd of the same month, two of the Turkish delegates, viz., Daniel Pasha and Ali Riza Pasha were unable to give their further attendance at the sittings of the commission, their services being required in the war which in the interval had broken out between Turkey and the Balkan States. The appointment, therefore, of two new Turkish members became necessary and advantage was taken by the Persian Ambassador of the opportunity thus afforded to represent to his Excellency Gabriel Effendi in a friendly manner the advisability, if a satisfactory arrangement were to be arrived at, of appointing as president someone of less uncompromising attitude than Adil Bey had shown himself to be. These representations received the support both of myself and my Russian colleague and eventually, and after much negotiation and delay, the following members who, I understand, are satisfactory to my Persian colleague, were chosen to represent the Turkish Government, viz., Sadr-ed-Din Bey, formerly chargé d'affaires at Tehran, Said Bey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Zia Pasha, brigadier-general.

The commission as reconstituted held its first meeting on the 12th instant. The business transacted was, however, merely formal, the Turkish delegates requesting that, in view of their very recent appointment (some three days previously in fact), the commission might be adjourned for a week to allow them to obtain a better knowledge of the questions involved. This was agreed to and the next meeting of the commission fixed for the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[2817] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 1 of the 1st instant, in which you request that every effort should be made to obtain an exact *tracé* of the sections of the Bagdad Railway between Eregli and the Euphrates. I would beg to state that although the several attempts made since the receipt of your despatch No. 271 of last June to procure a correct *tracé* of these sections met with no success, the matter has not been lost sight of, and I am causing further efforts to be made, which I hope will have the desired result.

In the despatch under reply, the desire is expressed that the exact position of Radju, the point west of Aleppo reached by the Bagdad Railway and situated on the eastern side of the Amanus range, should be ascertained, as it has not been possible to trace this place on any map in your department. The exact position of Radju will be shown in the *tracé* which I hope to be able to procure and transmit, but in the meantime, I would suggest the consultation of Kiepert's large map of Asia Minor, section IV Haleb. It will be found that Radju (or Radjun, as noted in the map) is shown as being on the railway *tracé*, and its position is about latitude 36° 40′ north and longitude 36° 41′ east, and immediately to the east of Karababa Daghy.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

---

[572] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1913.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1131 of the 31st ultimo, forwarding copy of a report from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, relative to anti-Turkish agitation among the Kurds.

Your Excellency should thank Mr. Fontana for this report, which has been read with interest, and inform him that his action in communicating confidentially to the Governor-General of Aleppo the chief points in Mr. Woolley's letter has my approval.

I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject, alluded to in your despatch, of the alleged decision to send an Armenian deputation to plead the cause of the Armenians in Europe.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

---

[572] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 29. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 20, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, forwarding a copy of a report from His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, relative to anti-Turkish agitation among the Kurds.†

Your Excellency will observe that, in his covering despatch, Sir G. Lowther alludes to a decision alleged to have been taken at a meeting of Armenians held in the Caucasus, to send a deputation to the capitals of Europe to plead the cause of their countrymen.

I should be glad to learn whether your Excellency has any information tending to substantiate this report, and I have to request you to endeavour to ascertain whether it has any foundation, and, if so, what attitude the Russian Government have adopted towards the proposal.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3272] No. 37.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting the surrender of the island of Chios to the Greeks.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January* 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Chios reporting the surrender of the island to the Greeks and the circumstances under which it took place.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

---

* No. 35. † No. 10.

[3526] No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Government have asked that you should support strong representations which your Russian colleague is about to make to Turkish Government with a view of expediting an early solution of Turco-Persian frontier question. Could you ascertain why this question is being raised at a moment which does not seem very propitious or opportune, and whether any fresh incidents have occurred which render representations urgently necessary?

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 56, and Tehran, No. 37.)

[3298]

No. 37*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)

India Office, January 21, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence with your department regarding expenditure on lighting and buoyage, wireless telegraphy, and survey schemes in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to lay before Secretary Sir E. Grey a proposal regarding the adjustment of expenditure of these classes.

As the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is aware, diplomatic and consular expenditure in Persia is ordinarily adjusted once a-year and in arrear (*vide* annual statement submitted with this Office letter of the 21st October last), but it was recently agreed that outlay in connection with the additional troops from India now employed in Persia should be adjusted quarterly in view of the special nature and magnitude of the expenditure. Initial expenditure on the schemes referred to in paragraph 1 of this letter will be on a large scale during the current year, and probably for some little time to come, and the Marquess of Crewe thinks that it would be convenient and appropriate if the adjustment of expenditure on these schemes (whether initial or recurring) between this Office and the Imperial Government were effected quarterly as in the case of the outlay on the special troops. When the heavy initial expenditure is completed it may possibly be more convenient that the adjustment of the smaller recurring expenditure thereafter should be effected through the ordinary annual in respect of diplomatic and consular expenditure in Persia. This point, however, can be decided hereafter.

If Sir E. Grey concurs in this proposal, Lord Crewe will cause the necessary information to be obtained from India with a view to presenting claims as soon as possible on account of expenditure incurred on these three schemes up to the present time.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Acting Vice-Consul Antovitch to Consul-General Barnham.

M. le Consul général,

Chio, le 3 janvier, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer que les négociations officieuses qui ont eu lieu au commencement de cette semaine entre Zihni Bey, commandant de la garnison turque, et le commandant de l'armée grecque, par l'entremise d'un comité composé de primats ottomans, et du vice-consul d'Allemagne en cette ville, pour que le premier se rendit à l'armée grecque, n'ayant abouti à aucun résultat, hier l'armée grecque, laquelle depuis une semaine avait été renforcée de 2,500 soldats de l'armée de Mytilène, et de deux canons Schneider-Dangli, attaqua simultanément d'assaut de divers points la garnison turque de manière que vers le soir du même jour Zihni Bey a été obligé de se rendre avec toute la garnison, composée de 1,400 soldats environ, qui ont été emprisonnés.

Les pertes des deux côtés ont été insignifiantes pendant le dernier combat.

Veuillez, &c.
P. ANTOVITCH.

[3856]

No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 55.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of M. Sazonof's opinion that it was not opportune to raise the Armenian question at the present moment. M. Cambon himself thought this.

I said that I agreed. The first thing which should be done was to bring about peace between the allies and Turkey. When this had been done, we should have to occupy ourselves with putting Turkey on her feet as regards her Asiatic possessions, and there might then be an opportunity of dealing with the question of reforms in Asia Minor.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3858]

No. 39.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 56.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day what the German Ambassador had said to me yesterday about the report as to a proposed division of Asia Minor by France, England, and Russia into Armenian, Arabian, and Syrian spheres of interest. I had explained to the Ambassador that there was no truth in the rumour.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3857]

No. 40.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 40.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day what the German Ambassador had said to me yesterday, about the report as to a proposed division of Asia Minor by France, England, and Russia into Armenian, Arabian, and Syrian spheres of interest. I had explained to the Ambassador that there was no truth in the rumour.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[3606]

No. 41.

Mr. Greenway to Mr. Parker.—(*Received January* 24.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, January 23, 1913.

Dear Mr. Parker,

WITH reference to your request for particulars of the specific grounds upon which our claim to the Bagdad–Mosul concession is based, I am informed by Mr. Nichols that these are as follows:—

1. In April 1909 the details of our convention were all settled in principle and approved of by the Grand Vizier, application had been made to the palace for the Imperial iradé, and but for the mutiny that occurred in that month and the subsequent events the iradé would undoubtedly have been signed.

2. In June 1909 the then Grand Vizier himself assured Sir G. Lowther that the Council of Ministers had decided to grant the concession to us (see Sir Louis Mallet's letter of the 28th June, 1909, to Mr. D'Arcy).

3. Statements of a favourable nature were, I understand, also made to His Majesty's Ambassador by a subsequent Grand Vizier.

4. Similar promises were repeated from time to time to Mr. Nichols by several of the Ministers and officials attached to the various departments.

Mr. Nichols has been assured on many occasions since 1906 by all the competent Turkish officials that any rights which may have been granted to the Société Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie under the option dated the 16th July, 1904, had lapsed, and that the Turkish Government were absolutely free to deal with them in any way they chose, and, as a matter of fact, the Turkish Government have since been negotiating for the disposal of them, or portions of them, to different parties in connection with railway schemes (*e.g.*, the "Chester," the "Glascow," the "Prince Ibrahim" schemes), and several small "permits des recherches" have been actually issued by the Minister of Mines.

During the whole of this time no really serious steps appear to have been taken by the Société Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie to establish a recognition of their claim under the above option, and it is only recently, consequent upon the formation of the Deutsche Bank, National Bank, and Shell combination, that they have shown any activity in the matter, their policy up till this period having been purely one of a "dog in the manger" character.

A further ground to the concession may, I think, be very justly claimed in respect of the large amount of money and time which we have already expended in connection with this matter, relying, as we have done, on the numerous promises and assurances which we have from time to time received to the effect that the concession would be granted to us.

Yours truly,
C. GREENWAY.

P.S.—I will reply to your letter of yesterday in the course of a day or two.
C. G.

[3662]

No. 42.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 24, 1913.

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 51 of 23rd January.

My Russian colleague has been constantly making representations on this question, and I have periodically urged the necessity of expediting the work of the mixed commission. During the last few days we had both gained the impression that the instructions of the new Turkish Commissioner were satisfactory, and although Minister for Foreign Affairs had decided on a two months' prolongation of the commission, term

of which should conclude to-morrow, there seems to be some hope that the matter might be settled before the expiration of the two months.

No fresh incidents have occurred, but as Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed to be fairly well disposed, and as there was always a risk of his falling, Russian Ambassador neglected no opportunity to press settlement on him.

[4261]

No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 32.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government had no objection to guaranteeing the integrity of Asia Minor; indeed, they were in favour of doing so. Their interests were purely commercial, such as the Anatolian railways.

I asked whether it would not be rather inconvenient if Turkey failed to keep order in Asia Minor, and some German engineers on the railways were killed. What would Germany do then?

Prince Lichnowsky asked why anything of that sort should happen? Even if it did happen, he thought that Germany would not land troops.

I said that, in any case, we must first see peace made between the allies and Turkey before we could form an opinion as to what was likely to happen in Asia Minor.

I gave him the accompanying copy of the words which I had used to the French Ambassador.*

On his remarking that the "Times" here had already pointed out that our "désintéressement" in Syria did not mean the recognition of a sphere of interest, I again said that, in consequence of what the French press—at any rate, the "Temps"—had said in this connection, I had observed to M. Cambon that what I had said about Syria did not imply a disturbance of the *status quo*, which it was our object to preserve.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* Reports having appeared in the French press to the effect that British agents were working for the annexation of Syria either to Great Britain or to Egypt, I told M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government had neither the intention of taking any action there nor any design nor political aspiration of any sort.

[3809]

No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received January* 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy dated the 24th January, 1913 regarding the situation in Shiraz.

India Office, January 24, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Simla, January* 24, 1913.

PLEASE refer to Cox's telegram to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 19th instant, regarding situation at Shiraz.

We agree that advantage should be taken of existing opportunity to obtain from

Persia certain definite concessions, but on the specific requirements mentioned by the resident, we would remark as follows:—

First.—It is most desirable that our prescriptive right to buoy and light the Persian Gulf and to police its waters should be recognised, and this should be pressed, but it seems unnecessary to demand reaffirmation respecting quarantine.

The second point is not urgent, and might be held over.

The undertaking mentioned as third point would be impossible unless Russia first consented; and to seek her consent would probably mean that she would make counter-demands, which is doubtless not convenient in existing circumstances.

Fourth.—Rights for navigation on the Karun are not an urgent matter, but it might be well to mention them.

Fifth.—As far as Persia is concerned, our *de facto* position on the Trucial Coast and at Bahrein is assured; recognition of British consular protection of the subjects of these States in Persia might, however, be demanded.

The sixth and seventh points might be held over till occasion arises for them to be dealt with.

With regard to the concluding paragraph of telegram under review, our opinion is that if the general question is to be raised of British interests in Persia, we should, without doubt, press Persian Government to undertake to alienate or lease no Gulf island, or part thereof, to any other Power unless we consent, and also to agree that if the occasion arises, the portions of Sheikh-Shuaib, Larak, Hormuz, Henjam, and Kishm islands, that may be required for purpose of lighting and buoying and policing the Gulf, and for convenience of ships of the Royal navy employed on these duties, shall be leased to us.

(Repeated to Bushire.)

[3885] No. 45.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 26, 1913.*

TURCO-PERSIAN frontier.

My telegram No. 41 of 24th January.

At yesterday's sitting of mixed commission, Turkish delegates, owing to recent change in Government, had not yet received the fresh instructions they were awaiting, the Persian commissioners agreed on their own responsibility on provisional prolongation for fifteen days, pending the receipt of instructions from their Government respecting the two months' prolongation applied for by former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[2695] No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir W. Townley.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 13 of 9th January: Lighting and buoyage in Persian Gulf.

The India Office suggest that a notification be made at once to foreign consuls as to the new gas buoys at Bushire and Bunder Abbas and the dioptric lanterns at Bushire. Do you think the moment opportune, bearing in mind that this may possibly raise the whole question of British control of lighting and buoyage with the Persian Government?

If you are prepared to deal with this question now, you have discretion to do so.

In event of your not thinking it desirable at this moment, do you think in any case that the notification to foreign consuls might be made, risking objections of Persian Government?

[3298] No. 47*.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from the India Office,* suggesting that the expenditure on lighting and buoyage, wireless telegraphy, and survey schemes in the Persian Gulf should be adjusted quarterly between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers, instead of yearly as heretofore.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, to cause the India Office to be informed that this suggestion is accepted.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

* No. 37*.

[4452] No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 39.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.

THE German Ambassador told me this afternoon that his Government attached great importance to the integrity of Asia Minor, and that they feared, as Russia was massing troops in the Caucasus and was taking a great interest in Armenia, that she might be contemplating some move. If Russia was to move into Armenia and France into Syria, Germany could not be indifferent.

I said that, only a few days ago, the Russian Ambassador had asked me to impress upon the Turkish Government that a settlement of the disputed Turco-Persian frontier was what Russia really desired, and that, if Turkey would make this settlement, she would find Russia quite friendly. I did not believe that Russia had any designs upon the integrity of Asia Minor, but there were strategic points on the Turco-Persian frontier that Turkey had threatened. I would tell the Russian Ambassador what the German Ambassador had said to me, but if, as I believed, a settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier was the one thing required to produce security, perhaps German influence could be used in Constantinople to impress this on the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4349] No. 48.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 179.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bushire, January 28, 1913.

I HAVE just received information that lighthouse, consisting of skeleton iron tower with fairly powerful red light, has been erected at Fao. Work commenced about 21st January, and was completed yesterday. Material was apparently sent out from Constantinople to Bussorah, whence it was sent to Fao by lighter.

Light has been tried experimentally, but I understand that it will not be shown for some days till ships have received warning.

(Addressed to Foreign, reference my telegram No. 318 of 9th April, 1911; repeated to Foreign Office; sent by post to Bussorah.)

[4624] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.

IN the course of my conversation to-day with Count Benckendorff and M. Cambon as to a compromise about Scutari, I impressed upon Count Benckendorff how strong was the German apprehension of a Russian move in Armenia. I thought that this was already beginning to affect the German attitude in Constantinople, and it would react unfavourably upon the German attitude in the Albanian question. If, as I had been told by Count Benckendorff, the settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier was Russia's one anxiety, I did not see why she should not have a frank explanation with Germany about it, and it would be very desirable that she should do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4458] No. 50.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 29.)

Sir,

India Office, January 28, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 17th instant forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople expressing approval of the continued

employment of a Hindu consular guard at Bagdad, I am directed to say that the Marquess of Crewe agrees that Sir G. Lowther's view should receive the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[4783] No. 51.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 29, 1913.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day the substance of Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 28, explaining to him what I had instructed Sir George Buchanan to say in St. Petersburgh. I observed that this information was satisfactory, and I again emphasised the advantage it would be if Germany could impress on the new Turkish Government the importance of not resuming a chauvinistic policy on the Turco-Persian frontier, and of coming to a settlement about it.

The Ambassador said that he had already put this point before his Government.

I pointed out to the German Ambassador that I understood the situation to be that, if the Balkan war began again, Russia could not sit still and see Bulgaria beaten; but, if this contingency arose, it would not be the same thing as designs on Asia Minor on the part of Russia, and it might merely imply that Russia would take action to help Bulgaria on the European side.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4639] No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 30.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 29th January, 1913, relative to Abu Musa oxide.

India Office, January 30, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 52.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 29, 1913.

ABU MUSA oxide.

Please refer to your telegram of the 2nd January.

Following report received in reply from political resident, Persian Gulf:—

"Please refer to enclosure to my letter of the 3rd November, 1912. The 5,000 odd bags alluded to there were shipped on the 14th November. Up to the 31st December, 1912, no other shipment took place, and it appears from the report of the 17th January from the agent that the removal of Hasan's gear from the island has now been effected. It is believed that in the meanwhile Wönckhaus's Lingah agent asked the German consul, Bushire, by wire to get further respite for him, but that the reply from the consul was not favourable."

[4726] No. 53.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 31.)

Sir, *India Office, January* 29, 1913.

WITH reference to the communication from this Office of the 28th November last, forwarding copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India regarding

language study in the Persian Gulf, I am directed to enclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a further telegram from the Viceroy on the subject, and to inform you that, subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, the Marquess of Crewe proposes to authorise the Government of India to permit officers to make a round trip by sea to ports where consular officers are established, and to include Bussorah for this purpose among the ports of the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure in No. 53.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 15, 1913.

LANGUAGE study.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 25th November last. Enquiry is made by military authorities whether it would be considered undesirable to allow officers to make a round trip by sea for recreation and travel to "the Persian Gulf ports," and whether this expression is to be held to include Bussorah.

We propose, subject to your Lordship's approval, to give officers permission to make round trip to those ports in the Gulf at which there are consular officers, and to reply to second question in affirmative.

[4930] No. 54.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received February 1.)

Sir, *3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, January* 31, 1913.

WITH reference to our letter of the 25th November, on the subject of steam-ship enterprise on the Tigris, and to your acknowledgment on the 13th December of the receipt of that letter, I am directed by my Board to enquire whether we may assume that the understanding embodied in the last paragraph of our letter meets with the approval of His Majesty's Government, and whether we may expect to be kept informed at an early stage of any contemplated changes in the steam-ship service which may come to the notice of His Majesty's Government, or in case His Majesty's Government should at any time consider the moment favourable for negotiations with the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
FRED W. PARRY, *Secretary.*

[4989] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, February* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 71 of 31st January.

Stock accepts representation on behalf of his firm, and is telegraphing direct to company date of arrival in London.

[5383] No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 84.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 1, 1913.

I AGAIN impressed upon M. Cambon to-day the anxiety which was felt in Rome and Berlin about Asia Minor. The Italian Ambassador had again spoken to me about the apprehension created by the articles in the "Temps," and had asked me to get assurances from France.) I had told the Ambassador that I had already spoken to

M. Cambon some time ago about the articles, and had said to him that, as the Italian Government were on good terms with France, I thought that they should get assurances for themselves if they wanted.

M. Cambon said that the French Ambassador in Rome had already spoken to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had reassured him respecting Syria and the articles in the "Temps." The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that the Italian Ambassador in London had had no instructions to speak about this subject. This, M. Cambon said, could not be accurate, as the Ambassador had spoken more than once to me.

I said that he had certainly spoken more than once, and the last time as lately as the day before yesterday.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4349] No. 57.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 3, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, reporting the erection by the Turkish Government of a lighthouse at Fao.*

I am to observe that in the memorandum forwarded to the Turkish Ambassador at this Court on the 18th July last, in the course of the negotiations for the settlement of outstanding questions between this country and Turkey, His Majesty's Government asked the Turkish Government to recognise the right of Great Britain to control the lighting of the Persian Gulf, and that the step now reported would appear to constitute a violation of the *status quo*, which both parties to those negotiations are bound to respect.

I am accordingly to state that Sir E. Grey is disposed, subject to the concurrence of the Marquess of Crewe, to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople by telegraph to protest to the Turkish Government on the above grounds against the erection of this lighthouse.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[5357] No. 58.

Consul Crow to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Bussorah, February 4, 1913.*

VALI states red fixed light 25 feet above sea level, and visible 6 miles, placed at Fao, latitude 29° 58′ 30″ north and longitude 48° 29″ 35′ east will be shown from 7th February next instead of two plain white lights.

(Repeated to embassy and Bushire for information of Government of India.)

[2695] No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence relative to the provision of two dioptric lanterns for His Majesty's consulate-general at Bushire, and the desirability of inducing the Russian Government to instruct their consul-general at that port to remove the lights at present shown by the Russian consulate-general.†

Your Excellency will observe that the lanterns in question are now in working order and therefore that it cannot now be contended that the Russian lights are necessary as a guide to ships. It is even clear that, as a matter of fact, these lights,

* No. 48.

† India Office, May 28, 1912; to India Office, June 13, 1912; Sir P. Cox (No. 9), November 24, 1912.

which have been shown since last February only, are more a source of danger than a benefit to shipping and that the British naval authorities in the Persian Gulf are anxious for their removal on that ground.

Your Excellency should take an opportunity of bringing these considerations to the notice of the Russian Government in a friendly and unofficial manner and should point out to them that the action which you have been instructed to take is dictated by a desire to avoid confusion to general navigation by the display of unnecessary lights, and you should also state that as the lightage and buoyage of the Gulf have been for many years past in the hands of the British authorities His Majesty's Government naturally desire to maintain the *status quo* in that respect, and they feel sure that the Imperial Government will admit and recognise the predominant interest which Great Britain necessarily has in the matter. You should further suggest that, if the sudden discontinuance of the lights at the present moment is distasteful to the Russian Government, this step might be postponed, as proposed by Sir P. Cox, till the transfer or departure on leave of the present Russian consul-general at Bushire.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2463] No. 60.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th ultimo, relative to the exploitation of oilfields in Mesopotamia and Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that the managing director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company called at this Office on the 9th ultimo and had an interview with Sir L. Mallet on the subject.

Mr. Greenway informed Sir L. Mallet that if His Majesty's Government were successful in obtaining the Mesopotamian concession for his company they would be in a position to refuse the offer of amalgamation made to them by the Shell Company.

He then asked whether the Admiralty had replied as to the conclusion of a contract with his company, and on being informed of their refusal to do so, said that, in that case the amalgamation of his company with the Shell Company was inevitable even if the Mesopotamian concession was secured by the former.

Sir L. Mallet pointed out that the refusal did not affect the question, and that Mr. Greenway appeared to have changed his ground, but the latter maintained his point of view.

Sir L. Mallet thereupon observed that in these circumstances there was no use in sending instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to support the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in their efforts to obtain the Mesopotamian concessions, and that he should accordingly recommend Sir E. Grey no longer to do so.

Mr. Greenway said that if his company had the support of His Majesty's Government they would be in a much better position for making good terms with the Shell Company.

Sir L. Mallet said that the sole preoccupation of His Majesty's Government was that his company's Persian concession, embracing as it did all the oilfields of Persia, which were largely situated on the Persian Gulf, should not pass under the control of a foreign syndicate. He reminded Mr. Greenway of his company's professions of imperialism and of the support which His Majesty's Government had hitherto given to them, and stated that Sir E. Grey had been much surprised to learn that persons of the standing of Lord Strathcona and Mr. d'Arcy should actually propose to enter into such an arrangement when it appeared that a marketing agreement, i.e., one for the sale of the oil at a certain price, would amply suffice to meet the case.

Mr. Greenway said that he himself would strongly oppose amalgamation with the Shell Company, and there is reason to believe that, if sufficient pressure is exercised by His Majesty's Government, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will not go beyond a marketing agreement with them.

Sir L. Mallet suggested that such an agreement might be made for five years, after which it might be to the interest of the Admiralty to make a contract with the

Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but Mr. Greenway said that such an agreement would have to be for ten years.

Mr. Greenway informed Sir L. Mallet that the Shell Company were in negotiation with Lord Cowdray in connection with the exploitation of the Mexican oilfields, and that there was no doubt that the absorption of his Lordship's interests by the company was only the matter of a very short time.

I am to draw the special attention of the Marquess of Crewe to this last statement, which appears to Sir E. Grey to be of special importance.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which Sir E. Grey has caused to be addressed to Mr. Greenway setting forth the views of the Admiralty on this subject, and to observe that this Office could only support a proposal to subsidise the Anglo-Persian Oil Company if Lord Crewe and the Lords Commissioners were able to show good grounds for doing so.*

Short of such a demonstration, Sir E. Grey has done all in his power to preserve the British character of the enterprise.

I am, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

[2463] No. 61.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

(Confidential.)

Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to the conversation which you had with Sir L. Mallet at this office on the 9th ultimo, relative to the exploitation of oil-fields in Mesopotamia and Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for the confidential information of your company, that he has received a letter from the Admiralty expressing the view that British Imperial interests in the Persian field are sufficiently strongly fully to justify them in recommending that diplomatic support might be given to your company in respect of their application for concessions in Mesopotamia and to use all legitimate influence to prevent if possible the foreign acquisition of control of the Persian fields viâ Mesopotamia. The Admiralty on their side intend in respect of Admiralty contracts to give us favourable consideration as practicable to tenders from your company, consistently with due consideration of supplies from other available sources.

There would, however, be great objections to the proposal that the Admiralty should themselves embark, or recommend the Secretary of State for India in Council to embark, upon a policy of finding 2,000,000*l.* of capital for a British company operating in territory which although presumably largely subject to British influence is nevertheless foreign territory. Although the proposal is that this advance should be repaid it would depend upon the success of the company both in finding its supplies and in maintaining its markets against powerful commercial rivals, whether the money would be repaid, and the Government would be obliged to appoint representatives to sit upon the board of a commercial company engaged in a business subject to some risk.

The Admiralty doubt whether such a policy could be recommended to Parliament on naval grounds, and if such a policy could be advocated from that point of view alone there are other oil-fields in which the arguments for similar action might prove to be equally or even more cogent, especially if the fields were in actual British territory and within a short open sea voyage from the United Kingdom than the route from the Persian Gulf, either viâ the Suez Canal or the Cape.

In regard to your remarks as to the Admiralty being unwilling to place before the Secretary of State for India in Council a proposal for an Indian subsidy to your company to include a sub-contract for Admiralty benefit, the Admiralty state that they are in communication with the India Office as to whether there is any prospect of Persian oil being adopted by the Indian Government for railways on its merits of quality and price. They point out that you are fully aware that cheap Indian coal will necessarily remain a formidable competitor with oil on some of the Indian railways, and therefore if the Persian oil products cannot be adopted on their merits either for Indian railway purposes, or for other purposes for the benefit of the Indian consumer, the Admiralty in inviting the India Office to take up the question of subsidy would be practically asking for a subsidy from India to your company indirectly for the benefit of Imperial

* No. 61.

services. Moreover, your company's proposal in respect of India involves proposals for preferential fiscal treatment of oil imported from Persia into India. This attitude, however, in no way precludes the matter being put to the India Office by your company on its merits.

In respect of negotiations between the Anglo-Persian Company and the Shell Company, you indicated that if an agreement were ultimately unavoidable contracts with the Admiralty on ordinary terms might possibly be arranged with your company, outside of any such agreement.

If that course were followed and if the Indian Government were also able on the merits of the question to utilise oil fuel on certain of the Indian railways where there might be an advantage in the use of oil over coal, considerable support would be given to the position of your company on grounds that would not be of an exceptional character. If in addition continued diplomatic support is given to the company in respect of the Mesopotamian concessions in order to avoid if possible the bringing of other foreign influence into the Persian fields, the Admiralty are of opinion that, apart from any political considerations which might justify more exceptional measures, as much governmental support as present circumstances admit would be given to the preservation of the commercial independence of the Anglo-Persian Company.

The Admiralty regret any extension of influence which may tend to a greater monopoly in the oil fuel market by powerful combinations, but they have to consider from the purely Admiralty point of view in each case whether Admiralty interests would be so jeopardised as to necessitate the consideration of the large question of subsidising commercial companies—a policy which they have hitherto declined to entertain in other cases and which if once begun would probably have to be extended—and they consider that it is at present very difficult to say in regard to any oil-field, however important in certain eventualities it might become, whether it is likely to stand in any absolutely pre-eminent or exclusive position from the Admiralty point of view.

I am, however, to express Sir E. Grey's strong hope that your company will not find it necessary to combine with the Shell Company.

I am to observe that the support which His Majesty's Government have given to your company in the past, both in obtaining their concession in Persia and in other ways, was given on the understanding that the enterprise would remain British, and it would be a matter of great surprise and regret if your company made any arrangement whereby a syndicate predominently foreign obtained control of their interests in that country.

I am to point out that, in such a contingency, your company could not of course hope to obtain from His Majesty's Government the same support as in the past.

I am to add that while, in the contrary case, your company would continue to enjoy in Persia the treatment hitherto accorded to them by His Majesty's Government, there is some reason to suppose that the German claims to the Mesopotamian concession may rest on a more substantial foundation than was at first imagined. The information at present available with regard to the precise nature of these claims is, however, incomplete, and His Majesty's Government consider it worth your company's while to make every effort at Constantinople to obtain the concession, and will afford you their full diplomatic support.

I am, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

[6020] No. 62.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 2, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 31 of the 14th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting on the movement in that vilayet for the introduction of reforms on the principle of decentralisation.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

No. 8.)

Sir, *Beirout, January* 24, 1913.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 87 of the 31st December reporting the movement set on foot for the introduction of local administrative reforms in the vilayet of Beirout, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in furtherance of this object, at a meeting of the administrative councils of the various communities of this town a special committee of eighty-six members was elected.

This representative body is composed of 42 Moslems, 16 Greek Orthodox, 10 Maronites, 6 Greek Catholics, 2 Protestants, 2 Syrian Catholics, 2 Armenian Catholics, 2 Latins, and 2 Israelites.

They all met on the 12th instant at the municipality, and after electing a Moslem as president and a Christian as secretary, they passed a resolution establishing the necessity of reforms, and elected a sub-committee of 25 members, composed of 12 Moslems, 12 Christians, and 1 Israelite, to draw up a list of the required reforms for presentation to the Government, and to work for their adoption.

It may be remarked that this is perhaps the first time that public meetings of this kind have been allowed to take place in Turkey.

So far as I can learn, the principal demands will be that a certain fixed portion of the local revenues shall be allotted to works of public utility under the sole control of the general council; that the Governor-General shall have the right to interfere in all departments of the administration, except of course the customs, posts, and telegraphs; that the services of foreign inspectors shall be engaged if found necessary, and that in general the principle of decentralisation shall be admitted.

In the meantime the Governor-General, acting under instructions from the Minister of the Interior, is also preparing a scheme of reforms with the assistance of the general council which he has specially convened for that purpose.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[6026] No. 63.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 88.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 4, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 797 of the 31st October, and to my telegram No. 246 of the 12th November, 1910, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting that the authorities have waived their objections to the registration of the property of Sheikh Mubarek of Koweit and Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Bussorah, January* 11, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the refusal of the authorities at Bussorah to permit the registration of land and house property in the names of Sheikh Mubarek of Koweit and Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah, I have the honour to report as follows:—

A telegram has been received from Constantinople by the vilayet to the effect that the services of Sheikh Khazal and Sheikh Mubarek are highly esteemed by the Government, and that the Sultan is pleased with them.

The acting vali, Ali Reza Pasha, on receipt of this telegram, sent Ahmed Naim Bey to Failieh to inform the sheikhs, but as they were absent he has decided to communicate the message to them by letter.

As regards the question of Sheikh Khazal, it will be remembered that in the time

of Suleiman Nazif Bey the Tapoo office were instructed by Constantinople not to register any property in Sheikh Khazal's name. More recent instructions have been received by this department, allowing the sheikh to acquire property in houses and shops, and I hear that Sheikh Khazal has now begun to purchase houses.

I am informed that after Hassan Reza Bey, former vali, left Bussorah, Sheikh Mubarek wrote to the vilayet asking why his land purchases were not allowed to be registered in his name. He stated that he had rendered good service to the Ottoman Government in the time of Midhat Pasha, former Vali of Bagdad, by going to Hassa and driving bin Saoud out of that district, and that he had always paid his taxes and given pecuniary assistance to the Government. He urged that the authorities should not suppose that he bought the land for other people, as they could do so themselves, and it was unreasonable to imagine that they wanted his assistance. He asked for a clear statement of the objections to his purchases.

I am informed that Sheikh Khazal also wrote to the vilayet in similar terms, stating that he preserved good relations with the local authorities, and often captured runaway criminals and returned them to Bussorah. He asked for the reasons of their refusal to the registration of his land.

Both sheikhs requested that instructions might be issued permitting the registration of property in their respective names. The Administrative Council discussed the matter and decided to support the requests of both sheikhs, informing the Minister of the Interior that there was no objection to register the lands acquired by Sheikhs Khazal and Mubarek in their respective names, and pointing out that Sheikh Mubarek had given £T. 500 towards the relief of the sufferers in the fire at Constantinople, and £T. 3,000 to the war fund during the Turco-Italian War; and that Sheikh Khazal had given £T. 400 to the Turco-Italian War fund, and £T. 300 during the present war. Ali Reza Pasha, the present acting vali, wired on his arrival here to the Minister of the Interior and confirmed the reports of his predecessors, requesting that instructions might be sent as soon as possible to permit the registration of the lands of both sheikhs.

The matter was finally arranged satisfactorily through the medium of Seyyid Talio Bey.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the political resident in the Persian Gulf for the information of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[6219] No. 64.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 36.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, February* 3, 1913.

IN reply to the enquiries which I addressed to him, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 29, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo, M. Sazonof said that, though he was constantly receiving letters from Armenians, he had so far heard nothing with regard to their supposed intention of sending a deputation to the European courts. His Excellency, however, volunteered the statement that not only was there a strong anti-Turkish agitation manifesting itself among the Armenians, but that there was also a movement in favour of their incorporation within the Russian Empire. The Russian Ambassador had, his Excellency added, been approached on the subject by some leading Armenians in Paris; but the latter had been informed that the Russian Government could not entertain the idea of anything in the shape of annexation.

Prince Abamelek Lazarof, to whom Sir G. Lowther refers, is an equerry at the Imperial Court, and owns one of the finest houses at St. Petersburgh. He is, I believe, spending the winter at Rome.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[6197] No. 65.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12 of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, reporting on the murder of the mayor of that town.

In my above-mentioned telegram I observed that Bedros Bey was probably assassinated by Tashnags.

The members of that organisation at Constantinople, however, have indignantly denied that the murder was in any way due to a decree issued by them. The fact that they have recently coalesced with the general body of Armenians, the Henchagists, and others, would seem to point in the same direction, though, of course, some individual Tashnagist may have committed the crime on his own account.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Van, January 9, 1913.*

AS I had the honour to telegraph to your Excellency on Monday last, the Mayor of Van, Bedros Kapamajian, was shot dead on Sunday night as he was leaving his house and about to enter his carriage to go to visit his son-in-law. The murder has naturally produced a profound sensation here.

Bedros Bey was one of the principal merchants of Van. He had been twice re-elected mayor, and was much respected by the inhabitants, Christian and Moslem alike. He had always shown himself opposed to the Tashnagists, and naturally, as a Government official, he could not do otherwise than support the party favourable to the vali. There is no evidence as yet of his having had any quarrel of a personal nature such as might have led up to this premeditated murder, and it is the generally accepted opinion that the murder was an act of terrorism committed by the Tashnagists.

The latter have shown themselves extremely hostile to the vali ever since his arrival, and have been using all their influence to get him removed from Van. Bedros Bey, together with most of the reputable Armenians, was on the side of the vali, and had refused to sign certain "mazbatas" demanding his dismissal. It is therefore supposed that the Tashnagists killed Bedros Bey in order to terrify the Armenians away from the side of the vali, and oblige them to declare themselves partisans of the Tashnagists.

The latter declare that the crime was not committed by order of their committee, but if they wish to prove this they have only to find the criminal, who was undoubtedly one of them, and hand him over to the authorities. Two persons have been arrested, but it is unlikely that anything will be proved against them. The wife and daughter of Bedros Bey, likewise his coachman, as is usual in such cases, decline to say a word which might help the police for fear of revenge.

In the face of what is deemed by the vali and people alike to be an act of terrorism which, if left unpunished, must obviously lead to similar acts, and eventually anarchy, the vali has shown himself weak and vacillating. His position, however, is difficult. The police force and the gendarmerie have proved of little use to him. As an illustration, I may mention that a few days ago fifteen gendarmes were sent to arrest a certain Armenian Tashnagist. This man, on being told to surrender himself, had only to put his hand on his revolver and all the fifteen gendarmes fled. To complicate matters, Jabir Pasha, the commandant of the troops, who is credited with the desire of becoming vali himself, has lately been cultivating the friendship of the Tashnagists, so that, in the event of an attempt being made to arrest and deport all their chiefs, the vali feels that military support could not be counted on.

The case of the Tashnagists against the vali is that he, generally speaking, humours and favours the Kurds, and, in particular, that he did not cause the arrest of Said Ali in the case of the killing of Raphael.

In point of fact, on his arrival here the vali adopted what is now known as the

"pilaf" policy, that is, he invited all the principal Kurds to a feast with a view to gaining their sympathy.

In explanation the vali states that, to establish a state of security in the vilayet, he had to choose between a policy of severity and one based on obtaining the assistance of the Kurd chiefs themselves in suppressing the brigands, and not allowing them to take refuge in the Kurd villages. Means not being at hand to carry out the first, he adopted the second, or "pilaf," policy.

I have, &c.
J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[6463] No. 66.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 10, 1913.*

THE Grand Vizier tells me that Hakki Pasha is being sent by the Government to London to-morrow to discuss unofficially Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf questions, and reply to be given to your note of 18th July.

[4726] No. 67.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, regarding a proposal to allow British officers to make, for purposes of travel and recreation, a round trip to the "Persian Gulf ports," including in the expression the Turkish port of Basra.

I am to state, in reply, that in the opinion of Sir E. Grey, constant visits to Basra on the part of British officers would at any time, and especially during the continuance of the present war, excite suspicion, and he would accordingly suggest that that port should be excluded from the proposed itinerary.

Subject to that exception, and on the understanding that the advice of His Majesty's consular representatives in the ports in question shall be strictly followed by the officers, he concurs in the proposal to grant the permission desired by the military authorities in India.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[4930] No. 68.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 10, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo relative to steam-ship enterprise on the Tigris.

I am to inform you, in reply to your enquiry, that the understanding embodied in the last paragraph of your letter of the 25th November last meets with the approval of His Majesty's Government, and that your company will receive timely information, should occasion arise, on the points there mentioned.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[6488] No. 69.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 72.) *Paris, February 9, 1913.*

Sir,

THE "Echo de Paris" states this morning that M. Poincaré received last week a deputation from the Syrian colony in Paris, who presented their congratulations on his election to the Presidency of the republic.

M. Poincaré is reported as having given the deputation an assurance that the policy which he had followed with regard to Syria would be continued by his successors.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[6603] No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 23rd January, 1913, relative to the Shell Oil Company.

India Office, February 10, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, December 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department endorsement, dated the 29th November, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a despatch, dated the 24th December, 1912, which I have addressed to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with regard to the entry of Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co., connected with the Shell Oil Company, into the shipping trade to these waters.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 15. Commercial. Confidential.) *Bushire, December 24, 1912.*

Sir,

IN connection with the apprehensions expressed to His Majesty's Government by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) as to possible coercion by the Shell Transport Company (of which Sir Marcus Samuel is the chairman), I have the honour to report that Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. have already commenced activities in the trade of the Shatt-el-Arab.

The British steam-ship "Ayr," now loading at Bussorah, was consigned to Asfar and Co. (Mr. Asfar is a Chaldean under French protection) by Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co., and the steam-ship "Cambyses," now about to arrive at Bushire for the Anglo-Algerian line (Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.), has been chartered for her homeward voyage by the same firm.

I have authoritative information that an Armenian in London, of the name of Karkas (?), who till recently had the entire management of the Mesopotamian business of the British firm of Andrew Weir and Co., has suddenly left them and been taken over by Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. From the same source I hear a rumour, doubtless exaggerated, that Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. are about to build or purchase a number of vessels for the Persian Gulf trade.

In view of the charter of the steam-ship "Cambyses" to Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co., relations between this company and Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. (who are, on the other hand, intimately connected with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Bussorah and Mohammerah under the style of Messrs. Strick, Scott and Co.) are a matter of some interest.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[6687] No. 71.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, February 11, 1913.*

FOLLOWING lights were established 9th February at Bushire:—

1. Outer anchorage in 23 feet, at a distance of 4·2 miles bearing south, 84° west from residency flagstaff; gas-buoy showing occulting white light, ten seconds. Light seven seconds, dark three seconds; 300 candles

2. Inner anchorage in 17 feet, at a distance of 2·5 miles bearing north, 53° west from residency flagstaff; gas-buoy showing an occulting red light ten seconds. Light seven seconds, dark three seconds; 300 candles.

(Addressed to Government of India; repeated to Minister and Director, Royal India Marine for Admiral.)

[6692] No. 72.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, February 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 263 of 11th February.

Have notified British shipping agents, but in absence of reply to my despatch of 13th December, I have taken no further pronunciatory action.

(Sent to India; repeated Tehran reference my despatch No. 95, and Foreign Office reference my despatch No. 13 of 13th December.)

[7026] No. 73.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office.—(Received February 13.)

(Confidential.) *Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, February 12, 1913.*

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, conveying confidentially the views of the Admiralty on the proposals recently put before His Majesty's Government by my company.

Before replying to the point referred to in the earlier part of your letter, I am desired by my board to say, with reference to the last four paragraphs, that the desire expressed by Sir Edward Grey that this company may not find it necessary to combine with the Shell Company is shared very strongly by myself and by every one of my colleagues, and that it is solely for this reason that we have been endeavouring to seek for some practicable means of maintaining the purely British character of the company.

At the same time, however, I am desired again to point out that the matter is one of considerable urgency, as, although we have managed so far to put off the Shell Company by excuses of one kind and another (in which we have been helped by the fact that our entry into the market has been somewhat delayed owing to late deliveries of some plant), yet that within a short time we shall, by the exigencies of our position, be forced into coming to a decision one way or the other.

Should we unfortunately be unable to withstand this pressure we shall do our utmost to exclude contracts with the Admiralty from any such agreement, but, as you will have seen from the copies of the correspondence between Mr. Cohen, of the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Limited), and myself, beginning with a letter dated the 15th

October, 1912, and concluding with one dated the 24th October, 1912, of which I have submitted copies for your confidential information, this condition would be very strongly resisted by the Shell Company, and it may be impossible for us to insist upon it.

As regards the proposed granting of a subsidy by His Majesty's Government, my board quite appreciate that there may be difficulties in the way that are insurmountable, but they desire me to point out that it is, they think, scarcely correct to say that the Admiralty are asked to embark upon a policy of finding 2,000,000*l.* of capital, inasmuch as it could, of course, be stipulated that the annual amount should only be payable so long as the company was duly carrying out the conditions of the contract. Therefore the only risk that could be involved would be that of the amount actually paid in advance of deliveries of oil.

As regards the proposal that the financial assistance to the company should be provided by means of an Indian Government guarantee (of say 3 per cent. to 3½ per cent. per annum) on the 2,000,000*l.* of additional capital that it is estimated would be required, it is quite true that this would be practically asking for a subsidy from India for the benefit of Imperial services; but this also, for the reason given in the last paragraph, is a subsidy more in name than in effect, since the interest guaranteed would be repayable by the company annually out of the amount due by the Admiralty on account of the oil delivered, and the only risk involved would be that of the company's failure.

But the granting of this small assistance to the Imperial services would, my board venture to suggest, be a very right and proper one for India to make to the Imperial Navy, more particularly in view of the great importance to India, both politically and strategically, of maintaining the purely British character of this important commercial interest in Southern Persia.

So far, as regards the adoption by the Indian Government of Persian oil in place of coal for use on Indian railways, I am pleased to report that as the result of representations by my company the Railway Board have now authorised extensive tests and trials in comparison with coal, but, though there is but little doubt that these will demonstrate the superior advantages of oil, the question of whether or not the Indian Government eventually decide upon the use of Persian oil for railway purposes will not help to solve the present difficulty, as it will be eighteen months to two years before the results of these tests and trials can be shewn.

Therefore, the proposal as to the giving of a guarantee by the Indian Government is one that must, presumably, be judged solely from the point of view of whether or not India can properly be asked to make this (nominal) contribution to the Imperial Navy, and on this question my board fear that any representations made by them to the India Office will be of no avail unless at the same time some strong indication were given that such assistance would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government.

But, as represented by me at my last interview with Sir Louis Mallet, if none of the proposals so far put forward by us is felt to be practicable, there are, given a desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to preserve the British control of the Persian oilfields, probably half-a-dozen alternative ways in which this could be achieved; and if a meeting could be arranged at which some members of my board, and such members of the Government and [or] of the Admiralty Board as are dealing with this matter, could meet together to discuss the various alternatives at a "round table conference," some solution could no doubt be found.

For example, one suggestion which I put forward at my interview with Sir Louis Mallet was that a contract should be entered into between the Admiralty and my company on the lines proposed in my letter dated the 20th ultimo—one of the stipulations of this contract being that the Admiralty should each year pay 100,000*l.* on account of the oil subsequently deliverable. This is quite an ordinary condition of commercial contracts, and in effect would mean that, from the time that we begin the large amount of expenditure (for additional field development, pipe lines, and refineries) that would be required to implement the contract—*i.e.*, "lay the keel" of this extension of our business—we should be paid 100,000*l.* per annum on account of the money expended, which sum (at the rate of 5*s.* per ton) would go in reduction of the amount payable for the oil we have delivered.

Such an arrangement might, my board think, enable them to raise the additional capital that would be required to meet a contract of the nature of the one under consideration, and at the same time remove the one obstacle that stands in the way of the company maintaining its independence.

As the matter is one of great importance—not only to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), but also, we venture to think, to His Majesty's Government—and

is also of extreme urgency, my board would feel much obliged if Sir Edward Grey could see his way to arranging an early meeting, as suggested above, at which the whole question would be discussed, with a view to trying to find some practicable way of dealing with the difficulty in a manner that would neither be onerous to the Government nor be open to political objections.

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Managing Director.*

[7315] No. 74.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Bushire, January 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 115, dated the 15th January, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister regarding the desirability of obtaining recognition by the Persian Government of our protective rights in regard to Bahrein, and our title to protect Bahrein subjects in Persia.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure in No. 74.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.

Sir, *Bushire, January 22, 1913.*

IN my telegram of the 19th January, I had the honour to suggest, amongst other desiderata, the preliminary settlement of which by the Persian Government was desirable, the abandonment by the latter of its empty claims to sovereignty over Bahrein, and the recognition of our protective rights in regard thereto, and our title to protect Bahrein subjects in Persia.

It will be remembered that His Majesty's Foreign Office intimated in 1909 that it was intended to raise the question again when an opportunity presented itself.

2. The subject of Persian claims to Bahrein, and the attitude adopted by the Persian Government in the matter of the protection of Bahreinis in Persia, is doubtless familiar to your Excellency, and it will be sufficient for me, before mentioning such local developments as have occurred since the matter was last under discussion, to refer to the correspondence ending with Sir G. Barclay's despatch No. 116, dated the 4th June, 1909, to His Majesty's Foreign Office.

3. During 1910 an arrangement was come to with the Sheikh of Mohammerah, in regard to the protection of Bahreinis, which has fulfilled its object, in so far that no further question in this regard has arisen since then in Arabistan, where, so recently as June 1912, the intervention of His Majesty's consul in regard to a Bahrein subject has been accepted apparently without demur by the provincial director of customs at Mohammerah. This departmental recognition has also been accorded, though with some hesitation, at Lingah.

4. In Bahrein itself the element of petty difficulty and intrigue arising out of the lingering fiction regarding Persia's claim to the islands, though for the time dormant, still survives. It will be remembered that, in July 1910, His Majesty's Foreign Office agreed to the expulsion from Bahrein by the sheikh of a certain Persian merchant, Abdul Nabi, who had been constructively treating Bahrein as a Persian port by issuing internal coastal tezkereh passes to Persians proceeding from Bahrein to Persian ports. When, however, authority was received for this man's expulsion several circumstances combined to make it necessary to suspend action for the time: firstly, the sheikh now proved unwilling to act against Abdul Nabi; and, secondly, it was discovered that the British-Indian director of Bahrein customs had innocently, in the absence of Abdul Nabi, signed some passes to the same effect without understanding the bearing of them.

As we were at the time engaged in the framing of an order in council which

would put us in a position for dealing with foreigners effectively ourselves, it was thought prudent by the political agent and myself, in view of the sheikh's uncertain attitude and the above circumstances, to postpone dealing with Abdul Nabi until it had been brought into operation. The issue of the said order has been delayed from month to month, but is on the point of issue, and meanwhile, the objectionable practice has not of late been in evidence.

5. Having regard to the fact that the Persian Government based their claim to the sovereignty of Bahrein on no better grounds than a convention dated 1822, which was not only never ratified, but was specifically repudiated by both the Persian and British Governments, the abandonment of the claim would not appear to involve to them any real loss of prestige or *amour-propre*, and by removing from the category of disputed issues a matter which has caused a vast amount of correspondence and no little diplomatic friction in the past, can only tend to improve our relations with the Persian Government and its local officials.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Foreign Office and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[7318]

No. 75.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 5.)
Sir,

Bushire, January 22, 1913.

IN continuation of my preceding despatches, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a despatch, dated the 22nd January, 1913, which I have addressed to His Majesty's Minister with regard to our present position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government in the matter of our right to protect in Persia subjects of the trucial chiefs of Oman.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure in No. 75.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir W. Townley.

Sir,

Bushire, January 22, 1913.

IN my telegram dated the 19th January I had the honour to mention, amongst other desiderata, the recognition by the Persian Government of our protective rights over the Trucial Coast, and our right to protect in Persia subjects of the trucial chiefs of Oman.

2. Our position *vis-à-vis* the Persian Government in this matter differs from that in regard to the question of the protection of Bahreinis, inasmuch as it does not appear that specific representations have been ever made on the subject at Tehran.

3. The question, like many others, was first raised by the action of one of the Belgian Customs officials in the Gulf, who formally declined in 1907 to accept British intervention in two cases concerning subjects of the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Shargah, quoting in justification "Tehran circular No. 1361, dated the 4th February, 1905," of which, however, he declined to furnish a copy.

In reply to my suggestion that we should obtain formal recognition of our position in this matter from the Persian Government, Mr. Marling replied that our right to insist on the Persian Government accepting such intervention was unassailable in view of our published treaties of 1892, and that it seemed probable that His Majesty's Government would insist on final recognition of our rights respecting Bahrein and Bahreinis also, and that he was inclined to think that these matters would best be dealt with simultaneously.

Sir G. Barclay, however, subsequently expressed the opinion that, although we could not admit any refusal on the part of the Customs or other authorities to

recognise our rights to intervene on behalf of these sheikhs, he preferred not to raise the question for the present except in the event of our intervention being challenged in some more specific case than those at the time under consideration.

4. The issue has not been actively raised by the Persian Government since, and at Lingah and elsewhere the local authorities and Customs officials now accept our intervention in matters concerning Oman subjects without demur, but, in the absence of any specific recognition of our title and the issue of instructions to local authorities by the Central Government, they are in a weak position to co-operate with us even when personally friendly and inclined to do so.

For example, I would recall the action of the Turkish consul at this port, who proceeded to Lingah in 1911, and, without informing our representative, who is officially in charge of Turkish interests there, enrolled as Turkish subjects some 400 Persian, Oman, and trucial Oman subjects haphazard. Had our position with regard to the latter category been clearer, both we ourselves and the local Persian authorities would have been on stronger ground for taking prompt action on the spot to put a term to this and similar intrigues, which, as will be noted from the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report for 1911, reacted at the time unfavourably on the authority of the Governor of the Gulf Ports at Lingah.

5. Having regard to the position as described above, it will appear that, whilst our title to protect in Persia the subjects of the trucial chiefs of Oman is unassailable, it would be distinctly advantageous to obtain formal recognition thereof from the Persian Government, who can have no reasonable grounds for withholding it.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Foreign Office and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

[7466]

No. 76.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 111.)
Sir,

Constantinople, February 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Van reporting on the situation at that place.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Vice-Consul Molyneux-Seel to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2.)
Sir,

Van, January 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a further report on the condition of this vilayet. The vali's claim to have brought about a cessation of brigandage since his arrival here appears to be a just one, though whether this is the fruit of his conciliatory policy with the Kurds or, as his enemies say, due to the arrival of winter, cannot yet be definitely known. It is a fact, however, that since the arrival of the vali nothing has been heard of Mir Mohe, Said Boy, and other well-known brigands, whereas last winter and the preceding one, many encounters took place between them and the troops. According to the vali's own statements the inducements which he has offered to the Kurds for their remaining quiet are only such as can be temporarily effective, and it is not likely that the arrangement, whatever it may be, will be able to stand the strain for any length of time of the continued provocative attitude of the Taschnakists towards the Kurds.

The vali has given me to understand that he considers that his departure would be the signal for the renewed activity of the Kurd brigands and for the deferred revenge of the murder of Yakoub and his five companions at Karkar.

While the vilayet has been enjoying a respite from brigandage a situation causing ground for much uneasiness has arisen from other causes.

The vali had no sooner arrived here and made it clear by what is known as his

"pilaf" policy with the Kurds that he did not intend to be the tool of the Taschnakists, than the latter organised a campaign against him to secure his dismissal. Soon followed the incidents of Raphael and Yakoub and more recently the murder of the mayor. The commandant, who fell out with the vali almost immediately after his arrival, has been encouraging the Taschnakists and gaining a section of the Moslem population to the side of what may be called the military party in alliance with the Taschnakists. The result is that the vali finds himself deserted except by a small following of Moslems. No Armenian of note dare openly declare himself partisan of the vali. The vali himself fears an attempt on his life. Personally I do not think that the Taschnakists would go to such lengths, as being a Kurd, his assassination would produce the gravest results.

The vali has undertaken several local reforms, among them a modification of the system of "Council of Ancients," and the appointment of village guards. He has also formed a commission to study and settle administratively the vexed land question both as concerns the claims of Kurds and Armenians. Regarding the latter step, the vali has been placed in a difficult position by the receipt of instructions from Constantinople not to proceed with the work of this commission as the Central Government has under consideration a general scheme of reform embracing the land question. If the vali now gives orders for the work of this commission to cease, his action would be liable to misconstruction.

However, the whole Armenian population are strongly opposed to any reforms being initiated or carried through by the Turk at the present juncture, as they wish the matter to be taken in hand by the Powers. A "mazbata," signed by 5,000 Armenians of this town (there are no signatures of any notables among them), has been sent to the three vice-consulates. After passing in review the past six centuries of Ottoman history the "mazbata" goes on to state, somewhat ingenuously, that Europe undertook by article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin to guarantee the security of the lives, honour, and property of the Armenians and has only succeeded in causing them to be massacred; it then requests the Powers to put no faith in Ottoman promises of reform, not excepting the present commission the object of which is to bury the Armenian question, but to take in hand the necessary reforms under their own effective control.

Similarly representations have been made to me by a Syrian bishop speaking on the desire also, so he said, of several other prelates on behalf of the Syrian race. They request that if the Armenian question is to be taken into consideration by the Powers, their case may also be considered. Their ambition is to leave the mountains where persecution has driven them, and where they live in poverty and misery and return to their own country in Mesopotamia and live and develop as a Christian nation under British protection.

They point out that Mesopotamia is in need of a population, and that, given British protection and a district of country to settle in, they would be able to live united and develop as a nation.

What they fear most is absorbtion by Russia. They strongly condemn Mar Shimun's attitude in turning his back on the English mission and seeking the friendship of Russia as being prompted by purely selfish and personal motives.

The Syrians in the whole of Turkey must number nearly a million, it is therefore not unnatural that they should desire not to be left out of any scheme for the betterment of the Christian races of Turkey.

I have, &c.

J. MOLYNEUX-SEEL, *Captain.*

[7472] No. 77.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 118.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice an incident of some interest which has occurred in the Diarbekir vilayet, and which is of importance in its bearing on the attitude of the new régime in Turkey towards the Armenian population in those vilayets.

On the 9th September last a certain Hanna Effendi Kazazian was found shot in the streets of Diarbekir, and two notorious Mussulman assassins were arrested upon suspicion of the murder. After a summary enquiry these two men were released,

although it appears that the evidence against them was at least sufficient to merit their being committed to trial.

The murdered man was a prominent Armenian Catholic, and it is significant that at the date of the murder he was known to be the only Christian parliamentary candidate in the Diarbekir district. His murder, and the unjustified release of his suspected assassins, led to much agitation in Armenian circles, and representations were made to the British and French embassies here.

Finally, early in October, the rearrest of the suspected murderers was effected on a direct order from the Grand Vizier, but these were again released by the court of enquiry on the 14th of last month.

The circumstances of this further release are rendered suspicious, not only by the fact that the evidence adduced against the prisoners was of considerable importance, but also that prominent local members of the Committee of Union and Progress had openly used their influence to secure the acquittal, and the whole incident has aroused much ill-feeling among Armenians generally.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[7820] No. 78.

Mr. Greenway to Foreign Office.—(Received February 18.)

Sir, *Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, February* 17, 1913.

I BEG to confirm the appointment with Mr. Parker at 3 P.M. to-morrow arranged by telephone this afternoon, to discuss with Mr. Stock and myself the question of the steps to be taken in connection with the oil concession for Moussoul and Bagdad.

In the meantime, I beg to enclose copy of extracts from a letter which Mr. Nichols has received from a correspondent at Constantinople, from which it will be seen that Mr. E. Whittall has recently put forward a definite application on behalf of the National Bank of Turkey for the concession in question.

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Managing Director.*

Enclosure in No. 78.

Extracts from Letter received by Mr. Nichols from Correspondent in Constantinople.

MY friends at the Ministry of Mines have handed me a copy of an application to the said ministry signed by a member of the Board of Managers of the National Bank of Turkey, Mr. E. Whittall, the summary of the contents being as follows:—

"In accordance with a former agreement and the special clauses of the railway concession of the Anatolian Railway Company, the right of working the oil mines situated in the Moussoul and Bagdad districts was granted to the said company. By a special arrangement these rights have been transferred to us, and we, therefore, hereby ask for the concession of working the said petroleum mines."

The Minister of Mines, in order that he may be in a position to deal with this request, has written a letter to the Minister of Public Works asking for particulars of the above-mentioned rights claimed by the Anatolian Company, to which the Ministry of Public Works replied briefly to the effect "that the Minister does not know, neither has he found in the conventions of the Anatolian Company, any clause or disposition granting to them the right of working the oil mines alluded to."

The Ministry receiving this reply will be obliged to put the matter aside in view of the above, whilst, on the other hand, the earlier orders of the Sublime Porte that the Ministry is not to deal with the petroleum mines will also prevent them from taking the initiative.

I know, however, as a fact, that now that the Committee of Union and Progress is in power, and seeing that two of the influential members of the committee are on the

board of management of the National Bank they will try again, taking new and more effective steps, to secure recognition of these rights, directly or indirectly, by the State Departments.

I may add that some of the superior officials of the Mining Department have been promised "satisfactory remuneration" if the affair succeeds.

[7853] No. 79.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, February 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 89 of 12th February: Turco-Persian boundary.

Communication made to-day by the Russian Ambassador and myself.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me that he had been actively engaged on the subject, and promised a settlement within twenty days.

I asked if I might so inform you officially. He replied in the affirmative.

A similar answer was given to my Russian colleague.

[7026] No. 80.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to a letter from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, of the 12th instant, copy of which was sent to you on the 14th, concerning the views of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the proposals recently put forward by the company, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he would be glad to be favoured with an early expression of the views of their lordships on the contents of that letter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[8011] No. 81.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam-Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, February 18, 1913.

Sir,

WE learn from the press that Hakki Pasha is now on a visit to London with a mission from the Turkish Government to His Majesty's Government. It will be within your recollection that his Excellency succeeded Hilmi Pasha as Grand Vizier when the latter was obliged to resign office, partly owing, it was said at the time, to the friendly attitude which he had adopted towards the proposals for a fusion of the steam-ship interests on the Tigris, which were receiving the support of His Majesty's Government. Upon assuming the office of Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha reversed the policy of his predecessor in this respect, and the fusion proposals were abandoned. It is unnecessary to remind you of the great trouble and expense to which our company was put in connection with these protracted negotiations. The work which devolved upon His Majesty's Foreign Office and upon the British Embassy in Constantinople was also considerable. The failure of the negotiations had, moreover, a very prejudicial effect upon British interests in general in that part of the world and upon the interests of this company in particular.

Under these circumstances my board feel it to be their duty respectfully to suggest to His Majesty's Government that, if his Excellency were to leave this country without having received from His Majesty's Government any indication to the contrary, he might carry away with him the impression that His Majesty's Government had not attached much importance to the failure of these British proposals. The moment may not now be opportune for reopening the negotiations. Upon that point my board are

* Also to India Office, *mutatis mutandis*.

reluctant to express an opinion, as they are unaware of the scope of his Excellency's mission. But, since his Excellency is now engaged on an official mission to His Majesty's Government, we trust that he may be able to convince himself personally of the importance which is attached here to an early and a satisfactory solution of the steam-ship question on the Tigris.

I have, &c.
FRED. W. PARRY,
Secretary.

[7820] No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 105. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 20, 1913.*

MR. STOCK, local representative of Messrs. D'Arcy and Greenway, is returning to Constantinople on Monday, and I have to instruct your Excellency to arrange for a private interview between Mr. Stock and the Grand Vizier at an early date in regard to the oil concession in Mosul and Bagdad.

As you are aware, I have been advised that, on the terms of the 1904 agreement between the Anatolian Company and the Civil List alone, there is no reason to assume that the Germans have a secure title to an option. Moreover, in the spring of 1909 the terms of a contract had been virtually agreed to by the Ottoman Government on the one hand and the lawyer (Sir Edwin Pears) and local agent of Mr. D'Arcy on the other. The Grand Vizier had given assurances that the concession would be granted, and his Highness had gone so far as to issue a recommendation that an irade should be promulgated when the *coup d'Etat* took place.

In view of these circumstances, and the expectation long held out to Mr. D'Arcy that the concession would be granted to him, His Majesty's Government feel confident that the Ottoman Government will recognise the claim of Mr. D'Arcy now definitely advanced, and I have to request your Excellency to afford Mr. Stock your sustained and energetic support, as it is a matter of supreme importance to British interests that these oilfields should not pass into the hands of a foreign-controlled combine.

I understand that a definite application has only recently been put forward by Mr. Whittall on behalf of such a combine, which appears to have succeeded to the claims of the Anatolian Railway Company.

[8390] No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 21.)

Sir, *India Office, February 20, 1913.*

IN reply to your letter of the 18th February on the subject of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession, I am directed to say that the question of India's contribution to the cost of the Royal Navy is one which must be considered on its merits; and that even if the Secretary of State in Council were prepared to admit the principle of an increased contribution, the form in which it is suggested by the company that it should be made, viz: a subsidy to a speculative commercial undertaking, is not likely to satisfy the Admiralty and, in the Marquess of Crewe's opinion, could not be defended in Parliament.

As regards the proposal for a conference, his Lordship will be happy, if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wishes to hold one, again to depute Mr. F. C. Drake to represent this office, but he sees no reason to modify the views expressed in this office letter of the 4th January last as to the essentially limited extent of Indian political interests in the matter.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

[8557] No. 84.

Consul Crow to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 1. Commercial.)

Sir, *Bussorah, January 31, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to private information received by me at Bussorah, Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. are building four or five oil fuel burning steamers for the Persian Gulf trade; the vessels are said to be large and will have good passenger accommodation. The proposed itinerary will be Marseilles, Jibuti, Aden, Muscat, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, Mohammerah and Bussorah. The first steamer is promised for March next. The agent of the line is Asfar and Co., an Arab catholic under French protection. Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co., have previously chartered ships for the Gulf trade. The "Cambyses" which came out lately chartered by Messrs. Strick Scott and Co., the agents of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was chartered by Marcus Samuel and Co. for the return voyage at a rate, so Messrs. Strick Scott and Co. say, at which they could not look at and Asfar and Co. had no difficulty in filling her. I understand that Asfar and Co. have acted as Marcus Samuel's agents for some time past. The Persian Gulf branch of Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. is under the management of a certain Korkis (Razouk), who was formerly in the employ of Andrew Weir and Co. but left that firm and is now taking legal action against them.

I hear that Messrs. Marcus Samuel and Co. are doing a big business and taking heavy risks.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[8511] No. 85.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 131.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 120 to Sir G. Buchanan and to your telegram No. 89 to me, I have the honour to report that after agreement with my Russian colleague the enclosed communication to be made to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs was drawn up.

The Russian Ambassador and I spoke to the Minister on the subject to-day and handed in the communication.

Prince Said Halim assured me that he had been giving careful attention to the matter, that his predecessor in office had evidently gone very deeply into the matter, for he had found a vast collection of documents accumulated, but that he had decided to deal with it in a practical manner and give it a final solution.

On being pressed as to when this solution might be looked for, his Highness said "within fourteen to twenty days"; and on my asking him whether I could give this information officially to you, his Highness replied in the affirmative.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 85.

Note communicated to Ottoman Government.

D'ORDRE de leurs Gouvernements, les Ambassades de Grande-Bretagne et de Russie ont l'honneur de s'adresser à la Sublime Porte en la priant de vouloir bien activer la réponse aux notes adressées respectivement à l'Ambassade Impériale ottomane à Londres en date du 5 (18) juillet, 1912, et à son Excellence Noradounghian Effendi, Ministre Impérial ottoman des Affaires Etrangères, en date du 9 (22) août, 1912, concernant la délimitation de la frontière turco-persane. Les deux Ambassades se font un devoir d'exprimer leur conviction qu'une prompte solution de la question dans le sens indiqué dans les notes susmentionnées est nécessitée par les intérêts de l'Empire ottoman lui-même, qui n'aurait rien à gagner à laisser traîner en longueur ces négociations.

Constantinople, le 17 février, 1913.

[7820] No. 86.

Memorandum communicated to Tewfik Pasha.

IN the spring of 1909 the terms of a contract had been virtually agreed upon, and approved by the Sultan's Civil List, between the Ottoman Government, on the one hand, and the representative and local agent at Constantinople of Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, a British subject, on the other, whereby the right to work the deposits of mineral oil existing in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad was assured to Mr. D'Arcy.

The Grand Vizier had given assurances that the concession in question would be granted to Mr. D'Arcy, and had gone so far as to make a recommendation that an Imperial iradé should be issued to that effect, when the *coup d'Etat* which occurred at that time prevented the completion of the transaction.

The local representative of Mr. D'Arcy leaves London for Constantinople in a few days with a view to pursue the matter, and His Majesty's Ambassador at that capital has been furnished with stringent instructions to afford him sustained and energetic support, and to arrange for his reception by the Grand Vizier at an early date.

In view of the circumstances above related and of the expectation long held out to Mr. D'Arcy that the concession would be granted to him, His Majesty's Government feel confident that the Ottoman Government will recognise his claim, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs trusts that his Highness the Turkish Ambassador will recommend it strongly to the favourable consideration of the Sublime Porte.

Foreign Office, February 24, 1913.

[7820] No. 87.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 24*, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 17th instant, and your interview at this Office on the following day, in connection with the negotiations for an oil concession for Mosul and Bagdad, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been instructed by telegraph to arrange for a private interview between the Grand Vizier and Mr. Stock at an early date after the latter's return to Constantinople, and to lend your representative his sustained and energetic support during the future conduct of negotiations.

Sir G. Lowther was at the same time directed to remind the Ottoman Government that the terms of a contract had virtually been agreed upon in the spring of 1909 between the Sublime Porte and Mr. D'Arcy's lawyer and local agent; that the Grand Vizier had given assurances that the concession would be granted, and had actually recommended the promulgation of an iradé when the *coup d'Etat* took place.

The Ambassador was to inform the Ottoman Government that, in view of these circumstances and of the expectation long held out to Mr. D'Arcy, His Majesty's Government felt confident that the Ottoman Government would not longer delay in recognising the claim which he had now definitely put forward.

I am to add that a memorandum embodying the above views has been sent to the Turkish Ambassador, and that an opportunity will be taken of mentioning the matter to Hakki Pasha.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9216] No. 88.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of an enclosure in a covering letter from the political resident in the

Persian Gulf dated the 4th August, 1912, on the subject of the limits of Koweit. A copy of map referred to in the enclosure is the only one in the possession of the India Office, and its early return is requested.

India Office, February 25, 1913.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, August 4, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to the Secretary of State's telegram of the 26th July calling for evidence demonstrating the control over tribes exercised by Sheikh Mobarak within the limits referred to in Mr. J. G. Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf.

2. A reference to the political agent at Koweit on the subject has been necessary and on receipt of his reply Government will be addressed by telegraph. Meanwhile I have the honour to state that a careful study of records since 1897 bearing on the question of the limits of the Sheikh's effective influence inclines me to the view, as I shall proceed to explain, that, if it is still possible to arrange for the adoption of a slight modification of Mr. Lorimer's line, it would be expedient to do so.

I would explain in this connection that both when telegraphing to the Government of India on the 26th March, 1911 and on the 6th July, 1912, I was absent from my head-quarters and archives and had to reply without reference to them.

3. I may commence by inviting reference to the line which Captain Shakespear indicated, in a report on his tour in the Koweit hinterland, as being in his opinion the boundary of the principality. It is somewhat less extensive, but to the southwards, a good deal more definite, than that indicated by Mr. Lorimer, upon such scanty information upon the subject as was available to him. It, however, includes Anta'a (Nta'), a group of villages of considerable importance (*vide* Map of the Koweit hinterland Survey of India June 1910, 8-miles to 1-inch), which Captain Knox's reports of 1908 give good grounds for regarding as within the domains of Sheikh Mobarak; and the statement of the Porte that it is part of the vilayet of Bussorah is presumably on all fours with their claim that Koweit is also in that province. Its headman in 1908, at any rate, was a nominee of the Sheikh of Koweit.

4. It will be seen that Captain Shakespear also includes within the limits of Koweit district, Jazirat 'al Amayir, an island inside Musallamiyah Bay. This is identical with the Bay of Balbul which was described by Mr. J. C. Gaskin, in his report to the resident on the 6th September, 1897, as the southern boundary of Koweit. This report, it would appear, was not forwarded to Government, though an account of the results of Mr. Gaskin's visit, in connection with which the report was made, will be found in residency letter of the 20th September, 1897 to the Government of India.

This testimony, given at a date considerably anterior to our assurances, is of considerable value. It is true that the political resident expressed doubts as to the validity of the Sheikh's claim to the island when forwarding it to the Government of India in 1902, but he gave no reasons for doing so, and the fact that the attempt of the Turks made about that time to place troops on the island failed, would seem to give us ground to include the island within the principality. There are no Turkish troops on the island at the present time.

In making these observations, however, I do not overlook the fact that the view has been expressed by His Majesty's Foreign Office and concurred in by the India Office that the Sheikh's claims cannot be sustained so far south as Musalliyah Bay. I do not know precisely on what evidence or absence of evidence that decision is based, but I realise that it may not be possible at this stage to consider the inclusion of that feature.

5. The next point after Anta'a mentioned by Captain Shakespear is Al Safah. In a country were water is a precious commodity, to be found only at certain spots, often many miles distant from each other, the inclusion of such wells within the boundaries of a principality is of the greatest importance, and as these wells appear, from Captain Shakespear's report, to be used exclusively by the tribes under Sheikh Mobarak's control, and to have at no time been touched by Turkish influence, there seems every ground to include Safah within the principality.

6. We next come to Hafar. The strategic importance to the Sheikh of Koweit of this point will be apparent from a glance at the map. It is a half-way house to Buraidah, Riyadh and Hail, and has a constant supply of water. It is a well known outpost, and

(Enclosure to Bushire Residency Letter No 1727 to the Govt of India in the Foreign Dept.)

FIDENTIAL.)

43



MAP OF THE KUWAIT HINTERLAND (CONFIDENTIAL)



its possession by Sheikh Mobarak and the tribes under his control never seems to have been seriously questioned. During the troubles that took place in 1901, he used the place as a rallying point for his forces and claimed it as in his territory and was greatly incensed with Bin Rashid, who had camped there for a time and consumed the pastures of Sheikh Mobarak's tribes. The latter laid a formal complaint before the resident of the action of Bin Rashid in a letter dated the 22nd October, 1901, an extract from which is quoted in the margin.* The statement regarding Hafar was repeated incidently in a communication from the Sheikh to the resident dated the 17th November, 1901.

7. From Hafar the boundary line assigned to the Koweit district alike by Mr. Lorimer and Captain Shakespear is the Batin, a broad low depression in the desert, in which water can generally be found at no great depth, and which contains excellent grazing. Beyond it stretches desert, almost uninhabited and quite unfertile. The Batin is a well known and well marked boundary and a tract of great value to Bedouins. There seems no reason to think that it has been inhabited, except spasmodically, by tribes other than those under the influence of the Sheikh of Koweit.

8. It may be parenthetically remarked here that whereas Mr. Lorimer had to rely upon the word of the Sheikh for his description of the boundary to the westward, it has now been personally examined by Major Knox and Captain Shakespear, with the results mentioned above, which generally speaking tend to confirm the Sheikh's claims.

9. The position of the northern boundary alone has been subjected in the past to close examination. Captain Shakespear makes the well marked Ar Ratq Ridge the north-western corner of the principality; the point seems a suitable one for the purpose and will, I trust, be adopted. Thence it has been held to run through Jabal Sanam, another prominent point, to the sea immediately south of Umm Kasr.

10. The Sheikh's claims to Safwan are, I think, a good deal stronger than has generally been thought, and might have been supported with good reason, but it seems probable that as regards this point we are committed *vis-à-vis* the Porte to recognise it as beyond the limits of Koweit; the Sheikh's influence, however, is without doubt unquestioned up to the walls of the fort at Safwan and this fact should receive recognition when the boundary is fixed. Mr. J. C. Gaskin in his report of the 6th September, 1897, gives Safwan as the northern boundary of the principality and it has always been a camping ground of his tribes. His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, reported in 1902 that in his opinion the Turkish Government never thought of exercising authority over either Safwan or Umm Kasr until recent events. The Sheikh's claim to Safwan is recorded in a letter to the resident dated the 7th February, 1902, and he further said to the senior naval officer who interrogated him on the subject, that there were eight or ten families of sedentary Bin Hanedi and Bin Tarki there, who had lived there permanently for 40 years. They paid him no regular tribute, he said, but supplied him from time to time with grass and onions as a recognition of their subordination to him.†

11. When discussing with me a month ago, various newspaper reports suggesting that the Bagdad Railway was likely to find its terminus at Umm Kasr, under the aegis of Turkey, Sheikh Mobarak made it evident that he felt strongly on the subject of that point and emphatically claimed it as his own possession. Probably in reality his claim has as much validity as those of the Turks who previous to 1901 had never shown any interest in the place. But His Majesty's Government have decided 10 years ago that they would not support his claim to this outpost and I presume that they will not alter that decision now in any case; fortunately the place loses much of its strategical value if Warba and Bubyan are retained by the Sheikh. In regard to these islands we have I think every reason to insist on the Sheikh's rights, both on their intrinsic merits and as a matter of political expediency.

Major Knox's reports on the rights of the Sheikh and his tribesmen in regard to them were submitted to Government in 1908 *vide* enclosure to Government of India, despatch No. 168, Secret External, dated the 10th September, 1908.

12. As regards other islands, I presume His Majesty's Government will be able to provide for the recognition of the Sheikh's ownership or at all events his predominance, in those mentioned by Mr. Lorimer.

13. There remains one or two other points not directly referred to in the Secretary

* "Bin Rashid is at Hafar, which is distant three days journey from Koweit; our own cattle and those of our tribesmen are prevented by him from grazing; we have consequently suffered great loss. . . . We, as directed by you, are quite in our own country and are under the shadow of your protection. It is therefore necessary that Bin Rashid should be made to quit those places, which are in our boundaries."

† . . . . . "Regarding Safwan, the crops of grain produced there are under my authority and protection. The locality of my tribes is west of it and they go there in summer where there is water. Before now the Turks or others had not laid their hand on Safwan."

of State's telegram under reply, to which I would invite reference. Firstly, I presume that the phrase "town, harbour and immediate surroundings" used in India Office telegram dated the 1st July includes the whole of Koweit Bay from Sabiyah to Ras-al-Ardh, together with Jahreh, the possession of which is a vital necessity to the Sheikh. In this connection I would invite reference to the marginally noted military report, which described very well the attitude of the Sheikh to the possession of Jahreh and the importance of its retention in connection with our Kadhamah concession.

14. The conclusion to which the considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraphs bring me, subject to confirmation or modification, on receiving the report which I await from Captain Shakespear, is that if it is still possible as between ourselves and the Turks, to work in a slightly different line to that described by Mr. Lorimer, it will be both in the interest of the Sheikh and at the same time more palatable to the Turks, if we can arrange for recognition of the line subject to the slight modification mentioned below, indicated by Captain Shakespear, which while conceding a broad strip of territory to Turkey effectively safeguards the Sheikh's rights and influence over his tribes at strategic points and at the same time has the substantial advantage of affording a well defined frontier, a consideration which the Sheikh will, I have no doubt, appreciate.

15. The modification which I recommend is that the boundary on the coast should be arbitrarily held to be at Jabal Manifah and from thence to proceed south-west to include Anta'a and thence along Captain Shakespear's boundary viâ Al Safah, Hafar and Al Batin as indicated on the accompanying copy of the most recent map.

In order to save time I have sent a copy of this communication to His Majesty's India Office.

I have, &c.

P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars*, &c.

[9432]

No. 89.

Sir L. Mallet to Hakki Pasha.

SIR LOUIS MALLET, en présentant ses compliments à son Altesse Hakki Pacha, a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir ci-joint un aide-mémoire relatif à la navigation fluviale en Mésopotamie.

Foreign Office, le 26 février, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 89.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Hakki Pasha.

THE British claim to exceptional rights of navigation on the rivers of Mesopotamia, such as are not enjoyed by any other nation, is based on the following, amongst other, considerations, which are clearly borne out by the records in the possession of His Majesty's Government:—

1. That British vessels have traded with Turkish Arabia from the 17th century; that a British factory was established at Bussorah in 1639–40 with the sanction of the Turkish Pasha; and that from this date British trade has been carried on by British vessels and boats, under their national flag, on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates.

2. That British vessels have from very early times (1761, &c.), and at the express and reiterated requests of successive Pashas of Bagdad, repeatedly assisted the Turkish local authorities in their warlike operations against internal and external enemies, and have rendered the navigation of the rivers more secure.

3. That Government vessels (under the British flag) have been attached to the British residency at Bagdad from 1820, or earlier.

4. That at that period, and for many years before, British subjects were employing their own boats in the trade between Bussorah and Bagdad under the British flag, as is shown by the terms of the letter addressed by the Pasha of Bagdad to the British Resident at that place in 1823. In this letter he stated, *inter alia*, that "no tax except one previously well defined and arranged should be levied *on boats the property of*

Annexe V.

MAP TO SHOW THE LIMITS OF KOWEIT AND ADJACENT COUNTRY.

Scale 1 inch = 48 miles.

British subjects and protégés, such, for instance, as pass between Bussorah and Bagdad"; he also stated that their boats should not be seized for the public service.

5. That in 1846 an agreement was concluded between the British Ambassador (Sir Stratford Canning) and the Porte whereby the time-honoured right of British vessels to navigate the Mesopotamian rivers was explicitly and formally recognised.

It is quite evident, and, indeed, altogether beyond dispute, from the precise and categorical reports furnished by Sir Stratford Canning on the conclusion of this agreement, that both his Excellency and the Sublime Porte regarded at the time the agreement of 1846 as a definite and permanent settlement of the conditions under which British merchant-ships, without limitation as to numbers, might navigate the Tigris and Euphrates as far as they could find water.

It is equally evident that the agreement was the recognition of a right which British ships, in distinction to ships of any other nation, had in practice enjoyed, with short intermission, for well nigh two centuries; that, moreover, they had acquired this right partly in consequence of the great and necessary services rendered during a long series of years by British agency in the maintenance of security in those regions.

Sir Stratford Canning gave the purport of the agreement of 1846 as follows:—

"That, whereas British-owned boats had for many years carried on the internal trade on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates under the British flag and without payment of dues, they should in future pay the same dues as the native-owned boats engaged in the same trade."

The agreement was based upon a memorandum communicated by Sir S. Canning to the Porte, which clearly laid down the terms on which he claimed that British vessels should navigate the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, whether engaged in the external or internal trade.

The memorandum was submitted by the Turkish Government to the Grand Douanier who, in a report which was communicated by the Grand Vizier to Sir S. Canning, recapitulated and explained the memorandum in terms agreeing with the views expressed by Sir S. Canning in his despatch. These two documents were embodied in the vizierial letter which received the *sanction of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan*, and was accepted by Sir S. Canning, thus constituting an agreement of a binding and formal nature.

These three documents are included in an appendix, which is annexed hereto for convenience of reference.

There can be no doubt as to the interpretation of these documents, for they were subsequently twice submitted to expert legal investigation of a most searching character, with the result that the conclusions arrived at by Sir Stratford Canning in 1846 were unreservedly confirmed.

The foregoing summary clearly shows that His Majesty's Government would be justified, both on historical and legal grounds, in claiming for British vessels unlimited rights of navigation on the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates. They feel confident, therefore, that the Turkish Government will not fail to recognise the extreme moderation which characterised their recent proposal that the number of British merchant-vessels navigating those rivers should be permanently limited to six, a proposal which was put forward without prejudice, but with the desire to effect a final settlement based on a compromise.

Foreign Office, February 26, 1913.

[9415] No. 90.

Sir A. Hirtzel to Mr. Parker.—(Received February 27.)

My dear Parker, *India Office, February* 26, 1913.

BY Lord Crewe's instructions I enclose a statement of a possible basis of compromise as regards Koweit. His Lordship hopes that it will not be used except in case of real necessity, since the sheikh will certainly regard it with suspicion, and will (Cox anticipates) already be greatly disappointed by the loss of Um Kasr, Safwan, and Musallamiya, to say nothing of Anta'a. As to this last, Lord Crewe suggests—without pressing it—that if opportunity offers for obtaining a rectification of the southern limit so as to include Anta'a (as shown in green on the map enclosed) it should be taken. I enclose some extracts from an earlier report of Knox's which show

the strength of the sheikh's claims. It should in any case be pointed out to Hakki that all our claims are based, not on the sheikh's unsupported statements, but on the evidence collected during the last five years by our own officers, who have personally examined the whole frontier.

As regards the Turkish request for a right of way for their troops, Lord Crewe is at a loss to understand why they should want it, seeing that they apparently have easier means of access to Central Arabia (either by way of the Hedjaz, or from the Persian Gulf viâ Ojeir and Hofuf, where they already have garrisons). He would, therefore, be disposed to refuse, unless it is strongly pressed for. If conceded it should be guarded by a strong proviso that no posts or garrisons are to be established along the line of march or elsewhere.

You will have noticed that the Government of India ask that if the compromise is adopted they may have time and opportunity to explain the nature of it to the sheikh before news of it can reach him from Turkish sources. Lord Crewe attaches importance to this.

Yours, &c.
A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 90.

Statement.

THE limits of Koweit and of the tribes subordinate to the sheikh are as defined in annex 4 to the British note of the 18th July, 1912. That is to say:—

2. From the coast at the mouth of the Khor-es-Zubair the line proceeds in a north-westerly direction up to and past the walls of the port at Safwan to Jebel Sanam and the Ar Ratq ridge. From the latter point it runs in a south-westerly direction along the Batin to, and including, the wells of Hafar, whence it turns to the south-east between the districts of Summan and Dabanah, till it reaches the route from Wabrah to Riyadh. From that point it runs north-east to the Na'airiyah till at the north-west corner of Radaif, and thence to the coast at Jebel Manifah.

3. The islands included in the limits of Koweit are those mentioned in the annex above referred to.

4. Within the limits specified a circle shall be drawn with Koweit town as its centre and a radius of approximately 60 English miles, including Warba Island and the mid-channel of the Khor Abdullah to the north, Qrain Hill to the south, and Kubbar Island to the south-east. Within the territory thus circumscribed the complete autonomy of the Sheikh of Koweit shall be guaranteed, as defined in the British note of the 29th July, 1911.

5. Outside this circle and within the wider limits described in paragraph 1, the existing *status quo* shall be maintained, *i.e.*, the sheikh shall continue to levy tithes, and there shall be no direct Turkish administration, and no Turkish garrisons; and, further, the Turkish Government shall agree to take no action, military or other, within those limits without previous arrangement with us.

6. Provided that there shall be a right of way for the passage of Turkish troops by the recognised caravan routes across Koweit limits in the direction of Nejd, without, however, the right of establishing posts and garrisons as above mentioned.

Enclosure 2 in No. 90.

Anta'a.

Extract of letter from Major S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit, dated the 23rd May, 1908.

IT does not appear, so far as my information goes, that Anta'a is in any shape or form a portion of the Walayat of Bussorah. It was a halting place thirty-five years ago for the Turkish expeditionary force that took Al Ahsa and, since then, only one Turkish official has ever visited it, and he formed the solitary Turk in a raiding party

of the Ajman tribe on the Umtair. The inhabitants declare themselves to be subjects of Sheikh Mubarak-as-Subah, and this is supported by the statement of the sheikh, but it would seem that the *de facto* suzernin at present is Muhammad-bin-Hithlain, Sheikh of the Ajman, who was imprisoned last year by Sheikh Mubarak.

Enclosure 3 in No. 90.

Extracts from Major Knox's Report.

THE political agent was unfortunately bound by his own voluntary undertaking given to Sheikh Mubarak that he would not proceed further south than Anta'a villages, and so nothing better than a short excursion to the hill of Midr'a, which permitted of the return in one day, could be attempted, but the Wadi-al-Amya promises to repay further examination.

It does not appear that the Turk has ever established any effective occupation there, and to elicit this fact alone has amply repaid the political agent for his journey.

The people of Anta'a maintained, without leading questions, that their relations with Koweit were of the most friendly and binding nature, and that they considered the Sheikh of Koweit as their suzerain rather than the Amirs of Riadh or the Turk at El Ahsa.

Sheikh Mubarak looks upon Anta'a as within the Koweit boundaries, and the fact of the welcome received by the political agent, and the possibility of his travelling the 150 miles to that point without the slightest molestation of any kind, lends support to the view, and enables one to form an estimate of the hold that the Koweit Sheikh has obtained over the surrounding country.

Foreign visitors have, up to date, been only Turkish.

The first was one Al Fakhri, who had with him soldiers in the time of Ibrahim Pasha, who took Addir' Iya, probably an Egyptian.

Then came a Turkish commandant with soldiers about thirty-five years ago [?] at the time of the Turks' entry into El 'Ahsa. After this visit came another, Brahim Passa, unaccompanied by soldiers this time, and apparently raiding with the famous Ajman chief, Raikan, on the Umtair. This gentleman is said to have formed a project for building a fort here for the Turkish Government, but it came to nothing. Apparently, the people of Anta'a do not pay tribute to anybody except the akhawat to the Bedouins, neither to Bin S'ud, nor to Bin Subah, nor to the Turks.

Sheikh's rights are one-tenth of produce of village, but no other rights whatever. Difficult cases are brought to Koweit for shara' settlement.

Enclosure 4 in No. 90.

Extract of letter from Captain W. H. J. Shakespear, Political Agent, dated Koweit, the 23rd March, 1910.

ACCORDING to Bedouin information, it would seem that my route ran for some days along what is recognised as the boundary of Sheikh Mubarak's territory. It may be of interest to note that this territory would be included by a line joining Jasirat-al-Amayir (or Jinna?) on the coast with Anta'a, thence to As Safa, Al Hafar, following Al Batin to Ar Ratk, whence east-south-east to the Khor-um-Kasr to just south of that fort, and the sea on the east. Some doubt seemed to exist as to whether Warba and Bubiyan Islands could be included, but Falaikha certainly is.

Enclosure 5 in No. 90.

Extract from Captain Shakespear's Diary, dated the 25th February, 1910.

MARCHED at 8·25 and struck a bit south-west to make the high road between Jahara and Safwan, which runs almost perfectly straight between the two places, and not as shown on the map. Were sniped at for some time by Thukara, who refused to be convinced by the waving of cloaks that we were peaceable travellers. Finally, had to go and threaten them with Mubarak's wrath before they would desist.

Captain G. B. Brucks, 1829.—"From Grane to Khore-el-Kuffagee along the Arabian coast the authority of the Sheikh of Grane is partially acknowledged by the Bedouin tribe, who are mostly of the Al Ali, and a branch of the Beni Kalid, and some wandering parties of other tribes; also some few straggling camps of the Montific tribe, who come this way at certain seasons."

(Bombay Selections, XXIV, 576.)

"Khore-el-Kuffagee . . . . . Here ends the authority of the Sheikh of Grane, and that of the Sheikh of Katif begins." (*Ib.*, page 574.)

[9375]

No. 91.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 27.)

Sir, *Admiralty, February 26, 1913.*

IN reply to Foreign Office letters of the 14th and 18th February, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to offer the following observations for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's letter of the 12th February. My Lords are quite willing to join in a meeting of representatives of the Foreign Office, India Office, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to discuss the suggestions which the company indicate that they could put forward as alternative to those already commented on in Admiralty letter of the 28th December, 1912, in which the objections to any proposal of a direct subsidy or to making any suggestion to the Secretary of State for India for any indirect subsidy were pointed out.

2. The Admiralty have recently entered into a contract with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for 30,000 tons of fuel oil to be delivered in 1913-14, subject to certain stipulations as to the quality of the oil, and a proposal from the company for a long term contract for large quantities is at present engaging attention. A number of considerations arise on this latter proposal which cannot be disposed of immediately but no time is being lost in going fully into the matter with a view to making a definite reply to the company at the earliest possible date, probably within the next two or three weeks. Unless the necessity for a meeting has become one of exceptional urgency my Lords are of opinion that it would be preferable from their point of view to defer the proposed meeting until the company have received a reply from the Admiralty on the question of a forward contract.

3. Possibly in the interval the Secretary of State for India may be able to obtain from the Indian Government some expression of their views generally and in particular in regard to the possibility of utilising Persian fuel oil for Indian railways. It appears very doubtful, however, whether the India Office can be expected to give an opinion at present having regard to Mr. Greenway's remarks as to the probable duration of the tests that the railway board appear to be conducting. The possibility of taking more effective action could undoubtedly be strengthened if the India Office as well as the Admiralty could enter into contracts for use of Persian oil on its merits for the services in which the two departments are respectively interested.

4. With regard to Mr. Greenway's suggestion of a contract with advanced payments, the proposal as far as can be judged on the outline given by Mr. Greenway seems to differ but little in substance from the previous proposal of a subsidy which my Lords have not felt able to entertain. Further explanation may conceivably put the proposal in a different and more favourable light or one of the alternatives may possibly prove more acceptable. To ascertain whether this is likely to be the case my Lords are communicating with the company as in letter of which a copy is enclosed herewith.

5. A copy of this letter and enclosure is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Admiralty to Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir, *Admiralty, February 26, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th January to the Admiralty, and of the 13th February to the Foreign Office, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that they are giving consideration to your offer of fuel oil as a forward contract. Certain points, however, arise which prevent them from giving an immediate reply to your proposal to the Admiralty, but no time is being lost in the matter, and my Lords hope to reply definitely within two or three weeks.

In the meantime they desire some further information in respect of the proposal in regard to the payment of advances under an Admiralty contract. They do not quite understand in the outline given in your letter to the Foreign Office in what respect this proposal differs from that of a subsidy previously suggested, nor what the security of repayment would be if oil supplies were, from any reason, not forthcoming to the extent anticipated. My Lords would be glad to be favoured with your remarks on this point, and also some indication of the possible alternatives to which you allude in the same letter.

If it should be convenient to you to interview the director of navy contracts on this subject you may perhaps be able to afford the desired information more readily in that manner than by correspondence.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[9379]

No. 92.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received February 27.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,
Sir, *February 26, 1913.*

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, and note with much satisfaction that His Majesty's Ambassador has been directed to give vigorous assistance to Mr. Stock in his negotiations for the Mesopotamian oil concessions and to arrange for him to have a private interview with the Grand Vizier at an early date.

I am pleased to note further that Sir G. Lowther has been instructed to remind the Turkish Government that the matter was practically concluded in 1909, and that therefore His Majesty's Government are confident that Mr. D'Arcy's claim will be recognised without further delay.

I note also that the Turkish Ambassador has been advised of His Majesty's Government's views, and that the matter will be mentioned to Hakki Pasha.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY.
Managing Director.

[9422]

No. 93.

Mr. Ashley (Board of Trade) to Mr. Parker.—(Received February 27.)

Dear Parker, *Board of Trade, February 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to your enquiry of yesterday, I enclose a statement, taken from the Turkish customs returns, of the imports of cotton piece-goods into the Ottoman Empire during the Turkish year 1326. The first column shows the total value of each class; the second, the value of the imports from the United Kingdom and their proportion to the total; and the third column shows the principal other countries.

I hope this is what you want.

Yours very truly,
PERCY ASHLEY.

Enclosure in No. 93.

STATEMENT of Imports of Cotton Piece-Goods into Ottoman Empire for Turkish Year 1326.

Article.	Total Imports.	Imports from United Kingdom.	Imports from other Sources.
	Piastres.	Piastres.	Piastres.
Cotton tissues, unbleached	150,585,000	93,948,000 (62·0 %)	Italy, 25,954,000 (16·9 %). India, 12,388,000 (8·1 %).
" " bleached	75,283,000	56,883,000 (75·6 %)	Italy, 6,789,000 (9·1 %). Austria-Hungary, 4,551,000 (6·0 %).
" " transparent (ganzo tulle, &c.)	58,199,000	50,713,000 (87·1 %)	India, 3,712,000 (6·4 %). Austria-Hungary, 1,429,000 (2·5 %).
" " dyed or printed	391,062,000	181,683,000 (46·5 %)	Italy, 104,399,000 (26·7 %). Austria-Hungary, 28,764,000 (7·4 %). Germany, 23,069,000 (5·9 %). France, 18,350,000 (4·7 %). Netherlands, 12,359,000 (3·2 %). Belgium, 10,580,000 (2·7 %).

[9431]

No. 94.

Sir L. Mallet to Hakki Pasha.

SIR LOUIS MALLET presents his compliments to his Highness Hakki Pasha, and has the honour to inform his Highness that His Majesty's Government learn with some surprise that a light is being shown from the lighthouse at Fao.

This step appears inconsistent with the understanding come to with the Sublime Porte to the effect that, during the progress of negotiations on these questions, there should be no disturbance of the *status quo* in regard to the arrangements for the lighting and buoyage of the Shatt-el-Arab.

There are, moreover, two serious objections to it. In the first place, the sudden illumination of a light in this manner must be a source of confusion rather than of assistance to shipping. Secondly, it can scarcely fail to prejudice the course of the present negotiations.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government sincerely hope that early instructions will be given for the extinction of the light, and Sir Louis Mallet has the honour to request that his Highness will be so good as to recommend the adoption of this course to the Sublime Porte.

Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.

[2636]

No. 95.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Murrieta and Co.

Gentlemen,

Foreign Office, February 27, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 5th December last, respecting the desire of a British syndicate to acquire certain rights claimed by Tahsin Pasha to prospect for petroleum in Mesopotamia, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he learns from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, with whom he has been in communication in the matter, that the final decision of the Council of State has been given against Tahsin Pasha on the ground that the "permis" issued to him by the Bagdad authorities in 1898 was irregularly drawn up, and that whatever rights he may have acquired under that "permis" was annulled by the Imperial iradé promulgated some months later.

Sir G. Lowther points out that the question at issue appears not to be one between

a British subject or company and the Turkish Government, but one in which a Turkish subject is endeavouring to obtain the recognition and restitution by his own authorities of certain rights said to have been formerly granted to him. It has not transpired from the correspondence, nor has Sir G. Lowther understood that you or the group interested have been officially recognised through your, or their, local agents as principals in the matter, or that the official negotiations for the recognition of the rights acquired under the licence have been conducted by you or by them, or in your or their name.

The negotiations appear on the contrary to have been conducted by Tahsin Pasha, or on his behalf and in his name, and in the circumstances, Sir G. Lowther is of opinion that it would be impossible for His Majesty's Embassy to intervene, an opinion from which Sir E. Grey sees no reason to dissent.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9491]

No. 96.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 26th February, 1913, regarding the Turkish lighthouse at Fao.

India Office, February 27, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *February* 26, 1913.

LIGHTHOUSE at Fao.

Please refer to your telegram of 5th instant, and to telegram of 9th to Sir E. Grey from Resident, Bushire, and to the précis promised.

Telegram dated 9th instant also reached us from Cox as follows:

"After examination of my records, I cannot find that there has ever been official notification of the primitive lights hitherto shown at Fao, or that the shipping relies on them, cf. p. 240 "Persian Gulf Pilot," 5th edition. In any case it is certainly a breach of the *status quo* to erect a regular light now and notify it officially.

"The new light must be considered by us

"1. As a possible and harmless item within the scope of the River Commission, supposing that commission is created;

"2. If the commission does not come into being, in its relation to our own independent scheme for the bar's lighting and buoyage.

"As regards 1, there seems to be quite a possibility that the intention of the Turks' present action is to prejudice the negotiations for creating the River Commission, respecting which they seem to have refrained from committing themselves, and to prepare the ground (as was suggested in March, 1911, by consul at Bussorah) for claiming to levy Turkish dues on shipping.

"As regards 2, given the ultimate removal of the Turkish lightship, our independent plans for buoying and lighting bar would not be affected any more by the new light than by the former one; but as things now stand, if the Turks were to lay a gas buoy somewhere between their lightship and the new Fao light, thus linking the two continuously, they would be in a position to confront us with the accomplished fact of a presentably complete and independent Turkish scheme for buoying and lighting the river mouth.

"Their action at all events appears to show that we cannot depend on their intentions towards River Commission as serious or friendly; this conclusion is the more serious because by the experience of the last two years we have been taught that the Turks can improve their own position and modify the *status quo* by these deliberate

local actions, while no warning of them reaches us from Bussorah before the plan has reached the stage of actual realisation.

"It seems, therefore, to be urgent for us to make effective protest. With all respect I would suggest that in the course of such protest it should be intimated to Ottoman Government that unless the proposal for the River Commission (the scope of which could be made to include this new light) is forthwith accepted negotiations will cease, and we shall take such action to maintain our position as we think fit. I would go so far as to suggest that it might be considered whether the present opportunity is not a suitable one for pressing on Turkey compliance with all the proposals in our memorandum, and, in event of their non-compliance, taking necessary action to assert our demand. It seems probable on all grounds that as soon as their existing difficulties in Europe are disposed of, the Turks will become increasingly difficult in respect of outstanding questions in these parts. The foregoing is in reply to your telegram No. 13 S."

Cox's views above have our concurrence. The case appears to be established clearly, but we are having further search made in the records at Calcutta.

[7820]

No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 28, 1913.

MY telegram No. 105 of 20th February: Mesopotamian oil.

I shall be glad to be informed by telegraph of the steps your Excellency is taking and the success you are meeting with. I have reason to think that the foreign-controlled combine will be pressing their claim next week, and your Excellency will therefore appreciate the importance of prompt and energetic action now.

[9670]

No. 98.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)
Sir,

Bushire, February 9, 1913.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 260, dated the 9th February, I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter with enclosures, which I have addressed to the Government of India, on the subject of the buoying and lighting of the Shatt-el-Arab bar by British authorities since 1857.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Bushire, February 9, 1913.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 260, dated the 9th February, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Government of India, that whilst examining the records of this office with a view to obtaining details of the arrangements made for the buoying and lighting of Bushire Harbour since 1863 by Her Majesty's ships and the Government of India,* my attention was drawn to incidental references on the record to correspondence which has passed under flying seal through this office between the Government of Bombay and the political resident in Turkish Arabia with reference to the buoyage of the Shatt-el-Arab bar.

* *Vide* residency letter dated November 24, 1912.

2. I therefore asked the resident, Bagdad, to be good enough to furnish me with such correspondence on the subject as was available in his archives; this he was good enough to do, and I now have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government, a précis of correspondence, so far as I have had access thereto, upon the subject since 1861.

3. It will be seen that the bar was first buoyed by us during the war of 1857 in order to facilitate the passage up river of Her Majesty's transports; and that the buoys then laid down were renewed in 1862 by the Government of Bombay, under whose instructions the political resident in Turkish Arabia had applied to Her Majesty's Embassy for a vizierial letter to the Governor-General of Bagdad, directing the latter to co-operate with Her Majesty's ships to this end.

4. The vizierial letter is not very explicit, but read in conjunction with subsequent correspondence which passed between our representative at Bagdad and the local authorities it is clear that the Turks were kept fully and explicitly informed of all our proceedings in the matter, and that so far from raising any objection they promised us every assistance and co-operation, although they abstained themselves from taking any active measures in the matter.

5. Two documents of some interest and importance are not at the moment available, viz.:—

(1.) From the political resident in Turkish Arabia, Bagdad, to the Government of Bombay, No. 81, dated the 5th October, 1861.

(2.) The original Turkish text of the vizierial instructions and subsequent correspondence on the subject between the Governor-General and the political resident in Turkish Arabia.

I am requesting the political department of the Government of Bombay, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, to be so good as to obtain from their records, and send to Government and myself, copies of the first-mentioned paper; while in regard to the second I am inviting the acting resident at Bagdad to be so good as to ascertain if the correspondence is available in his office; and, if so, to supply copies.

I am sending copies of this letter with enclosures to His Majesty's Foreign Office, to the political secretary to the Government of Bombay, and the political resident in Turkish Arabia.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Lieutenant-Colonel, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

Précis of the History of the Buoyage of the (1) Shatt-el-Arab subsequent to 1857; (2) Bahrein.

(1.) SHATT-EL-ARAB.

IN a letter dated Bushire, the 27th March, 1861, the commander of Her Majesty's steamer "Zenobia" (Indian navy), addressed the senior naval officer in the Persian Gulf recommending that the Shatt-el-Arab be buoyed, and stating that the buoys then on the bar were in a very bad state of repair.

The commander-in-chief of the Indian navy transmitted the proposal to the Government of Bombay with his support, and suggested that the subject be brought to the notice of the Turkish Government.

The following resolution, dated the 17th June, 1861, was passed upon his letter by the Government of Bombay:—

"This proposal approved, the papers to be transferred to the political department, with a view to the necessary negotiation."

The political department addressed the political resident in Turkish Arabia on the 25th June, 1861, requesting him to enter into negotiations with the Turkish Government on the subject.

The political resident in Turkish Arabia replied (the 5th October, 1861) to the Government of Bombay under flying seal to the political resident in the Persian Gulf. A copy of this letter is not at present traceable.*

Captain Felix Jones, the political resident in the Persian Gulf, in transmitting this letter, addressed the Government of Bombay (the 23rd October, 1861) on matters of detail connected with the upkeep and care of the buoys, and stating his opinion that "he attributed the breaking adrift of those laid down in the expedition to the Euphrates in 1861† to fair wear and tear of sea and weather and not to the ill-disposition of the Kharag pilots," harmless people who were aware that there was no intention of superseding them in their occupation by buoying the channel.

The Government of Bombay replied (the 16th January, 1862) to the political resident in Turkish Arabia as follows:—

". . . . I am instructed to state that the project of maintaining buoys for the proper navigation of our vessels on the passage between Bussorah and Bagdad‡ is generally admitted to be most desirable. Bearing in mind also the probability of steamer communication being shortly established between India, the Persian Gulf, and Bussorah, and the increase of trade which may be anticipated in consequence, the honourable the Governor in Council is of opinion that the advantages to be derived from the measure would sufficiently warrant the whole of its estimated outlay being borne by the British Government.

"The commander-in-chief of the Indian navy will accordingly be requested to take the necessary steps for laying down the buoys, and for efficiently maintaining them in position, seeking your co-operation and that of the resident in the Persian Gulf in carrying out the proposed arrangement.

"(4.) I am at the same time desired to request that you will apply through the British Ambassador at the Sublime Porte for a vizierial letter, as proposed in your communication under acknowledgment."

The political resident in Turkish Arabia endorsed this despatch as follows to Her Majesty's vice-consul, Bussorah, under date the 25th April, 1862:—

". . . . Mr. Rogers is informed that assurances have been given by Namik Pasha of the willing co-operation of the Turkish authorities in the manner desired by the British Ambassador."

And in acknowledging its receipt to Her Majesty's Embassy (the 23rd April, 1862) he stated that, judging from the assurances of his Excellency Namik Pasha, he had every reason to believe that the co-operation of the Turkish authorities would be afforded for the purpose of buoying the bar in the manner desired by Her Majesty's Embassy.

In the meantime the political resident in Turkish Arabia had addressed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople (the 9th October, 1861) stating that, in conformity with the instructions of the Bombay Government, he had addressed a letter§ to his Excellency Ahmad Tewfik Pasha, and sending an extract of his despatch, dated the 5th October, 1861, to the Government of Bombay, requesting Her Majesty's Ambassador to procure a vizierial letter to the address of the Governors of Bagdad and Bussorah in the sense of his communication to Ahmad Tewfik Pasha.

Her Majesty's Ambassador replied (the 22nd February, 1862) transmitting a vizierial letter to the Governor-General of Bagdad, directing him to co-operate with Her Majesty's naval officers in placing and repairing the buoys necessary to mark the bar and channel leading to the Shatt-el-Arab.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. (afterwards Sir Arnold) Kemball shortly afterwards addressed the Government of Bombay (the 1st April, 1862) reporting the receipt of the above despatch, and of a vizierial instruction to the Governor-General of Bagdad, in which that functionary is directed to co-operate with Her Majesty's naval officers in placing and repairing the buoys necessary to mark the bar and channel leading to the Shatt-el-Arab. He enclosed the following translation of the vizierial instruction in question:—‖

* Political department, Bombay, asked to provide a copy.

† In a report dated December 24, 1861, the commander-in-chief of the Indian navy reported that the buoys on the Shatt-el-Arab bar, then two in number, were all that were left of several buoys laid down by Her Majesty's ships during the Persian war for the purpose of guiding vessels of war and transports up the river.

‡ Thus in original; appears to be a copyist's error for Bushire.

§ Date 4 October 4, 1861, enclosed to Ambassador in above despatch; copy not available.

‖ Original Turkish note not traceable.

"From the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to his Excellency Namik Pasha, dated 14th Shaban, 1278.

"Enclosed for your information is the copy of a translation of a despatch received from Her Majesty's Ambassador regarding the repair when necessary of the buoys placed at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab with a view to facilitate the navigation of the channel.

"Reference having been made to Her Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad on the subject of putting the said buoys in a good condition and of obtaining the materials necessary thereto, and it having been proposed that assistance, if need be, should be rendered to this end by the British squadron, and since it seems certain from the representations made, that the said buoys if left in their present state would not be secured from injury, you are hereby desired accordingly, after making due enquiries on the spot, to take the requisite steps for repairing the buoys in question, and for preserving them continually in good condition, reporting to us the result."

The following is a translation of the note from Her Majesty's Ambassador referred to above:—

"From Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated November 12, 1861.

"Instructions have been received by Her Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad from Bombay regarding the maintenance of buoys at the entrance of the channel leading to the Shatt-el-Arab, and the adoption of measures for preserving and protecting them, with a view to his entering into negotiation with the local authorities on the subject, Her Majesty's consul-general accordingly addressed a letter to his Excellency the Governor of Bagdad, under date the 4th October, 1861, of which a copy is herewith submitted to your Excellency.

"Should the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government meet with concurrence, I request that I may be furnished with a vizierial instruction in the sense of the above letter, either to the Governor of Bagdad or to the Mutessarif of Bussorah, for transmission to those functionaries, in order that timely precautions may be taken, and in that case I may assure your Excellency that every assistance will be afforded by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and by Her Britannic Majesty's naval forces in that quarter to further the end desired."

On the 19th June, 1862, Colonel Kemball wrote to the resident at Bushire, enclosing a letter from the Vali of Bagdad on the subject of the buoying of the channel, together with his reply thereto. They ran as follows:—

Letter from Vali of Bagdad, dated 9th Zilhaj, 1278 (June 6, 1862).

"In conformity with your suggestions for the maintenance and repair of six buoys to mark the channel leading to the river at Bussorah for the convenience of navigation, Munib Pasha was instructed to repair those that might require repairs, and to add as many others as might be requisite. The said pasha, in reply, writes to me by this opportunity that the four buoys at present existing are not in need of repair further than that the paint being worn off they must be repainted, but that two additional buoys must be made, for which anchors, he adds, are forthcoming in the Bussorah dock-yard, and the requisite chain cable can be manufactured there. Yet, as the cause of the destruction of buoys is owing to the crews of boats coveting and stealing the anchors, he considers it to be the safest course to sink some of the old unserviceable guns now available at Bussorah in lieu of anchors. As, however, sheet-iron is not procurable at Bussorah wherewith to make the necessary buoys, nor are there artificers competent to make them, Munib Pasha proposes that the said buoys should be made at the Bagdad foundry and forwarded to Bussorah, where the chains and guns and other materials will be supplied for the purpose of placing them at the requisite spots. In consequence of this communication the necessary steps are now being taken here."

Reply dated June 11, 1862.

"In reply to your Excellency's letter dated 9th Zilhaj, I have the honour to express my acknowledgments to your Excellency for your ready co-operation in the

arrangements proposed for buoying the channel leading from the sea to the Shatt-el-Arab. Your Excellency will find, however, on reference to my letters that your Excellency is in error in supposing that I specified six buoys or any number of buoys as being requisite for the purpose; nor am I in a position now to submit to your Excellency any definite proposition on this subject, seeing that I am myself ignorant of the numbers of buoys required. Under these circumstances and believing that the four buoys alluded to by Munib Pasha are in fact new ones not long since placed on the banks by Her Majesty's squadron in the Persian Gulf, I purpose to transmit a copy of your Excellency's letter under acknowledgment to the British resident at Bushire, with a view to his consulting the naval officers on the spot, and to his acquainting me for your Excellency's information, as well with the steps which have been taken, as with the necessity or otherwise for those which your Excellency has proposed.

"Should your Excellency desire it, after the lapse of the hot months, I will request the commander of Her Majesty's steamer 'Comet' to associate himself with the Turkish naval authorities for the purpose of examining and reporting upon the state of the buoys."

In forwarding the above communications to Bushire, Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball remarked that though he believed Namik Pasha to be quite sincere in the intention he announced, it would not be prudent to count too confidently upon its execution, and expressed the apprehension that the naval authorities at Bussorah might not be competent to lay down the buoys efficiently.

The resident at Bushire replied on the 5th July to this communication, stating that as soon as suitable vessel was available to send up to Bussorah he would invite the Turkish naval authorities to co-operate, with the British naval commander in the laying of the buoys, but pointing out at the same time that the bar had already been fully buoyed by Her Majesty's ships. Four buoys from Bombay were duly laid by Her Majesty's ships.

On the 16th July Colonel Kemball wrote to Bushire that Her Majesty's ship "Berenice" had landed five old guns at Bussorah, to be fitted to moorings for the four buoys in place of anchors, and that only four being needed the fifth was to be returned to Bombay; he enclosed, at the same time, a copy of the following note which he had addressed to the Vali of Bagdad:—

"I have the honour to submit herewith to your Excellency a skeleton chart of the channel leading to the Shatt-el-Arab, which I have just received from the British resident in the Persian Gulf. It seems to be the opinion of the British naval officers that the buoys now placed, four in number, are sufficient, and that they require merely to be repainted of a red colour. After the hot weather the resident at Bushire will detach a vessel to Bussorah for the purpose of substituting for the anchors by which the buoys are now held certain old guns now lying at Magil,* and notice of her coming will be duly given to Munib Pasha, Governor of Bussorah, with a view to his deputing a Turkish officer, if your Excellency should think proper, to be associated with the commander of the said vessel on this duty."

A proposal to place a beacon on the Shatt-el-Arab bar was raised by Colonel Pelly in his letter dated the 5th December, 1862, and subsequently referred to in his letters dated the 22nd June, 1863, and 23rd July, 1863.

On the 23rd July, 1863, Colonel Pelly made proposals to the Government of Bombay for the retention at Bussorah of a suitable quantity of spare gear for buoying purposes.

He further stated that—

"there was a beacon put ashore at Fao during the war. This the Arabs have made over to the Sheikh of Koweit, under alleged orders from this residency: no such orders are on record. I am now writing to the Sheikh of Koweit to return the beacon, when I will cause it to be erected at the entrance of the Shatt-el-Arab on a 2-fathom bank."

In the same communication he adverts to a request made by him for a spare hulk, which was misconstrued into a demand for a new vessel by the late naval department.

His proceedings were fully approved by the Government of Bombay (resolution dated the 11th September, 1863).

* The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's depôt above Bussorah.

On the 21st November, 1863, Colonel Pelly asked the Government of Bombay to send up a 24-foot buoy by next Government vessel; a first-class buoy, with a 28-cwt. mooring anchor, was accordingly sent up on the 27th February, 1866.

This buoy was carried away in December 1868 and stranded on Bubian, but was replaced in March 1869; a second buoy was stranded on Halul Island in the same year, and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi asked to send it to Bushire.

The residency agent reported that he found it on Jazirat-al-Jarnian; subsequently the chief of Abu Dhabi alleged that the buoy had been destroyed by the boatmen of Khalifa-bin-Salim of Debai.

The provision of a new buoy to replace it was sanctioned by the Bombay Government.

These Shatt-el-Arab buoys were washed away in 1880, and the Government of India decided not to replace them. The Turkish authorities placed a buoy on the bar on the 15th May, 1880, but it was also washed away on the following day and apparently not replaced. Messrs. Gray, Paul and Co. in reporting the fact remarked that it was the first buoy that had been contributed by the Turks.

One of the same buoys were washed away on the 14th January, 1887, and stranded on the Arab coast, 50 miles east of Kowoit (*i.e.*, somewhere on Bubian Island); Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Sabah was accordingly asked by the resident to take care of it.

Buoys were put down by British India Steam Navigation Company in 1891, 1894, 1899, 1902, and 1903.

A buoy was placed by the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" in 1900 to replace the outer bar buoy which had gone adrift.

(2.) Bahrein.

In 1874 the political resident in the Persian Gulf suggested to the Government of India the desirability of placing a large buoy at the entrance of Bahrein Harbour; the proposal was approved by the Government of India, and the Government of Bombay were requested to take the necessary steps through the British India Steam Navigation Company. At least two buoys were, however, apparently laid down by Government, as in 1879 the commander of Her Majesty's ship "Beacon" mentions the existence of an "outer" buoy, both in need of repair, and states that he believes them to be the property of the British India Steam Navigation Company (which would not appear to be the case, though they were no doubt laid by one of their ships), whilst in a later letter the resident mentions four buoys as needing replacement.

The Government of India, however, had ruled in 1875, in case of the buoys on the Shatt-el-Arab bar, that they could not be replaced at Government expense, and this ruling was quoted by Government as applicable equally to Bahrein.

In 1882 the political resident again addressed the Government of India in connection with the loss of a Government buoy at Bahrein, stating that he had been privately informed that it was in contemplation to replace certain of the buoys in the Persian Gulf, and submitting that "the right of control of all buoys in these seas might possibly be of advantage in certain contingencies."

The Government of India replied, however, that "it was not at present the intention of Government to replace the buoys in the Persian Gulf."

Buoys were subsequently laid by the British India Steam Navigation Company and maintained by them until taken over by the Government of India.

[9827] No. 90.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No 150.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 23, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reporting on the situation in that district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Acting Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Adana, February* 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency the following report:—

Committee of Union and Progress Club.—The club of the Committee of Union and Progress, which had been closed by the police about the 15th ultimo, was reopened on the 25th idem (my telegram No. 4 of the 26th ultimo). Some of its old adherents have rejoined it, but its influence is far from being what it was a year ago. The more extreme members wished to have the local Liberty and Entente Club suppressed, but now appear to have given up that intention. I am informed that the Liberty and Entente Club has lost but few of its members, the majority of whom are shopkeepers and well-to-do "esnafs." The Committee of Union and Progress Club is once more frequented by Government officials, and its efforts appear to be directed chiefly to obtaining subscriptions for the war fund. As there is no proper check on the sums received by its members, there is probably good reason for the statement that much of the money collected finds its way into the pockets of individual collectors. Merchants are approached by members of the club, who assess what they have to pay, and, as a rule, payment is made without question.

Salaries of Officials.—Government officials complain that they find it difficult to subsist, as their salaries are now more than a month in arrear.

Disquieting News.—The news of the assassination of Nazim Pasha and of the fall of Kiamil Pasha's Cabinet produced a bad impression upon the population, and later news, such as that of a mutiny at Chatalja, has added to the existing anxiety. The information telegraphed here on the 7th instant by the Agence ottomane that an internal loan was to be floated has not yet been understood. On one side it is stated that a share of the 5,000,000*l.* which it is proposed to borrow will be assigned to each vilayet, and that valis will be instructed to raise their shares as best they can; on the other side it is explained that Treasury bonds will be issued. One thing is certain, that an internal loan is an impossibility, for no one with any means will subscribe to such a loan at present. The situation is one of anxiety and tension. Responsible Moslems expect nothing good from the present Government, while the Christians have excellent reasons for fearing the worst. No one believes that the present Government will be long in power, and it is hinted that a change of Sovereign will take place.

Public Meeting.—A public meeting was held on the 5th instant at the Konak, at which subscriptions to the war fund were invited. A small sum, below 20*l.*, according to reliable information, was raised.

Coal Supply.—The supply of coal is running short, many factories having only sufficient for a fortnight, after which they will be obliged to close down. A serious situation will then arise, and there is certain to be much suffering.

Movement of Troops.—As reported by telegraph on the 23rd ultimo, the passage of troops through this district ceased about the 13th ultimo. It is reported that two battalions of troops from Syria passed through here about the 7th instant.

Italian Vice-Consulate.—An Italian vice-consul arrived here on the 8th instant, and is making arrangements to establish a vice-consulate here. He called on me yesterday, accompanied by the dragoman of the German consulate. Italian interests may be described as non-existent, and very few Italian subjects reside in this district. The appointment of a paid vice-consul has not unnaturally given rise to some speculation.

Hajin.—Your Excellency is aware of the history of the Armenian deserters at Hajin, whose suppression led to the recent disturbances there (my despatches Nos. 5 and 6). I have no doubt that these men deserted from the Turkish army owing to ill-treatment at the hands of their Moslem comrades and superiors. To make so stubborn a resistance and to sell their lives so dearly, these Armenians were evidently actuated by strong motives; it is to be noted, moreover, that repeated offers of pardon on condition of surrender had been made to them during the seven months preceding the 29th January. The spirit they showed is sufficient proof that they represented real grievances. Such men must be regarded not as ordinary "brigands," but rather as rebels against intolerable misrule. With all diffidence, I submit that, when Armenian affairs come to be settled, something effective should be done to secure the execution of article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, and article 32 of the Armenian Reform

Scheme of October 1895. In this vilayet, the kaza of Hajin can justly claim to participate in any ameliorations and reforms that may be decided upon.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[9648] No. 100.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 156.)

Sir, *Constantinople, February* 25, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith paraphrase of a telegram which has been addressed to me by His Majesty's consul at Bussorah on the subject of a meeting of Arab notables which has taken place at that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 100.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bussorah, February* 22, 1913.

ON the 20th instant a meeting of prominent Arabs was held at the house of Taleb Bey. A mazbata, the text of which will be telegraphed to the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior, was drawn up, and copies were sent to the vali. The mazbata, which is now being circulated for signature, asks that permission may be granted for the holding of a general council of the Bussorah vilayet. This council is to draw up a scheme of reforms, which are pressingly needed, analogous to those stated to have been granted to Syria.

It appears that the object which the signatories have in view is to introduce a system by which only the balance of local revenues will be sent to Constantinople, the remainder being used for local requirements. The demands are couched in respectful and moderate language.

(Addressed to the Embassy. Repeated to Bushire for the information of the Government of India.)

[9772] No. 101.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 115.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 1115 of 23rd December: Mesopotamia oil.

I saw the Grand Vizier on the 24th, and spoke to him very seriously as to the importance that we attached to the promises to the Porte being carried out in favour of D'Arcy group. His Highness professed to have no knowledge of the matter, but promised to look into it.

He agreed to see Mr. Stock on the 27th, with the result that his Highness promised to communicate to Minister of Mines at once. Mr. Stock is going to call on the latter to-day.

[9802] No. 102.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March* 2, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 18 of last year.

His Majesty's consul at Bussorah telegraphs that acting vali is negotiating with German firm of Wönckhaus for purchase of small dredger imported by them to dredge creeks in Bussorah. This dredger could not be used to clear bar.

[9777]

No. 103.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 2, 1913.*

TRANSPORT of material for Bagdad Railway.

I learn from Sir R. Crawford that arrangement concluded between Lynch and Bagdad Railway (your despatch No. 153, and Mr. Marling's despatch No. 675 of last year), has proved inadequate, and that representative of railway has approached Lynch and Bagdad Railway with suggestion for creation of a permanent river transport company in which the three parties would have equal participation. This involves absorption of Lynch and disappearance of flag and creation of a permanent German interest on river.

Sir R. Crawford believes that Lynch is not unfavourable to the scheme.

It occurs to me that Lynch should enter into no permanent engagement until Bagdad Railway and Gulf question is [group omitted], under which he might obtain right for three extra steamers.

[9830]

No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 139.)
Sir, *Constantinople, February 25, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah regarding the views of the local Arab notables on the present situation.

The Arabs were always known to detest the Committee régime on account of its policy of Turkification and its treatment of the Arabs in the Hauran, Aleppo, &c., as well as on account of its Zionist tendencies. There are, however, at present indications of a wider movement on particularist lines.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Bussorah, February 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Arab notables of Bussorah assembled in considerable numbers at the house of Seyyed Talib Bey on the 26th ultimo and drew up a mazbata, which they signed and sealed on oath, to the effect that political party differences having brought Turkey to the verge of ruin, they, as Arabs, will henceforward side neither with Committee nor Liberals, but will devote their efforts to the cause of Turkey as a whole without party distinction.

The 111th regiment left Bussorah on the 30th ultimo for Amara on the "Barhanieh," in order, I am informed, to compel the Arab sheikhs holding "mugata'as" (Government land contracts) in that district to pay the arrears due by them to Government, the sheikhs having, it is said, refused to comply.

Sheikh Mubarek, of Koweit, has arrived at Bussorah in his yacht, and will remain for some days. I hear that, in view of the fall of the Kiamil Ministry, the sheikh regrets his donation of £ T. 11,000 to the war fund reported in my No. 3 of the 18th January last.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[10067]

No. 105.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 3, 1913.*

OIL concession Bagdad–Mosul.

I have now received from Porte a reply to my communication made on instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 1115 of 23rd December. The Porte states that there is no trace of any application made on behalf of D'Arcy. It explains that the applications made to Civil List and on the spot without result before transfer of its properties to Minister of Finance in 1909 would, by the fact of that transfer, be considered null and void, and that any concession relative to those mines can only be granted subject to provision prescribed by regulations in force.

I have seen Grand Vizier again and suggested that perhaps application figures under name of Mr. Nicol.

I am communicating copy of note to Mr. Stock.

[9375]

No. 106.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo in regard to the recent proposals of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Sir E. Grey notes that the Lords Commissioners are willing to take part in a meeting between representatives of the company and the Government departments concerned, but that before doing so they would prefer to await the answer to a letter recently addressed to the company in regard to its latest proposal to supply fuel oil as a forward contract.

Mr. Greenway has been so informed privately, and no further action will be taken by this department for the present.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9422]

No. 107.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to advert to your letter of the 26th July last covering a memorandum for communication to the Turkish Ambassador respecting the desire of His Majesty's Government, in connection with the pending general increase in the Turkish customs tariff to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, to secure that the duty on certain classes of cotton yarns and manufactures should be limited to 13 per cent. *ad valorem*.

In this connection I am to inform you that Hakki Pasha, who has now arrived in this country to resume the negotiations for the settlements of various outstanding questions between His Majesty's Government and the Sublime Porte, has emphasised the difficulty with which the Turkish Government would be faced if they deferred to the wishes of His Majesty's Government in this matter. Other Powers, his Highness contends, would not fail to demand similar special tariffs for other classes of goods in which they are predominantly interested, and it would be impossible to refuse them similar treatment.

In these circumstances Sir E. Grey considers that the matter is one which should not be allowed to prejudice the course of the present negotiations, which involve several questions of paramount political importance, and even the future financial stability of Turkey.

He consequently feels constrained to hold this point over for the present, and he fears that it may even eventually become necessary to give way on it. The question will not, however, be lost sight of, and every effort will be made to attain the desired object should it be possible to do so at a later stage, when the Ottoman Government will not improbably be desirous of negotiating a specific tariff.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9772]

No. 108.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.

WITH reference to the letter from this office of the 24th ultimo in regard to the negotiations for a concession to prospect for petroleum in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople stating that he saw the Grand Vizier on the 24th ultimo and spoke to him very seriously as to the importance which His Majesty's Government attached to the promises of the Porte being carried out in favour of Mr. D'Arcy's group. His Highness professed to have no knowledge of the matter, but promised to look into it.

His Highness saw Mr. Stock on the 27th ultimo and promised at once to communicate with the Minister of Mines. Mr. Stock was to see the latter on the 1st instant.

According to a subsequent telegram from Sir G. Lowther, Mr. Stock has expressed himself as satisfied with the result of the interview which had then taken place. He is to have a further one after the Minister of Mines has consulted his colleagues in the Cabinet.

The Minister told Mr. Stock that in this connection an offer had been made of a loan of 500,000*l.* repayable in four years, the Government to pay interest, and, when asked why he did not accept, replied that he did not think it sufficiently serious, evidently wishing to intimate that a concession was not likely to be given without a very substantial advance.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9375]

No. 109.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 3, 1913.

YOUR letter of the 12th ultimo in regard to the proposals which your company have recently put before His Majesty's Government was referred to the Admiralty, who express their willingness to take part in a meeting between members of your board and representives from the Government departments concerned.

Before doing so, however, the Admiralty say that they would prefer to await the answer to a letter which they have addressed to you in regard to your company's latest offer to supply fuel oil as a forward contract.

We are consequently taking no further action for the present.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9802]

No. 110.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.

YOUR unnumbered telegram of 2nd March: Dredging at Bussorah.

Your Excellency should inform Ottoman Government of reported negotiations with Wönckhaus, and express surprise that they should have allowed a German firm to undertake dredging operations in the creeks of Shatt-el-Arab. It seems undesirable to

allow any such firm to acquire a *locus standi* in a matter which would fall within the competence of the proposed riverain commission. In the circumstances, it may be the best solution for the Ottoman Government to purchase this dredger now it has been imported, but your Excellency should express the hope that no operations will be undertaken with it pending the institution of the riverain commission, as such operations would not improbably impair navigation of the river.

When did the dredger arrive in the Shatt-el-Arab, and did Mr. Crow report its first arrival by telegraph?

[9777]

No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 119 of 2nd March: Transport of material for Bagdad Railway.

Lynch undertook last year to keep us advised of any new negotiations, and not to commit himself without our approval (see his letter of 25th November). The Board of Trade consider that there might be substantial advantage in three extra steamers, if secured, not being granted to Lynch, but to another firm. Have you any views on this point?

Your Excellency should thank Sir R. Crawford for his communication, and intimate to him that I should be glad if he would be so good as to keep you promptly informed of any developments.

[10067]

No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 4, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 121 of 3rd March: Mesopotamia oil.

I have communicated substance to Mr. Greenway, who is telegraphing full instructions to Mr. Stock to-night. It appears that the application was made in name of Mr. Nicol on behalf of D'Arcy syndicate.

The fact of a transfer of a property from one Government department to another cannot be held to invalidate a definite promise made by the Grand Vizier before such transfer took place.

I understand that Mr. Greenway is prepared to accept the provisions of present mining regulations in so far as they are not too onerous to render working of concession impracticable. His agent will explain to you the length he is prepared to go, and I earnestly trust your Excellency will be able to induce Ottoman Government to agree to a reasonable settlement forthwith.

[10266]

No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 164.)
Sir,

Constantinople, February 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting on an abortive public meeting organised to collect subscriptions for the National Defence Committee.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 19. Confidential.)
Sir,

Beirout, February 20, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that last week the president of the Beirout municipality, acting under the instigation of the local members of the Committee of Union and Progress, summoned a public meeting to form a local committee of "national defence," in imitation of a similar public meeting held at Constantinople.

Invitations to attend were sent out to all the religious heads, to the members of the "reform" committees, and to the leading men of all the communities, but out of 175, only 27 notables attended.

A committee of 35, composed chiefly of the religious heads and councils of the various committees, was elected to collect contributions towards the war funds, but 24 declined to act, the remainder being more or less active members of the Committee of Union and Progress.

This abstention of the general public is accounted for by the unpopularity of the present Government and the want of confidence in the honesty of the promoters of the meeting, but is also an indication of the little sympathy that exists on the part of the population, Moslem and Christian, of Syria with the Ottoman Government in its present struggle for the defence of the country.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[10268]

No. 114.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 166.)
Sir,

Constantinople, February 28, 1913.

IN my despatch No. 33 of the 14th January I reported on the growing interest which the Russian Government appear to be taking in Syrian affairs. I now have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, which gives a further indication of this interest.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 114.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 17. Confidential.)
Sir,

Beirout, February 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Mgr. Gregorious, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, who recently passed through Beirout on his return to Damascus from Tripoli (Syria), has been invited by the Russian Government to assist at the celebration of the tercentenary of the foundation of the Romanoff dynasty, and has applied to the Ottoman Government for permission to attend.

His Beatitude will be accompanied by the Greek Orthodox Bishop of Tripoli, who knows Russia and its language from having resided in that country, and several leading men of his community.

It is said that his Beatitude will be asked to officiate at the religious ceremony, and will be presented by the Russian Government with special sacerdotal garments for the occasion.

The attention paid to the religious head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Syria has given rise to much comment, and is looked upon as a desire on the part of the Russian Government to affirm its protection of the Greek Church in Syria, on which subject I had occasion to refer in my report on the conflict of religious forces in Syria (No. 64, Confidential, November 6, 1911, part 2).

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[10270]

No. 115.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 168.)
Sir,

Constantinople, February 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Trebizond, reporting on the alarm caused among the Christian population by the distribution of rifles to the customs guards.

In reply to my enquiries, Sir R. Crawford informs me that last year the Customs purchased 1,100 Mauser rifles and 220,000 cartridges for its guards. The Ministry of War took these over, and undertook to supply Martinis out of their stock in place of the Mausers. The Customs gave the Ministry of War a statement of their requirements, and it would appear, although the Customs have received no information on the subject, that the Ministry of War has now acted upon this arrangement at Trebizond.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)
Sir,

Trebizond, February 6, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the effect of the receipt of the news of the recent Young Turkish *coup* at Constantinople has been to increase the feelings of uncertainty and nervousness to which the non-Moslem element in towns such as Trebizond is always prone.

These feelings, which in the present case are due partly to the fact that this town has already experienced a massacre under the old régime, and partly to the absence of accurate information as to what is really happening at Constantinople, have now been increased by the fact that the present moment has been chosen as a suitable one by the Customs authorities to serve out some sixty Martini rifles with ammunition to their "koljis," who are allowed to take the weapons to their homes. The official explanation of this measure is that orders in this sense were received from Constantinople some three or four months ago, the intention being to check smuggling, which has of late been on the increase, but that, owing to the lack of rifles, it has only now been possible to carry out the order. An offer was also made to the Régie and Public Debt authorities to provide rifles for the use of the guards employed by them, but was declined on the ground that it was not desirable to allow the men to be in possession of arms in the town.

Another explanation put forward is that, with the return to power of the Committee of Union and Progress, it has been thought advisable to provide with arms some of its adherents, who if among the least reputable are probably the most redoubtable, which would be of use in the apparently improbable event of any move on the part of the supporters of the Opposition. According to one of my colleagues, a very similar measure was taken by the authorities in April, 1909, at the time of the counter-revolution in Constantinople.

However that may be, the Christians, and especially the Armenians, who form the minority of the non-Moslems, are considerably perturbed, and appear to believe that the distribution of arms is directed against them. The Armenians held a meeting at their church on the 2nd instant, when it was decided that their bishop should approach the vali on the subject. As far as I can ascertain, the proportion of Moslems to Christians may be as seven to four, and that of Greeks to Armenians as three to one.

I learn from a reliable source that members of the local Armenian "Tashnakist" club are endeavouring to collect money to buy arms for the purpose of self-defence. The Greeks are said to already possess arms in sufficient quantities. As the "Tashnakists" do not bear the best of reputations, this step would appear to be a more dangerous one than the issue of rifles to customs watchmen.

As far as outward appearances go there seem to be no signs of anything unusual. It is true that disorders are usually planned secretly, but, on the other hand, in Turkey hitherto all disturbances or massacres have only occurred either with the tacit connivance of or by the direct orders of the central authorities at Constantinople. As it

appears unlikely that at the present juncture the latter are desirous of provoking disturbances in Asia Minor, which would afford a pretext for foreign intervention, I am inclined to believe that the forebodings of the Christians are uncalled for.

I learn that steps are being taken to collect "voluntary" contributions to a war fund on the basis of the amounts paid annually by individuals as "temettu" and real property taxes.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[10274] No. 116.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 172.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 1, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, relative to disorders at Hajin resulting in an insult to the British flag, and the destruction of the Oriental Carpets Company's premises and property.

I have approved the course of action which Mr. Matthews proposes to take in the matter.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 116.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Adana, February* 22, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 6 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that in consequence of a telegram, dated the 13th February, from the agent at Hajin of the Oriental Carpets Company, stating that when the disorders occurred there he hoisted the British flag over the Company's premises, and that he had reported details to his Smyrna office. I called on the vali on the 15th instant, and pointed out how serious a matter it was that the capture of the Armenian deserters should have involved an insult to the British flag, and the destruction of so much property. Emin Bey stated that he had no knowledge of the fact of which I particularly complained, namely, the burning of the flag. He informed me that a report giving details of the damage to property, which he estimated as being probably between 4,000*l.* and 5,000*l.*, was expected in a few days from the Mutessarif of Kozan, and that the Government would indemnify those whose property had been destroyed.

On the 17th instant, I wrote to the vali asking for an explanation of the irregular action of the local authorities in not communicating with this vice-consulate before attacking a house over which the British flag was flying (enclosure No. 1).

I transmit herewith the vali's reply (enclosure No. 2), which can scarcely be considered satisfactory. However, I do not propose to take any further action in the matter, beyond interesting myself in the claim for an indemnity, should the Oriental Carpets Company decide to make one to the local authorities.

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to the agent of the Oriental Carpets Company on the 13th instant (enclosure No. 3). I had asked a Canadian missionary at Hajin, by letters of the 3rd and 8th instant, to request the agent of the company, if there was an agent, to communicate with me. The agent's telegram of the 13th instant giving the information respecting the flag appears to be due to the missionary's efforts. I would add that, had the agent of the Oriental Carpets Company telegraphed to me when he considered the situation sufficiently serious to necessitate the hoisting of the British flag, I could have seen the vali, and might very probably have prevailed upon him to give orders that no attack must be made upon property protected by the British flag.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 116.

Vice-Consul Matthews to the Vali of Adana.

Sir, *Adana, February* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to draw your Excellency's serious attention to the following:—

In the course of the disorders which took place recently at Hajin, a factory belonging to the British company, "Oriental Carpets Company," was destroyed. It appears from the information which your Excellency was good enough to give me, that the destruction of this factory occurred during the pursuit of certain deserters from the army. However, I have been unable to understand the motives which led the local authorities to attack a factory over which the British flag was flying without first communicating with this vice-consulate.

While requesting your Excellency to give me an explanation of the irregularity mentioned, I have, &c.

W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 116.

The Vali of Adana to Vice-Consul Matthews.

(Translation.)
Sir, *Adana, February* 9, 1913.

IN reply to your friendly letter No. 5 of the 17th February, 1913, the well-known Armenian brigands, who for some time previously had been carrying on brigandage in the town of Hajin, and who had shortly before extorted two liras from the local Armenian, Murakhas, after threatening to kill him, established themselves in the house of the brigand, Jintoros, one of their number, in the hope of escaping from the pursuit of the agents charged with maintaining public order. From this house they forced their way, after breaking down the door, into the Armenian girls' school, situated in the house owned by Terzian Artin Effendi, part of which is occupied by the Armenian girls' school, part by the widows' stocking house, and part by the Oriental Carpets Company, killing one gendarme and wounding an officer and several privates by the shots they fired. Upon these rebellious acts on the part of the brigands, the authorities surrounded the house with gendarmes and established a blockade. The above-mentioned individuals realising that they could not escape owing to the blockade poured petroleum from the top storey of the building and set it on fire, with the object of bringing about the intervention of those interested in the school and building. In this way the part occupied by the Oriental Carpets Company, as well as the girls' school and the rest of the building, were completely burnt down. From these explanations it results that the brigands mentioned above did not enter the portion of the building belonging to the Oriental Carpets Company, nor did they directly set it on fire; and further, that the investing forces never made the company's premises the object of their attack; but even supposing that the brigands had directly entered the company's premises and had established themselves there, and had by their firing perpetrated the crime mentioned above against the armed forces of the authorities, it is clear that the Government could not have consented to the loss of some days time which communication with the consulate would have involved, the town of Hajin being four or five days distant from the chief town of the vilayet.

I have, &c.
EMIN

Enclosure 4 in No 116.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Agent, Oriental Carpets Company, Hajin.

(By registered post.)
Sir, *Adana, February* 13, 1913.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of this day's date informing me of the circumstances in which certain property at Hajin belonging to the Oriental

Carpets Company was destroyed, and in reply beg to point out the desirability of your furnishing me with full details of what occurred, mentioning whether the outlaws took refuge in that portion of Mr. Torzian's house which was occupied by the British company, and whether the British flag was hoisted before or after their arrival. I would suggest that you should communicate with me without delay.

I am, &c.

W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[10317] No. 117.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 5.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, March 4, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to the message received from His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople on the subject of the Mesopotamian oil concession which Mr. Parker kindly communicated to me last evening, I beg to point out that the assurances given to His Majesty's Ambassador by the Grand Vizier that the Council of Ministers had decided to grant the concession to us were made subsequent to the transfer of the said properties to the Minister of Finance.

As regards the Sublime Porte's contention, that "the application made to the Civil List and on the spot without result before transfer of its properties to the Minister of Finance in 1909 would by fact of that transfer be considered null and void," if this is accepted as correct, it follows *ipso facto* that the claims of the Anatolian Railway Company under the option granted to them by the Civil List cannot possibly be substantiated. As soon as the properties were transferred to the State, a letter was addressed to the Grand Vizier to the effect that—

(1.) Mr. Nichols had applied to the Civil List for the right to work the petroleum deposits of the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul;

(2.) That the convention thereof had been submitted to his Highness;

(3.) That it had practically been accepted by the said Ministry; and

(4.) In conclusion the Grand Vizier was asked to issue orders to the proper department so that the necessary formalities could be concluded as soon as possible.

This letter was dated the 25th Nissan, 1325 (8th May, 1909), and was signed by Mr. R. Whittal in the absence of Mr. Nichols, as his representative. This letter was handed to the Grand Vizier on that date, and he at once referred the matter to the Minister of Finance with the request that he would do the needful at once. Thereupon, the Minister of Finance immediately requested the Civil List to forward to him the *dossier* of the business, including the draft of our convention, and the whole question was discussed at subsequent meetings of the Council of Ministers.

As stated above, it was at this stage that the Grand Vizier gave the assurances to His Majesty's Minister.

With reference to the Porte's statement that the mines can only be granted subject to the provisions prescribed by the regulations now in force, we are prepared to accept the concession on the understanding that it is subject to the existing and any future mining laws that may be promulgated, on the condition that any taxes or other imposts payable thereunder shall only be leviable in respect of such land as may be occupied by us for exploratory or drilling purposes, and we instructed Mr. Stock to this effect verbally before his departure and confirmed same in writing on the 21st ultimo.

All negotiations with the various Ministries were conducted by Mr. Nichols in his name as representative of the British group, and Mr. D'Arcy's name was not mentioned to the Turkish officials.

I beg to enclose, for your information, copy of a cable dispatched to Mr. Stock.

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY,

Managing Director.

Enclosure in No. 117.

Copy of Telegram to Mr. Stock (Constantinople) dated March 3, 1913.

HAVE seen official note wired to-day. All negotiations, Civil List and Porte, were in name of Nichols; application Porte was dated the 25th Nissan, 1325 (8th May, 1909). Promises to Lowther were subsequent this application. If transfer to Porte annuls our application to Civil List, it likewise annuls opponent's claims, and our application to Porte is an easy first. Our letter 21st authorised you accept concession, subject to provisions prescribed by regulations, but concession must cover whole both provinces, taxes being payable only on areas occupied.

[10327] No. 118.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 5.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, March 4, 1913.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, and note that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has spoken seriously to the Grand Vizier as to the importance which His Majesty's Government attaches to the promises of the Porte being carried out in favour of Mr. D'Arcy's group, and that Mr. Stock, our representative, had expressed himself as satisfied with the interview he had had with the Minister of Mines.

We have to-day received a cable from Mr. Stock reading:—

"I am advised substantial advance necessary. Against royalties will be properly secured interest payable. Ministry received offer 500,000*l.* for same proposal. I think this 50 per cent. [*f*] true. I will receive Ministry view to-morrow on full question. Please wire instructions to Stock."

To which we have replied as follows:—

"50,000*l.* is not necessarily advance; you have power make it outright payment. We cannot increase or make loan secured on concession royalties. We can probably arrange separate loan on adequate security, but this is another proposal, and must not be condition concession. You must maintain attitude agreed Foreign Office, namely, insist fulfilment promises, and strenuously resist Turkish Government entertaining any other proposals."

I have, &c.

C. GREENWAY, *Managing Director.*

[10403] No. 119.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 5.)

(No. 125.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 110 of 27th February.

Following from consul at Bussorah, dated 4th March:—

"Troops mentioned as going to El Katr were merely reliefs, according to my information.

"It seems that the whole of the 150 men were not destined for El Katr, and that part of the 110 men reported in the same despatch as returning from Ojeir probably came from El Katr.

"I am awaiting a report regarding the exact number of troops present, and their disposition in the Hassa district, and will telegraph as instructed to embassy and Foreign Office."

[10484]

No. 120.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received March 6.*)

Sir, *India Office, March 4, 1913.*

IN continuation of my letter of the 17th December last on the subject of British relations with Dubai, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of the correspondence from which it will be seen that the Government of India now definitely recommend the selection of that port for the wireless installation.

The considerations suggested by Sir P. Cox in his letter of the 25th January indicate that, on the merits of the two places, the balance of advantage lies on the side of Zora. But having regard to the fact that the success of a British establishment at the latter place will depend upon expenditure of unknown extent, the Marquess of Crewe is inclined to agree with the Government of India in preferring Dubai, and the fact that Dubai is becoming an important arms depôt confirms him in that view.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, January 25, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report the details of proceedings taken in pursuance of the authority given me in Foreign Department telegram, dated Delhi, the 10th December, 1912, to endeavour to come to an understanding with the sheikh-elect of Dubai.

I regret to say that I have had no success.

2. When I telegraphed certain suggestions to the Government of India on the 4th December I had only heard of the late sheikh's death by radio, and from off-hand acquaintance with the rivalries existing between different branches of the Al-Bu-Felasa* clan I apprehended that there would probably be a dispute over the succession. As will be seen from the residency agent's report, dated the 29th November (Enclosure 2), which reached me some days later, these apprehensions were not without foundation, but the factions represented by the sons of Maktoom and the sons of Rashid, having appealed to the residency agent, the latter brought them to an understanding, as the result of which Said, aged about 30, the eldest son of the late ruling sheikh but one, Maktoom-bin-Hashar, was chosen to succeed Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil.

3. I reached Dubai on the 18th December, but, owing to stress of weather, was unable to communicate with the shore until the following day, when I landed at the residency agent's house and sent a request to Sheikh Said to come and see me there. I had a long morning's interview with him and the residency agent together, in the course of which the position was discussed and rediscussed, and I endeavoured to convince the young sheikh both of the obvious need for measures of progress calculated to put Dubai on a par with other principalities and ports of steamer call, and of the benevolent and public motives of the British authorities for wishing to see such measures adopted. His demeanour was friendly and deferential; he professed personal anxiety to maintain cordial relations with the residency and Government and to avoid giving them cause for dissatisfaction, but assured me that he was unable to commit himself or even to express any definite opinion on the topics touched upon until he had ascertained the views of his relatives. Finally, in order to define the issues for consideration, a rough Arabic draft was framed by us in concert (of which I attach a translation (Enclosure 3)), setting forth briefly what I told the sheikh I should personally regard as a fully satisfactory answer from him, and one which would enable me to make a favourable report to Government. He assured me that he understood the position fully, and would do his best to influence his relatives in the directions desired and send me the result in a few days after full discussion with them.

* *Vide* paragraph 3 of Resident's letter, dated April 30, 1911.

4. I have now received his reply, and attach a translation of it. It will be seen that its purport is of a *non-possumus* and unsatisfactory character. In the face of it I fear we must expect the newly elected sheikh to continue, like his predecessor, in the hands of a camorra of his ignorant and reactionary relatives, and with the means at my disposal I see no likelihood of being able to effect any change in their attitude, as long as present conditions of British representation on the coast are maintained, under which, though useful in other local ways, the Arab agent of the residency wields no appreciably helpful influence where the larger questions of British interests or policy are concerned.

In the main, therefore, we find ourselves in the same position as we were before I sent my telegram of the 4th December. But the accession of a new sheikh and the fact that the lively feeling engendered by the "Hyacinth" incident may be considered to have evaporated in the two years which have since elapsed, the Government of India may think it worth while to review the position before they decide finally between the relative pros and cons involved in—

(1.) Sufficiently coercive action at Dubai to enable us to effect the minimum of our present requirements; and

(2.) The occupation and development of Zora.

5. I beg to offer the following observations in regard to the alternative courses:—

As regards Dubai. Our forbearance from proceeding forcibly with the inception of our mild measures of progress has borne no fruit in the past two years; on the contrary, the Dubai community has only become the more confirmed and confident in its passive obstruction, through the sheikh, to the least advance. In fact, such movement as there has been has been retrograde, for whereas no definite objection was ever evinced to the occasional sojourn of approved Europeans for business purposes, the sheikh has made the "Hyacinth" incident a pretext for refusing admission to any European or quasi-European, even as agent for the British India Steam Navigation Company's steamers; and I am convinced that until we do put our foot down to check this factitious obstruction we shall make no headway.

On the other hand, if we were once to announce and quickly commence to put into execution our intention to impose a post-cum-telegraph office at Dubai, I believe that the obstruction would be insignificant and short-lived, and that if the staff were installed there with a small guard for their quarters and one of His Majesty's ships stationed there until they were settled down and a temporary wireless apparatus erected and in working operation with Henjam, the community would soon get used to it, and any temporary hostility or opposition would die down. I should be ready to accompany the party in order to make the preliminary explanation and warning to the sheikh and his relatives, and to remain there until matters appeared to be on a satisfactory basis, provided that I could be kept by His Majesty's ship in wireless touch with work at Bushire.

But it is not safe to speak on these topics with absolute confidence seeing that untoward incidents as a rule result from trivial and unforeseen beginnings, and I cannot therefore take the responsibility of assuring Government that the measure can be put through altogether without risk; I can only say that I do not consider that the risk is one which we should not be warranted in taking.

The advantage of descending at Dubai lies in the fact that there we are dealing with a ready-made and flourishing town where a considerable community of Hindoo traders is already installed and possess valuable warehouse and living accommodation; developments would thus proceed on natural lines and show immediate fruit. On the other hand, at Dubai we have to reckon with a very backward and obstinate local administration,* and shall be faced with the same prospects of chronic disability and obstruction as our trade has had to struggle with for twenty years at Bahrein, and which we are only now beginning to overcome by the presentation of a benevolent ultimatum from Government to the sheikh.

6. At Zora, while we should alight on a site possessing anchorage and landing facilities just as good as, if not better, than at any other spot on the Trucial Coast, we should be breaking new ground from every standpoint. Within the limits imposed by the economic possibilities of the coast generally, which of course are not very portentous,

* *E.g.*, paragraph 4 of Resident's letter, dated April 30, 1911.

we could make anything we like of the colony ultimately, provided that we have the mind to develop it constructively and thus ensure success.

To this end we should need, to begin with at all events, to make the port import-free, and to arrange for mail steamers to call regularly, and generally to do everything reasonable and possible to induce British Indian traders on the coast to transfer their headquarters there. The mere fact of the existence of an efficient British post and telegraph office would be a great inducement, but it will obviously take time for the settlement to develop, and Government must be prepared to invest money liberally in the furtherance of the project.

If they are prepared to contemplate this prospect I think there can be no doubt which alternative will operate most in the interests of our commerce and political predominance on the coast. On the other hand, if it is only intended to deposit the wireless office there, and if Government are not prepared to proceed definitely and constructively to the development of the settlement on the above lines, then the simpler and less expensive, if less profitable, course will be the establishment by mild coercion of the post and telegraph office at Debai, at such initial risk as may attach to it.

I can only invite Government to review the position from all standpoints, and decide finally as soon as possible which course best suits their policy and convenience.

7. It remains to be decided what course is to be pursued in the matter of the recognition or non-recognition of the present sheikh. Our normal policy in these cases is to confirm the choice of the local community concerned so long as the individual elected accepts his treaty and customary obligations to Government. In the present instance I thought that a possible dispute over the succession might give us an opportunity of making a bargain with one of the candidates while the question was still fluid, but this contingency was forestalled by the natural action of the Residency agent and the newly elected sheikh, as will be seen from the letter dated the 14th December, of which a translation is attached (Enclosure 5), and which crossed me *en route* to Debai, gives the necessary assurances. Apart, therefore, from the consideration of the issues connected with the establishment of post and telegraph offices, the ordinary course would now be to accord recognition; and as I cannot say that any other candidate would be more satisfactory I recommend that we do so separately; and that, in reply to the sheikh's letter of the 6th January, I should express my great disappointment at the helpless nature of his reply, and say that I can only lay the position before Government and leave it to them to decide as to how long they will wait, or how they will provide for the improvement of the present unsatisfactory conditions in a way calculated to satisfy the requirements and interests of British traders.

8. Referring for a moment incidentally to the question of the comprehensive wireless scheme under projection, of which Zora (or Debai) forms an item, I have the honour to observe that it makes no difference to the sanctioned public works estimates, or the general wireless scheme itself, whether the station is at Zora or Debai; but as it would appear from the correspondence ending with my telegram dated the 15th January that active operations may at any moment commence in the direction of construction of buildings, it is urgent that the final decision of Government as to the location of the Trucial Coast station should be known without delay. I beg, therefore, that I may be informed telegraphically of the main conclusion arrived at by the Government of India after consideration of the foregoing paragraphs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Residency Agent, Shargah, to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(Translation.) *Shargah, November 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil, Chief of Debai, died on the 19th Zilhijah, 1330 (29th November, 1912), and that the ignorant section of the Debai people wished to create mischief between the sons of the late Sheikh Rashid-bin-Maktoom, who were in the service of Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil, and the sons of the late Sheikh Maktoom. Hostility arose between them and some volleys were fired. The sons of Sheikh Rashid-bin-Maktoom took refuge in the house of Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil, and made a bid for the sheikhdom. The Al-Bu-Felasa tribe having decided to appoint Said-bin-Maktoom as the Sheikh of Debai, certain notables of the said tribe came to me asking me to use my friendly endeavours to effect a conciliation and

to avert mischief between the sons of Sheikh Rashid and Sheikh Said-bin-Maktoom. I called on the sons of Sheikh Rashid in the house of Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil, advised them to avoid mischief and to give up hostile feelings, and assured them that they will receive emoluments and due respects from Sheikh Said-bin-Maktoom. I accompanied them to the said Sheikh Said, and made a conciliation between them in the presence of the headmen of the Al-Bu-Felasa tribe, and they were satisfied with each other and their relations were improved. The internal affairs of Debai have been pleasantly arranged by the grace of God, and the situation is tranquil at present.

It rests with your Honour to decide as regards offering condolence, and to give orders as to the question of treaties.

Enclosure 3 in No. 120.

Draft of Letter given to Sheikh of Debai.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

AS promised at our interview on the 19th December, I have the honour, after mature deliberation and discussion with my relatives, to give you the following reply:—

Your honour explained to me that in regard to several matters with which the interests of British trade and the progress of civilisation on the Trucial Coast were bound up, the great Government had not experienced from the late Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil, the same accord and friendly co-operation as was displayed in the past by my late father, Sheikh Maktoom-bin-Hashar, and you invite me, who have now been chosen by my clan to succeed the late sheikh, to inform you frankly what amount of co-operation may be expected from me in regard to the several matters in question.

In reply, I beg to say that—

Firstly, as regards the post office, I have no objection to the installation of an Indian post office, such as exist at Muscat, Bahrein, Koweit, and will accord the necessary support and protection to the postmaster.

Secondly, as regards the introduction of the telegraph, I am aware that it is provided in our treaties with Government that they are entitled to extend it to our territories when they please, and I have no objection to offer, but am prepared to accord facilities for erecting the station and obtaining accommodation, and to protect the telegraph operators, and in all matters connected therewith to co-operate with Government.

Thirdly, in regard to the visits of British traders to Debai for purposes of trade, I have no objection to their visits, and undertake to take such steps as may be necessary for their assistance and support.

In return for my co-operation in these matters I hope from Government, for their assistance and support to myself in the conduct of my administration.

Enclosure 4 in No. 120.

Sheikh Said-bin-Maktoom (Chief of Debai) to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(Translation.) *January 6, 1913.*

WITH reference to the conversation which took place between me and your honour on the 9th Moharrum (19th December) in regard to the post office and the telegraph at Debai, your friend explained to your honour that my tribe have appointed me as their sheikh with their free will and that being new to the affairs of the sheikhdom, I have not yet established myself (in authority) and do not know the real attitude of the people of Debai who have chosen me as their sheikh, as to whether they rely upon my views or wish to follow their own in such matters which have no definite precedent at Debai. Your honour knows likewise that a new man is not like an experienced one. So long as I am in this situation I have no power to oppose the views of the community, because if I oppose their views while the control is with them, I will be lost amongst them.

I explained to the community a part of the discussion which I had with your honour, and noticed a strong disapproval on their part. They even accused me with having perhaps agréed to a matter without consulting them; and my relation with them became strained. They stated to me that "they have no power to undertake responsibilities to the exalted and Imperial Government such as the protection of the agent to an English firm or of the postmaster or of the telegraph master, because they have enough to do to ensure their own protection against the Bedouins and are troubled by the incidents which take place between them, as when any of them kills another, he (the murderer) absconds to another tribe of those Bedouins from whom they (the community) cannot recover him; and what will happen if a similar incident befalls foreigners such as the dependants of the exalted and Imperial Government? What will be their condition (*i.e.*, the condition of the community) at that time? It is certain that matters will become serious and that the people of Debai will be ruined in consequence." It is strongly hoped from the Imperial Government that you will not burden us with what we cannot bear and that in the same way that you considered us with kindness in the past and were satisfied with what we could do, you may not burden us with difficulties (now).

May your life be everlasting, and salaams.

Enclosure 5 in No. 120.

Sheikh Saïd-bin-Maktoom (Chief of Debai) to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox.

(Translation.) *December* 14, 1912.

I BEG now to advise your honour that Sheikh Butti-bin-Soheil departed this life and that we were extremely distressed at this, but this being the inevitable path for mankind, nothing is possible but submission to what is decreed by God the Most High, and we therefore say "Verily we belong to God and verily to Him we shall return." And whereas I have assumed the sheikhdom of the town of Debai with the approval of the community of the Al-bu-Felasa, I deemed it fit to advise your honour accordingly. And I confirm the treaties which are (existing) between our predecessors and the exalted and Imperial British Government, and recorded in the book available with us; and we maintain the friendly relations and obligations existing between us. It will always delight me to hear of your welfare.

This is what was necessary to be stated, and salaams.

Enclosure 6 in No. 120.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December* 24, 1912.

DEBAI.

Your action, as reported by telegram on the 11th instant, is confirmed, but before your Government commit yourselves definitely I should wish to consider the further report of the Resident, Bushire.

Enclosure 7 in No. 120.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Simla, February* 19, 1913.

DEBAI.

Sir P. Cox's report referred to in your telegram of the 24th December, 1912, was sent in letter of the 6th instant from Secretary, Foreign Department. We have fully reconsidered the question and now recommend that the Zora scheme should be abandoned, and that, as Cox proposes in paragraph 5 of his letter, a post and telegraph office should be established at once at Debai. Considerable expense would be involved by the Zora plan, which also might, no doubt, create on the Trucial Coast suspicions liable to retard the expansion of our influence. Another point is that as the illicit trade in arms has shifted north it has increasingly centred at Debai; a footing there

would enable us to watch and control it. Debai is a large and prosperous town, and once we are quietly established there, no doubt will remain as to extension of our influence on Trucial Coast. Cox's opinion is that there is little risk of serious opposition; we agree. A small naval force could legitimately deal with any opposition arising, since this would only be exercise of the right which the Telegraph Treaty of 1864 confers on us. Cox might be left to grant or refuse recognition to the new sheikh, as seems most expedient to him in view of attaining establishment of telegraph without disturbance.

[10584] No. 121.

Consul Crow to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bussorah, March* 5, 1913.

I HAVE received the following particulars from a reliable source regarding the present numbers and distribution of Turkish troops in the district of Hassa:—

El Katr, 1st battalion of 112th regiment, consisting of 140 men.

Katefi, "Cadro" units of the 3rd battalion of the 112th regiment, consisting of 85 men.

Ogeir, "Cadro" units of the 3rd battalion of the 112th regiment, consisting of 80 men.

Hofuf, 2nd battalion of the 112th regiment, consisting of 190 men.

(Addressed to Constantinople; repeated to Foreign Office and Bushire.)

[10741] No. 122.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 124 of 4th March.

The suggestion of the three contemplated new steamers being granted to a firm other than Lynch seems to be excluded by the decision which exists to reserve navigation of the river only to Ottoman subjects, Lynch's rights being, however recognised.

[10768] No. 123.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 7, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 123 of 4th March

Dredger arrived quite recently in the Shatt-el-Arab in pieces and is not yet put together. His Majesty's consul reports that the vali's intention was to purchase it outright from German firm, who would not participate in working it.

The creeks which it is desired to dredge are irrigation creeks, no channel in Shatt-el-Arab, or its approaches from the sea warehouse side. Condition of these creeks has long been a grievance with local merchants, British or other, and the authorities have been repeatedly urged to take steps to improve it, which seems very desirable in the interests of trade.

I have mentioned the matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs who says, that no arrangement had been or could have been made with foreign firm without his knowledge. He was of opinion that it would be better to do nothing until settlement had been [group omitted: ? arrived at] in London with regard to riverain commission and would issue instructions accordingly.

[10815] No. 124.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 174.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 2, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 4th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah stating that the acting vali has received a telegram from the Minister of the Interior instructing him to permit the Tapu office to register property in the names of Sheikh Mubarak of Kowéit and Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[10818] No. 125.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 177.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 2, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 119 of to-day's date, I have the honour to furnish you with the following further details on the subject of the Bagdad Railway Company's suggestion for the formation of a permanent river transport company in which Messrs. Lynch, the Ottoman Nahrié Company, and the Bagdad Railway would participate on equal terms.

It appears that the company formed in Belgium (see Mr. Marling's despatch No. 675 of the 8th August last) by agreement between Messrs. Lynch and the railway company has proved inadequate for the work of carrying up the machinery and matériel during the period of construction of the railway, which is consequently threatened with serious delay. The German company, however, is unwilling to provide the capital for the purchase of additional steamers which would be left idle on their hands at the end of three years or must be sold at a serious loss to the Turkish company. Messrs. Lynch cannot take them, as their fleet on the river is limited to three working vessels.

To remedy this state of affairs, and also in order to obtain a permanent interest in the river-borne trade, which is of importance to them as a feeder to the railway, the German company have approached the Turkish Minister of Finance with an outline of the scheme, and have also submitted it to Messrs. Lynch, who, Sir R. Crawford understands, have given it a not unfavourable reception. The Turkish Ministry of Finance has made no definite reply, and will certainly, before doing so, consult Sir R. Crawford. I am not aware of the precise nature of the proposal made by Herr Gunther to Messrs. Lynch, but presumably as a commercial proposition they offer substantial attractions. Still, I venture to suggest that it might be to their advantage to refrain from any binding engagements until some settlement of the Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf questions has been reached, which might place them in a position to increase the number of their vessels on the Tigris, and would thus enable them to obtain better terms in negotiating the formation of the new company. It does not appear that Messrs. Lynch's interests would suffer by a certain delay, as the life of the company formed in Belgium has still some three years to run.

Herr Gunther's proposal of course involves the disappearance from the river of the flag and of a distinctive British concern, a result which may be expected to recommend the scheme to the Ottoman Government. I think also that we must be prepared for the possibility, and indeed the probability, that the German company will eventually acquire Messrs. Lynch's interests in the projected company.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[10820] No. 126.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 179.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 808 of the 24th October of last year, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting on the precarious condition of the Turkish light-ship "Kilid-el-Bahr" at the outer bar of the Shatt-el-Arab.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Bussorah, February 4, 1913.*

I AM informed that the "Kilid-el-Bahr," now stationed at the outer bar as a Turkish light-ship, is in a very precarious condition and that her cabins are leaking badly. The commodore lately sent two barrels of cement to fill the holes but this measure is ineffective. As the vessel appears to be in imminent danger of foundering, the commodore has provided her with 16 life-buoys and 1 life-boat for the safety of the 12 marines, 1 officer and 3 guardians on board. It is not expected that the "Kilid-el-Bahr" will remain afloat till next winter. The Naval Department promised some time ago to send a barge to replace the vessel but, up to the present time, nothing appears to have been done in that direction. This information has been furnished me by the representative of the Light-house Administration.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[10821] No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 180.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 121 of the 3rd March, relative to Mr. D'Arcy's oil concessions in the Bagdad and Mossul districts, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Porte's note of the 1st instant, as referred to in my telegram, as also copy of the notice addressed to the Porte by this embassy, to which the said Turkish note is a reply.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

Note verbale by Sublime Porte.

LE Département de l'Agriculture et du Commerce, saisi de la communication de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique datée du 28 décembre, 1912, concernant l'octroi à Mr. D'Arcy de la concession des sources de pétrole sises dans les vilayets de Mossoul et de Bagdad, fait savoir en réponse qu'il n'existe dans les registres aucune indication au sujet d'une demande qui aurait été faite par Mr. D'Arcy en vue d'obtention de la concession dont il s'agit.

Ledit département ajoute que ces sources, ainsi que les autres mines qui appartiennent à la Liste civile, ayant été transférées en 1325 au nom du Département des Finances, les diverses propositions qui avaient pu être faites à leur sujet précédemment, sans aboutir à un résultat définitif, sont par le fait de ce transfert restées sans effet, et que toute concession relative à ces mines ne peut être accordée que suivant les prescriptions du règlement en vigueur.

Sublime Porte, le 1er mars, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Note communicated to Sublime Porte.

FOLLOWING upon the verbal communication which His Majesty's Ambassador had the honour to make on the 10th instant to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the oil-fields in the vilayets of Mossul and Bagdad, and the negotiations between Mr. D'Arcy, through his representative in Constantinople, Mr. Nicol, and the Imperial Ottoman Government, for obtaining the concession of those oil-fields, His Majesty's Embassy, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, has now the honour to state that in view of Mr. D'Arcy's negotiations with the Imperial Ottoman Government extending over a considerable number of years, and entailing large expenditure in maintaining a special representative in Constantinople to conduct those negotiations, and, in view of the promises and assurances received by the latter in his negotiations with the Council of Ministers in 1909, to the effect that the concession in question would be accorded to him, His Majesty's Government beg to express the hope that the concession of the oil-fields in the vilayets of Mossul and Bagdad will not be given to concessionnaires other than to Mr. D'Arcy.

Constantinople, December 28, 1912.

[11073] No. 128.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 183.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 3, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 488 of the 8th June last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith extract from a letter from Sir R. Crawford, in which he urges the necessity of expediting the settlement of the question of the site and constructions of the new customs depôts at Bagdad.

The letter sufficiently explains the contemplated arrangements, but I should add that, in conversation with Mr. Marling, Sir R. Crawford said that it would be impossible for him to delay taking a definite decision any longer. The existing depôts are scattered all over the town—in itself a most inconvenient and costly arrangement, and are, besides, in a very dilapidated condition, and Sir R. Crawford was naturally anxious to avoid unnecessary expenditure in temporary repairs. In addition, the accommodation provided by them was insufficient and bad, and protests from merchants and the local authorities are being constantly received. Sir R. Crawford is of opinion that the arrangement he proposes cannot be detrimental to our interests, and would be glad to learn that His Majesty's Government does not desire to delay them further.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Sir R. Crawford to Sir G. Lowther.

Dear Sir Gerard Lowther, *Constantinople, March* 1, 1913.

A FEW days ago I had a conversation with Gunther about the plans for the railway buildings and customs depôts at Bagdad. The provision of new customs buildings is a matter of urgency. The existing buildings are dilapidated and insufficient, and it has been found impossible to procure suitable storage space elsewhere in the town.

In the interests of commerce, and to avoid claims for damage, the Turkish Government must therefore take measures promptly to deal with the situation, and inasmuch as the site for the railway depôts and station has now been definitely fixed on the right bank of the river, it has been decided that the new customs depôts, and particularly the transit depôts, should be constructed in proximity to the railway buildings. Preliminary negotiations for the purchase of land required have already taken place, and a vote on account will be put into the forthcoming budget.

In connection with these projects a question has arisen as to the desirability of allowing the customs depôts and transit depôts to be constructed and managed by the

company, on a scale of warehousing charges to be approved by the customs, on lines similar to those recently settled in connection with the port of Beirout. The estimate put before the Government for the construction of these buildings, including the customs offices, involves an expenditure of about 100,000*l.*, of which the larger portion would be absorbed by transit depôts.

It is probable that the Government will eventually abolish the transit duty on goods in transit to and from Persia viâ Bagdad, and, in any case, the amount of revenue derived from the existing transit duty is so small that the fiscal interest in this traffic would not alone justify a large expenditure on buildings for its accommodation. Moreover, the railway company has under its concession the right of monopoly in the construction of general warehouses and bonded warehouses at Bagdad, and from this point of view the concentration of the warehousing privileges for dutiable and transit goods in the company's depôts, subject to proper control for revenue purposes, would in many cases relieve the goods from double handling charges. Consequently we are of opinion that it would be in the interest of the Government, and also of commerce, that the warehousing of all goods subject to customs control, including goods in transit, should be undertaken by the railway company, and that the company undertake the cost of erecting the necessary buildings, the outlay for which would be compensated by a scale of warehousing charges to be approved by the customs and which would in any case be lower than the regulation "ardieh" imposed in custom warehouses.

In connection with the transit traffic it is also to be noted that it is contemplated that the manipulation of these goods will be later on transferred to Hamiekin, so that any buildings constructed at Bagdad in respect of this trade would probably be light constructions, capable of removal afterwards to Hamiekin. So far as regards the goods destined for consumption and distribution in the town of Bagdad, the railway company would undertake to provide suitable means of free transport from the right bank to the left bank of the river pending the construction of proper railway communication with the town.

Yours sincerely,

R. F. CRAWFORD.

[11238] No. 129.

Mr. Greenway to Mr. Parker.—(Received March 10.)

Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,

Dear Mr. Parker, *March* 6, 1913.

I AM obliged for your letter of the 3rd instant, advising that the Admiralty have expressed their willingness to take part in a meeting between representatives from the Government departments concerned and some members of our board, but that, before doing so, they would prefer to await the answer to a letter which they recently addressed to me on the subject of our latest offer to supply oil-fuel under a forward contract.

Since receipt of your letter I have seen the Director of Navy Contracts in regard to the above letter, and I now beg to enclose copy of a letter which I have, at Mr. Black's request, addressed to the Secretary of the Admiralty, giving the result of this interview.

This constitutes the answer which the Admiralty were awaiting, and nothing, therefore, now stands in the way of the proposed meeting. This, I understand, it is desired should take place at the earliest possible date, and I therefore suggest Tuesday or Wednesday next, either of which days will suit my co-directors, if convenient to the Government representatives.

Yours sincerely,

C. GREENWAY.

Enclosure in No. 129.

Mr. Greenway to Admiralty.

(Confidential.) *Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London,*

Sir, *March* 6, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th ultimo, I have had an interview with the Director of Contracts at which the points raised in your letter were discussed, and

at his request I beg to give the following explanations in respect of two of the various proposals which we have had under consideration with a view to overcoming the financial difficulties in connection with the proposed oil-fuel contract, viz.:—

1. Advance payment of 100,000*l.* per annum for the period of the contract in respect of oil to be delivered, repayable by deductions of 5*s.* per ton from the contract price of the oil delivered.

The security for repayment of these advances would be—

(*a*) The deductions from the contract price as above;
(*b.*) The credit of the company;

and in order to further safeguard the Government, my directors would also be willing to consider giving a charge, up to the amount of the advances outstanding, on the assets of the company, subject only to the current debenture loan of 600,000*l.*

As the Government are, I believe, aware, the properties of the company are, even at the present time, probably saleable for a sum greatly in excess of the liability that would be incurred in respect of the above proposal. The security that would be thus offered is therefore ample.

This proposal obviously differs materially from the out-and-out subsidy referred to in the Foreign Office memorandum No. 1 of the 19th November, 1912, but it is much the same in effect as the proposal contained in my letter of the 11th October, addressed to you, with the exception of the above-indicated security.

It, however, has the advantage that, the advance payment being a condition of sale common to many contracts, it could presumably be dealt with departmentally, and would not, therefore, be open to the objections which were found to this proposal in its original form.

2. Guarantee by the Indian Government or by His Majesty's Government of 4 per cent. per annum on the 2,000,000*l.* additional capital which it is estimated would be required to carry out the proposed contract.

It was originally proposed that this guarantee should be given for the period of the contract, but my directors now think that it may be possible to raise the required capital on a guarantee for a period of ten years; but this is a point to which they cannot definitely commit themselves at the moment.

As in the "advance" proposal, the amount paid by the Government in respect of the guarantee will be repayable by deductions at the rate of 5*s.* per ton on the quantity of oil delivered.

This proposal would only involve a total risk of 800,000*l.*, less the amount repayable in respect of the oil delivered, and the whole amount would be covered in about nine years, with deliveries at the rate of 350,000 tons per annum.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

[11238] No. 130.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 3rd instant, in regard to the recent proposals of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that, in view of the correspondence now passing between your department and Mr. Greenway, he is now somewhat doubtful whether the attendance of a representative of the Foreign Office would be of advantage at the meeting between Mr. Greenway and the representative of your department.

I am accordingly to inform you that, unless the Lords Commissioners see any objection, Sir E. Grey does not propose to be represented, and I am to enquire whether their Lordships consider it necessary for a representative of the India Office to attend.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[9777] No. 131.

Foreign Office to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 18th ultimo, and previous correspondence, relative to matters connected with the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople understands that the arrangement concluded between your company and the Bagdad Railway Company has proved inadequate, and that your company and the Bagdad Railway Company have been approached by a third party with a view to the creation of a permanent river transport company in which the three parties would participate equally and the British flag would disappear.

In this connection I am to advert to the concluding paragraph of your letter of the 25th November last, in which you informed the Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government might rest assured that you would not fail to consult this department at an early stage in the event of your contemplating any change in the basis of the negotiations with the Turkish Government, or of your being approached by other parties with a view to effecting a change in the *status quo* on the Tigris.

In the light of this assurance, and in the absence of any intimation to the contrary, Sir E. Grey feels confident that the rumours current in Constantinople that you are not unfavourable to the conclusion of any such agreement must be without foundation; but, in view of previous communications of recent date between yourself and this department, he considers that the fact that such rumours do exist should be brought to your notice.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10327] No. 132.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 10, 1913.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th instant, transmitting copies of telegrams exchanged with Mr. Stock regarding the negotiations being carried on at Constantinople on behalf of your syndicate with a view to obtaining the concession for the oilfields in Mesopotamia, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he has taken note of the statement, contained in your telegram to Mr. Stock, that a loan is not to be a condition of any arrangement arrived at.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11393] No. 133.

Anglo-Persian Oil Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 11.)

(Confidential.) *Winchester House, Old Broad Street, London, March* 10, 1913.

Sir,

I BEG to enclose herewith copy of a letter which I have received from our representative at Constantinople in connection with the negotiations for the Mesopotamian oil concession.

I have, &c.
C. GREENWAY,
Managing Director.

Enclosure in No. 133.

Mr. Stock to Mr. Greenway.

Dear Sir, *Constantinople, March* 3, 1913.

ON Saturday, the 1st instant, I saw Djemal Bey, Minister of Mines and Commerce, who was expecting me, the Grand Vizier having communicated with him as arranged.

I had a cordial and friendly reception, and having opened the subject the Minister said there were difficulties in the way, as the laws do not permit of privileges such as we want over such wide territories as the entire vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad.

I told him the Council of Ministers had decided in the past that these privileges would be granted to the "syndicate represented by Mr. Nichols," and that it was "un droit acquis"; that if we had not moved in the matter recently it was because of the state of war, first with Italy and at present with the Balkans, and that as peace is now in sight the syndicate had decided to conclude the business and exercise its rights as confirmed to the British Ambassador by the Grand Vizier.

The Minister suggested that those formalities were prior to the Chester project, but I objected that that fact only strengthened our position, and that he knew as well if not better than the syndicate that the Chester scheme was quite dead. He appeared to admit this, and suggested that the vilayet difficulty could be overcome by promulgating a short special law through the Council of Ministers and an iradé, and that he would bring the matter before his colleagues at once. At this point the Minister raised a point that I expected, *i.e.*, was the syndicate prepared to make a cash advance on account of djerib tax and royalties? He added that he had recently received an offer of £T. 500,000 for the rights we are now demanding. I suggested that he ought to have accepted such a brilliant offer, but he replied that he was not sure the offer was quite serious. I think he was bluffing. Continuing the conversation, he said the Government was poor and would certainly look for such a facility. I told him that no such thing was provided for in the arrangements made with the Government in the past, and in principle we could not admit such a condition; but that the syndicate might be persuaded to meet the case, though this could only be in a reasonable amount, and in direct proportion to the present problematic value of the privilege which can only cover unproved lands. I informed him that I was not authorised to discuss this phase of the matter with him as a Government official, but would do so at a later date and when the Government had intimated its readiness to issue the necessary permits.

Having pressed the Minister for an early reply from the Cabinet, we arranged for to-morrow (Tuesday).

I returned to the office to find Mr. Weakley awaiting me. He told me the Ambassador had received a long and pressing despatch from the Foreign Office wanting to know what had been done, and stating that during this week competitors would make a definite move, and leaving it to the Ambassador to judge of the necessity of acting energetically.

The Ambassador had sent Mr. Weakley over to ascertain what I had done. I gave him full particulars which he communicated to Sir Gerard Lowther, who had arranged to see the Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister yesterday. I expect to hear the result of yesterday's meeting to-day.

The amount of £T. 50,000 mentioned as available for an advance or for other specific purposes will not, I am afraid, appeal to the Government, and the question arises how far the syndicate go towards a substantial advance on the express condition that it is properly secured, that it bears interest and is repaid in a short period by the djerib tax and royalties, and that if these two items are not sufficient to provide for reasonably early liquidation, the Government to make it up from other sources.

There are many concession-hunters and financiers, here and abroad, who are only too ready to come forward with advances in consideration of facilities, and I feel that we shall have to come into line with present requirements if we are to do any satisfactory work.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the Government well knows that there are valuable oil deposits in the two vilayets, but what makes the situation difficult is that the officials have such inflated ideas of the value of these deposits.

Djavid Bey, ex-Minister of Finance and a very active Young Turk, is now in Europe heating up the markets for money, and I understand he has authority to trade concessions in exchange; one local paper stated that he was authorised to deal with the Chester scheme.

I suggest the advisability of carefully considering the necessity of meeting the financial situation on favourable terms in the way of security, interest and repayment, and to let me know the maximum that can be granted, it being understood, of course, that it be arranged for the least possible amount. Officially, neither the Ambassador nor the Foreign Office must know of any such arrangement.

Touching Djavid Bey's presence in Europe, I think it necessary that the Foreign Office be induced to instruct the British Ambassador, in whichever capital Djavid

happens to be, to hint to him that he must not deal with oil propositions in Mosul or Bagdad; our position could easily be seriously prejudiced by Djavid. The Germans will, without fail, make the most of him while he is in Berlin, and we must not forget that the relations between him and Huggenin are of the most intimate.

It will interest you to know that in the file at the Ministry of Mines there is an official communication from the Civil List to the effect that at the time the oil rights were retransferred to the Ministry there was no contract or negotiations pending; in other words, the rights were handed over free and unencumbered. I shall *inspecteur financier* get a copy of this, as it will, I believe, dispose of any German claims.

I shall be glad if you will let me have a concise résumé of all you did out here, with names as far as possible; this will be materially helpful.

There was one point not touched on by us in London, the expenditure necessary with the chief clerk at the Ministry of Mines or at any other department for getting copies of any documents we may require. Men of this class cannot be arranged for on condition of the concessions going through, but must be paid in cash as and when their assistance is required, and leave us to make the best possible bargains.

Yours very faithfully,
H. W. STOCK.

P.S.—Just returned from Minister of Mines, who has not yet spoken to Grand Vizier; am to go again to-morrow, and shall report to Sir G. Lowther this afternoon. Believe Huggenin has got an application in for Mosul.

March 4, 1913.

[11475] No. 134.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March* 11, 1913.

MY telegram No. 121 of 3rd March.

I saw the Grand Vizier again yesterday about the oil concession. He said that besides Stock's demand there was another on behalf of an English company, whose name had escaped him, and he could not tell me the date of the request. He pointed out the difficulties in connection with the mining laws for granting so extensive a concession, but said that the Cabinet would examine the matter shortly.

It seems to me most important that Stock should be furnished at once with copies of all the documents that were put in by his predecessor, and a résumé of all the negotiations which took place between Nicols, the Porte, and the mining department.

[11475] No. 135.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 13, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the negotiations for the oil concession in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul, which Mr. D'Arcy is endeavouring to obtain from the Turkish Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting a further conversation on the subject with the Grand Vizier on the 10th March.

The Grand Vizier is reported to have stated that, besides Mr. Stock's demand, there was another on behalf of an English company, whose name had escaped him, but he could not recall the date of the request. His Highness pointed out the difficulties in connection with the mining laws in the way of granting so extensive a concession, but said that the Cabinet would examine the matter shortly.

Sir G. Lowther adds that it seems most important that Mr. Stock should be furnished at once with copies of all the documents that were put in by his predecessor, and a full résumé of all the negotiations which took place between Mr. Nicol, the Porte, and the Mining Department.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11879] No. 136.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, March 13, 1913.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 10th instant on the subject of the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, I am directed by my board to state that the information conveyed by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople would appear to refer to the pourparlers, of which we had heard privately as having been instituted by the National Bank of Turkey and a Belgian group in connection with this matter. Our chairman called at the Foreign Office at the time, and gave you all the information in our possession. Since then we have heard nothing further about the matter, except that we have understood privately that the Bagdad Railway Company have thrown cold water on the proposals. We have given them no encouragement whatever.

We should at the same time be much obliged if you would kindly give us in confidence some more specific particulars as to who the third party in question is, so that we may take such measures as may be deemed desirable.

As regards the supposed inadequacy of the arrangements made for the transport of railway material for the Bagdad Railway, we are not aware of such inadequacy. Two of the new steamers are already running in advance of the date contemplated, and the arrangements are working quite smoothly. Conversations have taken place at Constantinople with regard to the participation of the Turkish Government to the extent of one-third in the Société de Transports fluviaux en Orient for the conveyance of railway material in compliance with the understanding arrived at between the two parties who established that company, particulars of which are in your possession, but the political situation has stood in the way of the conclusion of the arrangement.

I have, &c.

FRED. W. PARRY, *Secretary.*

[11950] No. 137.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Bussorah, 12th March :—

"(Secret.)

"Sheikh Eh-el-Benaiyeh, brother of Ghadban, of the Benilam tribe, visited me yesterday in disguise and begged for British protection and assistance for all Arab tribes on both sides of the Tigris, from Gart to Gurna, in their differences with the Turkish Government. He said that if the Turkish Government refuse to make a satisfactory arrangement regarding their land contracts they will revolt. He also asked whether there was any hope of the British Government advising the Turks to give them the land contracts they demand for a period of fifteen years, adding that, if they do so, the Arabs will pay 100,000*l.* arrears out of the 162,000*l.* due.

"I replied that I could not encourage them, as we could not interfere in the internal affairs of the Turkish Government, with whom we had friendly relations, and urged him to submit the differences to the Turkish Government direct.

"He said that direct negotiations with the Turks were hopeless, and asked me to telegraph his application and solicit an answer.

"I undertook to do so with all reserve, but could not hold out hopes of favourable reply.

"He hinted that the Arabs might take Amara and Bussorah and stop river navigation by the Turks.

"Attitude of the Arabs as regards ourselves is sufficiently embarrassing, and I hope some reply may be sent (see my telegram No. 21 of last year and No. 4 of this year.) The three parties who have approached me are powerful and represent different and independent points of view. It would detract from our local interests to alienate them in view of their possible future action.

"(Addressed to Constantinople; repeated to Bushire for the information of the Government of India.)"

[11951] No. 138.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 145 of to-day.

I have instructed His Majesty's consul at Bussorah as follows:—

"Your telegram No. 12. Secret.

"You should discreetly inform the sheikh in reply that, the matter being an internal one, it is impossible for us to interfere, especially at a moment when the Ottoman Government is preoccupied with reasons of peace and war in the Balkans."

[11986] No. 139.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 102. Confidential.)

Sir,

Constantinople, March 10, 1913.

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 117 of the 1st March, it is clear that the German syndicate will make a most determined effort to prevent Mr. D'Arcy getting the concession for the oil deposits in question, and their position here at the present moment is very strong.

The committee, now in power, has always manifested leanings towards Germany, and the sympathy recently shown in England towards the Balkan allies, wrongly interpreted here as anti-Turkish, combined with the fact that the Germans, through the Deutsche Bank-Anatolian Railway combine, has helped the present Committee Cabinet by granting them financial assistance at a critical moment, has accentuated this pro-German tendency. As in the Lynch affair in 1909, when the Germans were so successful, there is no doubt that German agencies here, direct and indirect, will put forth every effort to secure the oil-fields concession.

It would seem that the only strong leverage we have to counteract such efforts are the concessions Hakki Pasha now seems to be unofficially discussing in London in connection with the 4 per cent. customs increase, &c.

As His Majesty's Government, by their communication of the 18th July last, is already committed in the matter, and it may be difficult to add any other desiderata, I ventured to suggest that Hakki Pasha might be given to understand that we attach the greatest importance to the concession being given to us.

If, coupled with such a hint, he found that we were indisposed to proceed rapidly with the negotiations, and that the pourparlers dragged on without any apparent serious reason, he and the Ottoman Cabinet would perhaps realise the necessity of giving us satisfaction in the matter. I understand that the plan of the committee in the matter of the Balkan war is to endeavour to turn European public opinion into pro-Turkish channels, and that in this connection it has been decided to be most accommodating on all outstanding questions with European Governments, especially those of the Triple *Entente*. It might perhaps be possible to take advantage of this disposition and anxiety to attain our purpose in the question of the oil-fields concession.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Mr. E. Whittall, who is on the board of Sir E. Cassel's National Bank, should be associated with the foreign-controlled combine which is opposed to Mr. D'Arcy in a matter of supreme importance to British interests and the vital issue of the naval defence of the Empire.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[12157] No. 140.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 15, 1913.*

THE Minister of Mines has intimated to Mr. Stock the intention of putting up to auction the Mesopotamian oilfields, a course which is contrary to the regulations.

A committee organ has to-day announced from a London diplomatic source (apparently the Ottoman Embassy there) that an arrangement is on the point of being concluded by which England would consent to the neutralisation of Koweit, while the Bagdad Railway would end at Bussorah, and that this has produced in England an excellent impression of a kind to bring about revulsion of feeling in favour of Turkey.

I would venture to recall your attention to the considerations set forth in my despatch No. 192, Confidential, of 10th March.

[12194] No. 141.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 197.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March 13, 1913.*

IN your despatch No. 73 of the 6th instant was enclosed a copy of a telegram sent by Mr. Greenway to Mr. Stock, in which a reference is made to "promises" made to me by the then Grand Vizier regarding the granting of a concession for the oil-fields in the Bagdad and Mosul vilayets.

I would observe that I have no recollection whatever of any promises having been made directly to me by Hilmi Pasha in this connection.

I was not concerned in the early stages of the negotiations, and, as will be seen from my despatch No. 674 of the 17th August, 1909, I only received from his Highness a statement to the effect that the Council of Ministers had "practically" decided to grant the concession, and later on in that despatch I refer to the promises said to have been made by the Sublime Porte to Mr. Nichols, and I then expressed the opinion that perhaps Mr. Nichols was over-sanguine.

Mr. Marling, who was acting chargé d'affaires when the question again came forward towards the end of the year, is quite certain that no such promise was made to him.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[11950] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 145 and 146, both of 14th March.

In view of the opinion expressed by Mr. Crow in the last paragraph of his telegram of 12th March, and of the uncertainty of the political situation, I propose to speak unofficially to Hakki Pasha on the subject of the land contracts.

In these circumstances Mr. Crow should be instructed to give the sheikhs a sympathetic reply, and say that, as I cannot of course intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, I cannot do more than mention the wishes of the sheikhs to the Porte unofficially.

I should be glad to know how the reply is received.

[12157] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 147 of 15th March: Mesopotamia oilfields.

I am sending a memorandum to Hakki Pasha. In meantime, please inform me what regulations are contravened by putting oil concession up to auction.

[12587] No. 143*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 18.)

Sir, *India Office, March 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the lighting and buoyage of the Persian Gulf, I am directed to invite reference to the telegraphic correspondence as to the proposed substitution of Musandim for Little Quoin Island as the site of one of the lighthouses whose establishment has been sanctioned by His Majesty's Government.

The adoption of this proposal, which the Marquess of Crewe strongly favours on strategical grounds, would involve a reference to the Sultan of Muscat, whose claims to jurisdiction over the Musandim peninsula have been recognised by His Majesty's Government. It might also lead to controversy with the French Government, as being inconsistent with the joint Anglo-French Declaration of 1862, the terms of which were held by the two Governments in 1899 to preclude either from obtaining any cession or lease of Muscat territory. In the event of an early settlement of the negotiations for the extinction of French rights at Muscat this question will not arise. Failing this solution, however, Lord Crewe would suggest, as a means of getting over the difficulty, that an agreement might be concluded with the Sultan conferring the right to erect and maintain a lighthouse, but not the lease or cession of any territory, upon His Majesty's Government.

Before instructing the Government of India to approach the Sultan in the matter, his Lordship will await an expression of the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

A copy of this letter is being communicated to the Admiralty.

I am, &c.
T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 143*.

The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March 3, 1913.*

PLEASE refer to the telegram of the 3rd January from the Resident, Bushire, which formed an enclosure to the letter of 6th February from your Foreign Secretary.

Please inform me of your views on the question of substituting Musandim for Little Quoin as a lighthouse site, the question of difficulties arising from the 1862 Declaration not being taken into account. The view has recently been expressed by the Admiralty before the Committee of Imperial Defence that any naval station at the entrance to the Persian Gulf should not be on the northern side of the Straits, but on Musandim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 143*.

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 12, 1913.*

LIGHTHOUSE on Little Quoin.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 3rd instant.

The Little Quoin site is shown by the report of the Lighting and Buoying Committee to be preferable for purely technical reasons, but a practicable site is afforded by Musandim Island, which, further, is preferable to any other site on the promontory, as it is separated from the mainland by a narrow channel, which would secure the keeper of the lighthouse from being troubled by tribesmen. Apart from the considerations arising from the Declaration of 1862, we agree to adopt Musandim instead of Little Quoin, so as to conform to views of the Admiralty, and also to establish gradually our position on the promontory.

(Repeated to Resident, Bushire.)

[12608] No. 144.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 18, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 145 of 17th March.

Mining regulations make no provision whatever for adjudication, but merely for "permis de recherche," and as there are no special regulations regarding petroleum it presumably comes under the mining laws, being a mineral oil concession.

[11393] No. 145.

Memorandum communicated to Hakki Pasha, March 18, 1913.

IN the spring of 1909 the terms of a contract had been agreed upon, and approved by the Sultan's civil list, between the Ottoman Government, on the one hand, and the representative and local agent at Constantinople (Mr. Nichols) of Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, a British subject, on the other, whereby the right to work the deposits of mineral oil existing in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad was assured to Mr. D'Arcy.

The Grand Vizier had given assurances that the concession in question would be granted to Mr. D'Arcy, and had gone so far as to make a recommendation that an Imperial iradé should be issued to that effect, when the *coup d'État* which occurred at that time in Constantinople prevented the completion of the transaction.

Mr. Stock, the local representative of Mr. D'Arcy, is at present in Constantinople, and His Majesty's Ambassador at that capital has been furnished with instructions to afford him sustained and energetic support in his negotiations.

Mr. Stock was granted an interview by the Minister of Mines, who observed to him that the mining laws of the Empire do not permit of privileges such as those which are being sought by Mr. D'Arcy being granted over such wide territories as the entire vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul. Mr. Stock, however, pointed out that the Council of Ministers had in the past decided that these privileges should be granted to the "syndicate represented by Mr. Nichols," and that it was a "droit acquis," and that if Mr. D'Arcy had not moved in the matter recently it was because of the troubles in which Turkey had been involved, beginning with the war with Italy; but Mr. D'Arcy now felt that the business could not be delayed, and that he must exercise his rights as confirmed to His Majesty's Ambassador by the Grand Vizier.

The Minister thereupon suggested that the difficulty which he had indicated could be overcome by the promulgation of a short special law by the Council of Ministers and by the issue of an iradé, and promised to lay the matter at once before his colleagues in the Cabinet.

In view of the circumstances above related, and of the expectation long held out to Mr. D'Arcy that the concession would be granted to him, His Majesty's Government feel confident that the Ottoman Government will recognise his claim, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs trusts that his Highness Hakki Pasha will recommend it strongly to the favourable consideration of the Sublime Porte.

His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the solution of this question in the sense indicated, and hope that Hakki Pasha will lose no time in telegraphing in this sense to his Government.

Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.

[11073] No. 146.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 21st May last, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Board of Trade, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,† enclosing a letter from Sir R. Crawford, who expresses the hope that His Majesty's Government do not desire any further delay in the building of the new customs depôt at Bagdad.

* Also to India Office, *mutatis mutandis.* † No. 128.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured as soon as possible with any observations which the Board of Trade may have to make on the enclosed communication.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10484] No. 147.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 18, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, supporting a recommendation of the Government of India that Debai and not Zora should be selected for the installation of the wireless telegraph on the Trucial coast.

I am to state, that Sir Edward Grey concurs in the view that Debai possesses obvious advantages over Zora as the seat of this installation, but I am to enquire when the Government of India would propose to take action in the matter, since it appears from the antepenultimate paragraph of the letter of His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to the Government of India, dated the 30th April, 1911, copy of which was forwarded to this office in your letter of the 6th June of that year, that it is desirable that the work should be undertaken in the cold weather.

I am to observe, in this connection, that it appears to Sir E. Grey to be preferable not to start operations till the negotiations now in progress at this office with Hakki Pasha are concluded.

Sir E. Grey notes that the Government of India agree with Sir P. Cox that the risk of serious opposition to the work on the part of the local population is small and he presumes that the Marquess of Crewe is satisfied that this view is sound.

Sir E. Grey would, however, be glad to learn what force would, in Lord Crewe's opinion, suffice to ensure that those engaged in setting up the installation should not be molested and to protect it from attack afterwards.

I am further to ask whether, if a permanent garrison is required for the latter purpose, it could safely remain at Debai during the hot weather.

I am to suggest that the Government of India should be consulted as to the points raised and that the consent of the Admiralty should, if necessary, be obtained to the employment of a naval force for the object in view.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[12656] No. 148.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 202.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 13, 1913.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 16 of the 16th January last on the subject of the application addressed to the Turkish Government by the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company for an extension of the railway, I have the honour to report that Mr. H. Pears, the company's agent here, has informed me that about the end of January he received instructions from his principals in London, as well as from the general manager of the company in Smyrna, not to press the demand for the extension scheme and to do nothing for the moment. Since that date he has received no further instructions.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[12657] No. 149.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 203.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum reporting on the state of uneasiness prevailing in the vilayet of Bitlis.

Mr. George Knapp, who is mentioned in Mr. Monahan's despatch, was forced to leave Turkey at the time of the Armenian massacres in 1895 owing to the persistance with which he endeavoured to throw light on what was happening in the interior of Asia Minor.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 149.

Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, March* 1, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received from the Rev. Mr. Knapp the following information, under date of the 10th ultimo, obtained during a recent tour which he has made through the northern district of Bitlis vilayet:—

A search for Armenian recruits liable for service was being made, with much cruel beating, in Boulanik Caza, a Lieutenant Kiamil Effendi, of Munzgerd, being especially active. He and seven mounted gendarmes had lived for three days at free quarters in a village, Shervan Sheikh, in that caza killing for themselves an ox, a cow, a sheep, and many chickens. A good many of the villagers of Shervan Sheikh were flogged, some of them with as many as forty strokes. Among them a pregnant woman was beaten with the result that childbirth was brought on, though, fortunately, there was no abortion. It was said that in another village, Kakarloo, a man was so severely beaten on account of his missing son that he died. In the Akhlat Caza a new registration of the people was being made, and heavy bribes were being paid for false registration of the ages of young men so that they might escape military service. One villager had paid as much as 13 liras for such registration of his son. The bribes were, however, useless, as the discrepancies between the old and new lists were at once noticed by the authorities.

It does not appear how far Mr. Knapp was able to verify the stories of the brutalities of recruiters, but the stories show the feelings of the Armenians towards recruitment. Some stories of rough, though much less rough, treatment of relatives of missing recruits have reached me from the remoter southern parts of Erzeroum vilayet, but not from other parts of this vilayet. The comparatively few Armenian recruits, facilities for escape to Russia being so great, who are obtained near Erzeroum town, seem at any rate to be well-treated, when with the colours, as are Armenian soldiers in general.

Mr. Knapp reports, further, on the same date that meetings of Kurdish chiefs, sheikhs, &c., were making the Armenian population rather nervous, that meetings of Moslems had been held in mosques, and had sent telegrams to Constantinople preferring readiness to sacrifice their lives and their all for the religion, and that "the military chaplain of the Vali of Bitlis" was supposed to have sent letters to the muftis in the Bitlis and other vilayets calling upon them to be ready to follow the sacred flag in case of need. A Moslem woman in a bath had insulted Christianity, but had been reprimanded by the Turkish matron in charge.

Mr. Knapp adds that but for the deep snow there would be serious disturbance even now; that the Armenians are intensely longing for Russia to deliver them from their precarious position, though they and many Moslems too, would, of all things, prefer England to take charge if it were possible; that, according to his information, Armenians in the Caucasus are arming, with the apparent approval of the Russian Government, to help their co-nationals in this country in case of need; that foreign force is necessary, but that on the news of its approach the Moslems will do their worst and the native Christians will have to defend themselves; and that the foreign force had therefore best come in winter when there would be a minimum loss of life.

I would venture to recall the facts that Mr. Knapp was born in Bitlis, speaks Armenian perfectly, and was expelled from Turkey by the Turkish Government in 1895.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[12660] No. 150.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 206.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the reports which I have received from His Majesty's consular officers in various parts of Asiatic Turkey continue to be of a somewhat disquieting nature. Apart from the disturbance at Hadjin, reported in my despatch No. 172 of the 1st instant, there has been no very serious outbreak, but murders of Armenians and looting of Christian villages have taken place in various districts, and a general feeling of uneasiness and unrest is in the air.

The United States Ambassador kindly supplies me from time to time with information which he receives from the numerous American missionaries working in Asia Minor, and though this information is naturally apt to be somewhat highly coloured, it agrees in the main with the official accounts which I receive.

The British vice-consul at Diarbekir reports the looting of three Chaldean and one Syrian Christian village in the Sert district, and a double murder of Syrian Christians committed by Mollahs at Jezireh.

His Majesty's consul at Aleppo states that, though he does not anticipate serious anti-Christian trouble there at present, there is great unrest owing to the rise in prices of the necessaries of life, and the lower class Moslems threaten to loot the market.

From Adana Mr. Vice-Consul Matthews reports that, in an interview which he had with the Catholics of the Armenians of Cilicia, the latter complained bitterly of the pressure which was being exercised on the Armenians, of the dispatch of large numbers of Turkish troops to the Armenian districts of Marash and Zeitun, and of the discourtesy of the officials to himself.

From Broussa and Trebizond I hear that strongly-worded anti-Christian pamphlets have been printed and distributed.

Although none of these things can be considered exceptional, and similar incidents might be cited at random out of almost any of the consular reports from Asiatic Turkey of recent years, yet the present state of affairs is undoubtedly one of unusual tension, and I fear that the return to Asia on the conclusion of peace of the Moslem troops now in Europe must be viewed with some apprehension. The Christian atrocities campaign has been waged with such bitterness here that it can scarcely fail to have its effect in Asiatic Turkey after the war.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[12608] No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 151 of 18th March: Mesopotamian oil.

You may protest against auction of oilfields if, after consultation with Mr. Stock, you think it advisable to do so.

[39691] No. 152.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 19, 1913.*

Referring to your letter of the 20th September last, respecting the draft convention for the future conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that he considers that the title "Inspector of Navigation" is open to far graver objection than that of "Captain of the Port," since His Majesty's Government are very anxious, on account of the difficulty in connection with dues, to avoid arousing suspicions of foreign shipping. If there were a British "Inspector of Navigation"—a somewhat ambiguous and vague term—foreign Powers might raise an objection to submitting their navigation to a British Inspector.

Sir E. Grey would therefore propose, subject to the concurrence of their Lordships, to substitute for the proposed title that of "Inspector of the River Conservancy," which, in his view, would accurately describe the functions of the official in question, and would not be open to the same objection.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn the views of their Lordships on this suggestion, and, in the event of its acceptance will endeavour, if opportunity offers to get the article modified in this sense.

At the same time, Sir E. Grey would point out that the idea was that the salary of the "Surveyor" should not be a large one, compared to that of the British Commissioner.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[13109] No. 153.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 214.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 18, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on suspension of work on the Bagdad Railway.

Mr. Matthews's despatch respecting the Chukur Ova concession was transmitted in my despatch No. 201, Commercial, of the 14th October, 1912.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 153.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Adana, March 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that, "owing to reasons connected with the war in the Balkans," work on the Bagdad Railway has been in a large measure suspended. According to reliable information, work is proceeding only on the tunnels through the Taurus and Amanus. The construction of the portions of the line between Kara Punar and Dorak, and between Mamureh and Hajn (near Islahieh) has ceased, and even the works necessary for the upkeep of the line ("Schutzwerke") are being abandoned.

I am informed that 18,000 dounums of land, a few miles north-east of the town of Hamidieh, have recently been acquired by two Germans of Alexandria, Messrs. Stoeffler and Peters. According to my information, this land was brought in 1908 at about 20 piastres a dounum by a Turkish subject named Raad, acting on behalf of the Germans. Considerable difficulty was subsequently experienced by the Germans in having the land transferred from Raad's name to their own.

Some hostility has been manifested by local Germans to the Chukur Ova concession (my despatch No. 32 of the 4th October last), but it is now reported that the concession has been confirmed by the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[13113] No. 154.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 219. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a certain amount of uneasiness has been caused in the Armenian community by the report that the present peace negotiations are to be made the occasion for renewing the guarantee of Europe of the integrity of Turkey in Asia, and especially of the North-Eastern Anatolian provinces, where Turkey undertook in 1878 to introduce reforms as provided by article 61 of the Treaty of

Berlin and the Cyprus Convention. Armenians instance the last three and a half decades of massacres and disorder as a reason why Turkey should be induced to institute serious improvements and orderly government in those regions as a condition precedent to any such territorial guarantee if the question is mooted. It must be admitted that, though many projects of reform for those vilayets inhabited by the Armenians have been discussed since the change of régime in 1908, reports, both official and private, go to show that the conditions of life there are little, if at all, more tolerable than in the days of the Hamidian régime, and any territorial guarantee that did not give Europe or a mandatory Power the right to insist on the introduction into those regions of the elements of decent government would seem of more than doubtful expediency.

As far as Armenians are concerned, their general sense would seem to be that any new paper guarantee is scarcely likely to be more efficacious than that contained in article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. Apart from the Armenian problem, it would appear that a European guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would imply a guarantee of the maintenance of the existing Ottoman *status quo* in Egypt, Tunis, and the Aden hinterland, which Turkey still holds to be an integral part of her Empire.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[13315] No. 155.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 157. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 22, 1913.*

ARAB unrest.

Substance of your telegram No. 143 of 17th March was telegraphed to His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, who, in view of your promised communication to Hakki Pasha, gives the following account of sheikh's quarrel with the Turkish Government.

The sheikh and his brother represent 460 minor sheikhs and adherents of the same tribe. Two months ago they killed Government representative (who happened to be their uncle) in the matter of land contracts, and seized nine large tracts of Government land on the Tigris. Sheikhs appeared to be determined not to pay taxes for these lands unless the Government agrees to leave them to present holders for fifteen years. His Majesty's consul at Bussorah anticipates probable bloodshed if the Government attempts to evict holders. He suggests that as the Porte is in want of money, Government may be disposed to temporise, but he mistrusts promises of either party.

Later telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah states that as he was previously unacquainted with his visitor he is asking for proofs of his identity.

Paraphrases of both telegrams follow by post.

[13432] No. 156.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25.)

Sir,

India Office, March 22, 1913.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant regarding the proposed construction of new customs and general warehouses at Bagdad, and in reply to say that he is of opinion, subject to anything that the Board of Trade may have to say, that, as His Majesty's Government have decided not to participate in the company to be formed for the Bagdad–Bussorah extension, there no longer appears to be the same reason for desiring the postponement of the construction of the warehouses until this company comes into existence.

Article 3 of the draft convention, which formed annex 2 to the British memorandum of the 18th July, 1912, would seem to protect British goods arriving at Bagdad by the southern line against wilful obstruction by the Bagdad Railway Company; but there

[13627] No. 155*.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 25.)

(Secret.)
Sir,

India Office, March 22, 1913.

WITH reference to my letter of the 17th instant, regarding the proposed substitution of Musandim for Little Quoin Island as the site of a lighthouse, I am directed to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the question of the defence of the entrance to the Persian Gulf is engaging the attention of the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India.

This question has gained new importance from the possibilities (1) that an international railway traversing Persia may debouch on the Gulf, whether at Mohammerah, Bushire, or Bunder Abbas; (2) that Turkey may, after the war, consolidate herself in Asia Minor; (3) that the construction of the Bagdad Railway as far as Basra, if no further, may radically alter the balance of commercial and political interests in the waters of the Gulf. As regards the first of these points, it is for consideration whether the fact that the construction of through railway connection with India has been indefinitely postponed by the recent decision of His Majesty's Government, lessens the desirability of taking precautionary measures at the entrance of the Gulf.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the question has been under discussion for many years, and opinion has hitherto been generally in favour of the selection of the Persian side of the coast for an eventual naval station (see, for example, Government of India's telegram of the 8th January last). But on a recent occasion the Admiralty have put forward the view that any naval station which may be required should be on the Ras Musandim promontory on the Arabian side. Assuming this to be the final view of the naval authorities, I am to observe that the promontory in question is part of the territory of the Sultan of Muscat, whose permission would have to be obtained for any active measures thereon. Moreover, the use made by His Majesty's Government in 1899 of the Anglo-French joint Declaration of 1862 regarding the independence of Muscat, precludes them from applying for the cession of territory to themselves as a Government. On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent a British subject from obtaining a concession or lease on the promontory if the Sultan is willing to grant it. Further, as explained in my letter above quoted, the question of applying to him for permission to erect a lighthouse on Musandim Island is under consideration, and, if it is granted, it would give His Majesty's Government a certain *locus standi* there.

There is the other possibility that the negotiations now pending with the French Government regarding the arms traffic may result in the abrogation of the joint Anglo-French declaration. But as regards this possibility I am to invite attention to the enclosed copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 17th March, from which it will be seen that they regard abrogation of the declaration with some misgivings, and that there is some reason to belive that, while it would obviously remove difficulties *vis-à-vis* of France, it may also create fresh ones *vis-à-vis* of the Sultan.

Sir Edward Grey will doubtless judge whether the line of action suggested by Sir P. Cox in the telegram is consistent with the Declaration of 1862, or whether in any case the proposed course is one for which the Foreign Office would wish to make itself responsible. In order, therefore, that His Majesty's Government may be able to deal both with this question (as forming part of the negotiations with France) and with the general question of the defence of the entrance and approaches to the Persian Gulf, I am to suggest that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should be asked, bearing the above considerations in mind, to state at an early date what is the exact nature of the station which they contemplate, and to advise what overt measures are necessary for the purpose.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Admiralty.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 155[2].

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *January* 8, 1913.

WE have not had time to consider as fully as we could have desired question referred to in your telegram of the 3rd instant of naval and military position at mouth of Persian Gulf: our views, however, are these:—

It is assumed that the Trans-Persian Railway will touch the coast at Bunder Abbas either with main line or by a branch.

On this assumption security of naval control of Persian Gulf requires in our opinion either—

1. Holding positions on Hormuz, Larak, and Kishm islands in order to command approaches to, and so make secure, anchorage in Clarence Strait. Simultaneously rights (apparently possessed by us in virtue of Treaty of 1891 with Muscat) of pre-emption on Musandam peninsula must be enforced; or

2. Establishment of a naval station at Khor Kawai, with a simultaneous ensuring of our positions in respect of three islands mentioned above. This would be effected either by their actual occupation or by an agreement with Persia; or

3. To secure anchorage in Clarence Strait at same time setting up at Khor Kawai a coaling station. This course is combination of alternatives 1 and 2.

Considered from strategic point of view, first course admits of provision of a good anchorage with plenty of room; it provides also what is probably best position from which to control the waters of the Gulf. On the other hand, to defend the anchorage considerable force would be required to command the different channels of approach, and further, there is a lack of good harbour which could be used as a coaling station.

By second course a more easily and efficiently defensible position is afforded. For coaling station we could use harbour at Khor Kawai. On the other hand, there is much less space in the anchorage, while strategic position is not so good as that of Clarence Strait, as Persian littoral is not dominated.

The most effective control of Gulf would be afforded by third alternative, which, however, involves more extensive defensive measures. Also it appears unnecessary, for the purpose we have in view, that position on both shores should be occupied—compare analogous cases of Aden and Gibraltar. Probably effective control could be obtained by having on one shore a securely established base, together with, on the opposite shore, either flying naval station or rights of pre-emption.

We cannot at present estimate extent of defences and number of military garrison which would be necessitated by the above or any other measures designed to give us naval control of waters of Gulf. For purpose of Trans-Persian Railway, we think on the whole that the first course suggested is preferable, but there are patent obstacles to getting Persia to come to an agreement with regard to Henjam, Kishm, Larak, or Hormuz. As regards the former, the establishment of telegraph station has strengthened our position, and if it is found impossible to concert an agreement with Persia, it might be feasible unobstrusively to establish ourselves by other methods on the three other islands. Does not the treaty with France, 1862, as interpreted in Bandar-Gisseh case, prevent us obtaining from the Sultan a lease of Khor Kawai, whereby we would be able to set up there a coaling station or a naval base? Otherwise there should be little difficulty in inducing His Highness to grant us such a lease if found necessary.

Enclosure 2 in No. 155[3].

Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 17, 1913.

MUSCAT.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 3rd instant.

As regards cash payment of compensation for existing stocks of arms and for abolition of trade we agree to pay share; we will, if necessary, telegraph later our estimate of adequate sum on latter account, which is difficult to calculate. As regards cession

of territory near Pondicherry to France, some exchange of territory in India is essential condition of our agreeing, and we incline to press demand for cession of Chandernagore and the "loges" by France as a return, for public feeling would not fail to be stirred up by the cession of British territory in India to France without some such cession in return, and a handle against Government that would prove embarrassing would be afforded thereby to disaffected quarters. The offer made in the 5th paragraph of Sir R. Ritchie's letter of the 1st April, 1911, to the Foreign Office still commands our concurrence if the cession to us by France of Chandernagore and the "loges" is included. We would urge that, if finally it be decided to cede territory at Pondicherry, whether with compensation or not, a stipulation should be inserted that without previous consent no wireless telegraph station shall be erected in French India.

Telegram given below, dated the 7th instant, has been received from Resident in Persian Gulf regarding negotiations for option of leasing part of Musandim peninsula:—

"It is highly important, if the smallest chance of repealing 1862 Declaration at an early date exists, that cupidity of French Government should not be excited nor Sultan be alarmed by allowing them to suppose that possibility of the declaration being repealed is connected with present negotiations with His Highness. The greater caution is required in our action because the Sultan, though often finding the French a nuisance, sets store, I feel fairly sure, by their presence and by the existence of the Declaration of 1862 as safeguards against being overtaken by the fate of Zanzibar, of which he is in dread; he therefore would not be glad to see the declaration revoked. We ought, therefore, to proceed on some other basis to get from the Sultan what we need at present, and I would submit that at first the basis of our negotiations should be restricted to lighthouse question. The argument might be adopted that the Little Quoin is found to be too inaccessible a site, and that his permission is wanted to use a site on Musandim (for which we would be glad to pay him a rent if he wishes) for the lighthouse. When the light is once established, we should next declare that telegraphic communication with it is required, and that for this we propose to re-establish the telegraph station at Maklab; article I of the Telegraph Treaty of 1862 gives us a right to do this. When this is effected the next step will be to act as at Henjam by putting some coal at Khor Kawai. If, in the meanwhile, the abrogation of the Declaration of 1862 were successfully attained, and the French were got rid of, a much bolder line might be adopted."

The abrogation of the declaration would undoubtedly cause the Sultan much alarm, and by it one of our existing safeguards against other Powers intruding into Muscat would be removed. Is it not possible to induce France to accept our right by our 1891 Muscat agreement to take necessary steps to establish a naval station in the Ras-al-Jibal peninsula without going so far as to revoke the 1862 Treaty, and in spite of our interpretation of it in the Bandar Gisse case? If the declaration were preserved, the Sultan would without doubt be more favourable towards such an undertaking.

---

is no corresponding provision for goods arriving by river, and Sir E. Grey will perhaps wish to satisfy himself that there is no likelihood that these will be subjected to unfair treatment.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

[13851] No. 157.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1913.

MY telegram No. 149 of 19th March.

Stock reports to Greenway that both German Embassy and Hugenin are redoubling their efforts both through Grand Vizier and through Minister of Mines to obtain Mesopotamian oil concession for German enterprise.

You should urge Grand Vizier in the strongest manner to fulfil assurances given in the past, and support Stock in every way you can.

[13315] No. 158.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 157 of 22nd March: Arab unrest.

This puts whole matter in a very different light, and does not justify the consul's earlier telegrams. You should tell him to be more careful.

[13760] No. 159.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No 227. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 20, 1913.

MR EDWIN WHITTALL, who as a director of the National Bank of Turkey represents the Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate here, called on me yesterday morning, and after premising that he had come with the full knowledge and consent of Herr Günther, the sub-manager of the Anatolian Railway Company, said that he wished, in a friendly and unofficial manner, to put me in possession of his views regarding the question of the concession for the Mesopotamian oil-fields.

Mr. Whittall, as will be seen from the enclosed notes of our conversation, did not impart to me any information that we do not already possess, nor, so far as I was able to detect, did he seem to desire to extract any from me. He appeared to be very anxious to impress me with the strength of the German position and the support that the Syndicate would receive from the German Embassy, but he was careful to disclaim any intention of using this as a "threat."

He spoke also repeatedly of his own and Herr Günther's desire to avoid friction. When Mr. Whittall refers to possible friction and conflict between the British and German Embassies, it may be pointed out that, as the Civil List in the old régime and the Ottoman Government Departments after the change of régime negotiated with Mr. Nicholl, they dealt on the basis of the German rights having lapsed or being non-existent, so that any conflict in the present phase of the matter would arise not from Mr. D'Arcy's attitude but from that of the combine with which the National Bank is associated, and the conflict and friction could in great part, if not entirely, be avoided by the National Bank desisting from seeking the assistance of the German Embassy.

In any case, should a conflict result, as Mr. Whittall anticipates, in neither party getting the concession the oil-fields in question will not have come under a foreign-controlled combine—a result of no small importance in such a vital issue.

Mr. Whittall was also at pains to explain that his own personal interest in the Petroleum Syndicate was trifling, and that he was acting for it simply as a director of the board of the National Bank. I must say that I am rather at a loss to account for

Mr. Whittall's visit. He is, as you are aware, a very earnest and convinced advocate of a fusion of British and German interests, and it may—and his rather insistent suggestion that Mr. D'Arcy should join the Petroleum Syndicate seems to bear out this theory—be that he hoped to influence me to support that solution by representing Mr. D'Arcy's chances of obtaining the concession as very problematical. On the other hand, Mr. Whittall may have been commissioned by Herr Günther to endeavour to play the game of bluff, and that his visit indicates that the Germans are not so confident of success as they pretend.

Of these two theories I must confess that I lean rather to the former.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 159.

Notes of Conversation with Mr. E. Whittall, March 19, 1913.

MR. E. WHITTALL came to see me to-day more or less in a private capacity, but at the instigation of Herr Günther, of the Anatolian Railway, to talk about the Bagdad and Mosul oil-fields concession. He said Herr Günther had been informed by the Grand Vizier that I was supporting an English concessionnaire, and he could not explain to himself how it was that His Majesty's Embassy was favouring one British concessionnaire against another. This Mr. Whittall had been able to make clear to him. He then went on to say that the demands of Herr Günther, otherwise the National Bank, which had taken over his rights, would receive the warmest support from the German Embassy, and that it seemed unfortunate that the way should be prepared for a conflict between the two Embassies which would inevitably cause friction and which would probably end in the concession being given to neither.

I asked Mr. Whittall on what they based their rights. He said that in part they were based on the preferential rights of the Bagdad Railway 20 kilom. on either side of the line, and partly on a concession given long ago for a general exploitation of the oil-fields of Bagdad and Mosul, presumably the result of the agreement enclosed in Mr. Townley's despatch No. 837 of the 28th October, 1908, which, as explained in Mr. Marling's despatch No. 931 of the 1st December, 1909, Mr. Nicholl considered to have lapsed. I said that I understood that this, an arrangement with the Civil List, had lapsed, and that this had been the opinion of the Turkish Government. He replied that they had taken legal advice, which declared the opposite to be the case. Mr. Whittall added, to show that, at all events, the National Bank had no doubts as to the Anatolian Railway Company's rights under the 1904 agreement, that the Bank were acquiring those rights for 20,000*l.* in fully paid-up shares in the Ottoman Petroleum Syndicate. It comes then, it appears, to a complete divergence of views between the Turkish Government, which treated with Mr. Nicholl on the basis of the German concession having lapsed, and the lawyers, who advise the National Bank that their position, based on the German concession, is a sound one.

Mr. Whittall was inclined to agree to this being the situation, but said he imagined we should wish to avoid friction with the German Embassy, which was inevitable if we gave our warm support to Mr. D'Arcy. I said we were as determined in thinking the latter had prior rights as he was in supporting the German rights.

Then, he said, from the practical point of view D'Arcy's would be unable to work the oil-fields even if they got the concession. The best fields were those running along the *trace* of the Bagdad Railway, and in other districts the oil could only be carried by the same Railway, for which it would naturally ask prohibitive prices, and no question of preferential rates could come in. Without technical knowledge I was unable to meet his arguments on this point.

Under these circumstances he argued that it was clearly to the advantage of D'Arcy's to amalgamate with the Petroleum Syndicate represented by the National Bank, and this Syndicate was to all intents and purposes English. At Herr Günther's request he was writing to Sir H. Babington-Smith, asking him again to approach the Foreign Office on the subject. I said I did not see how the situation had changed since he had last approached the Foreign Office, and that D'Arcy's still considered that they were the first in the field from a legal point of view.

Mr. Whittall, when asked whether he considered the Shell Company as British, said that he did not know, and that possibly a good portion of the capital came from Belgium and other foreign countries.

The general impression made on me by Mr. Whittall's conversation was that the National Bank was most anxious to come to terms, but would do everything with German assistance to block the concession being given to Messrs. D'Arcy, but his remarks about the impossibility of D'Arcy's being able to work the fields without German co-operation may be worthy of examination.

[13902] No. 160.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March 26.*)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, March 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 151 of 25th March.

Grand Vizier on March 24th declared that most valuable oil districts would in any case fall to German group in virtue of Bagdad Railway concession, and consequently is anxious that two competing groups should amalgamate.

I presume that D'Arcy is satisfied that concession without those districts is worth acquiring.

[11950] No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 89.)
Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 145 of the 14th instant, relative to the overtures made to His Majesty's consul at Bussorah by a representative of the Arab tribes of that region with a view to obtain British protection and assistance in their differences with the Turkish Government, especially in the matter of their land contracts, I have to inform you that Sir L. Mallet mentioned this last point unofficially to Hakki Pasha in the course of a conversation which he had with his Highness on the 20th instant.

Your Excellency should inform Mr. Crow of the action taken.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13432] No. 162.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 18th instant, enclosing copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the customs depôt at Bagdad, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Board of Trade, copy of a letter which has been received from the India Office containing observations on Sir G. Lowther's despatch above referred to.*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with any observations which the Board may have to make on the point raised in the second paragraph of the India Office letter enclosed herewith.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[10818] No. 163.

Foreign Office to India Office.†

Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you

* No. 156.

† Also to Board of Trade.

herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of a proposal made by the Bagdad Railway Company for the formation of a permanent river transport company, in which they, the Ottoman Nahrie Company, and Messrs. Lynch would participate on equal terms.*

I am also to transmit copies of letters exchanged with the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company on the same subject.†

Sir Edward Grey is of opinion that it would be well that Hakki Pasha should be informed that His Majesty's Government would not consent to such an arrangement as they understand to be in contemplation, on the ground that the concession was granted not to Messrs. Lynch, but to His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[11879] No. 164.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 26, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, relative to the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates.

I am to inform you, in reply, that since the letter of the 10th instant from this Office was written, Sir E. Grey has received further details from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople which throw a light on the subject.

Sir G. Lowther reports that, owing to the inability of the company formed by yourselves and the Bagdad Railway Company to cope with the work of carrying up machinery and material during the period of construction of the line, the railway company, anxious to remedy this state of affairs and to obtain a permanent interest in the river-borne trade, have approached the Turkish Minister of Finance with an outline of a scheme for the formation of a permanent river transport company, in which your company, the Ottoman Nahrie Company, and the Bagdad Railway Company would participate on equal terms.

Sir G. Lowther adds that the scheme has also been submitted to your company, who, he understands, have given it a not unfavourable reception.

I am accordingly to enquire whether Sir E. Grey is at liberty to inform his Excellency that such is not the case, and I am to advert to the last two paragraphs of the letter of the 10th instant above referred to, and to express the hope that the assurance there spoken of will not be forgotten.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[12978] No. 165.

Koweit Draft Agreement.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement certain questions concerning their interests, have determined to conclude agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Turkey in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries, to wit:

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:—

Agreement concerning Koweit.

The Governments of Great Britain and Turkey being desirous of placing beyond all doubt the status and limits of Koweit and the adjacent territory, as respectively

* No. 125. † Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, March 13; and No. 164.

defined in articles 5 and 7 of this agreement, and the relations between the Sheikh of Koweit and Turkey, and taking into consideration the special interests of Great Britain in Koweit, and the long-established relations between Great Britain and the Sheikhs of Koweit;

Have agreed upon the following articles:—

1. Great Britain and Turkey recognise Koweit, as defined in article 4 of this agreement, as an autonomous sheikhdom under the suzerainty of Turkey.

2. Great Britain and Turkey recognise the Sheikh of Koweit as a Turkish kaïmakam.

3. Great Britain and Turkey recognise the right of the Sheikh of Koweit to exercise complete autonomy within the limits laid down in article 4 of this agreement. Turkey undertakes to abstain from any infringement of such autonomy, and from any interference with the succession, internal administration, or foreign relations of Koweit.

4. Nothing in this agreement shall be taken to prevent Turkey from appointing an agent at Koweit.

5. For the purposes of articles 1 and 3 of this agreement the limits of Koweit are agreed to be a segment of a circle drawn with the centre of Koweit town as its centre and a radius extending from that point to the mid-channel of the Khor Abdulla at its northernmost point between the island of Warba and the mainland, to include Kuin in the south, and to a point at a corresponding distance from the centre of Koweit in the west. Within these limits are also understood to be included the islands of Bubiyan, Mashian, Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Karu, and Umm-al-Maradim, and the islets adjacent thereto.

6. Great Britain and Turkey recognise as subordinate to the Sheikh of Koweit the tribes within the territory defined in article 7 of this agreement. The Sheikh of Koweit shall continue to levy tithes from such tribes as at present, and shall conduct such administration as may be necessary in his capacity as Turkish kaïmakam. Within the territory defined in article 7 of this agreement Turkey undertakes not to set up any administration apart from that of the Sheikh of Koweit, and not, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, to station any garrisons nor take any military or other action.

7. The limits of the territory referred to in article 6 of this agreement are agreed to be as follows: a line running north-west from the coast at the mouth of the Khor-es-Zubair up to and past but not including the walls of the forts at Sawan to Jebel Sanam and the Ar Ratq ridge; thence south-west along the Batin to and including the wells of Hafar; * thence south-east, including the wells of Al Safah and Al Garaa, Wabra and Anta'a; thence north-east to the sea near Jebel Manifah. And the sheikh shall continue to levy tithes from such tribes as at present, and shall conduct such administrations may be necessary in his capacity of Turkish kaïmakam.

8. Turkey recognises the validity of, and undertakes to respect, all the agreements which have been concluded between the Sheikh of Koweit and Great Britain, copies of which are set out in the schedule to this agreement.

9. Turkey undertakes that the Sheikh of Koweit shall be admitted to the full and undisturbed enjoyment of any private properties on Turkish territory which he may now own or may hereafter acquire in accordance with Turkish law.

10. †Nothing in this agreement shall detract from any right which Turkey may at present possess of marching troops by the recognised caravan routes across the limits defined in article 7 in the direction of Nejd, provided, however, that Turkish posts or garrisons shall not be maintained or established therein except by previous agreement with Great Britain.

[14033] No. 166.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and forwards herewith, for the information of

* Or, south-east between the districts of Summan and Dahanah to the route from Wabra to Riadh; thence north-east to the Na'airiyeh hill at the north-west corner of Hadrit; and thence to the sea near Jebel Manifah.

† Only to be included if strongly pressed for.—A. H

the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, dated 26th March, 1913, regarding the boundaries of Koweit.

India Office, March 27, 1913.

Enclosure in No. 166.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Code.* *Bushire, March* 26, 1913.

SHEIKH of Koweit, writing on 14th March, informs me that Ottoman Government authorities have asked representative of Sheikh of Koweit at Basra to obtain from sheikh, confidentially, a memorandum, setting forth boundaries of territory claimed by sheikh. In reply, sheikh says he has given his representative a memorandum to show informally to Ottoman Government authorities as desired, and sends me a copy of it. Document rather crudely worded, but the following is the boundary claimed, as I read it:—

Sheikh of Koweit claims that Jubail-al-Bahri is his southern limit on the coast. To the north of that point eastwards he claims everything as far as Khor Abdullah, including Failakal, Bubian, Warbah, and their waters. On the north, he includes Um Kasr and Safwan in his limits. From Safwan boundary goes due west to Batin, and thence follows Batin to include Hafar, thence to the most southernly point in the south centre, which he places at Al-Habeh, said to be just south of Minaisir-al-Chort. From thence boundary claimed by him to the south of Anta, and passes thence south-eastward to the coast at Jubail-al-Bahri.

[12978]

No. 167.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 27, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Marquess of Crewe, copy of an amended draft agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Imperial Ottoman Government respecting the status of Koweit.*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn whether the Marquess of Crewe is disposed to concur in the terms of this instrument.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[14247]

No. 168.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 231. Secret.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 157, Secret, of yesterday, on the subject of the Arab unrest in the neighbourhood of Basra, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith paraphrases of the two telegrams from Mr. Crow, as promised in my above-mentioned telegram.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 168.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Basra, March* 19, 1913.

THE message contained in your telegram No. 8 of the 14th instant seemed somewhat to depress sheikh, who said that a blockade of the river was the only course for them

* No. 165.

[13902]

No. 167*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 157.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 28, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 165 of 26th March: Mesopotamian oil.

Our object is to maintain the independence of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in order to keep competition alive with the Shell Company.

Amalgamation of the various interests would not, therefore, suit us at all, nor would it be for the general interest in view of the great importance of oil in the future.

We are consulting Mr. Greenway as to the last paragraph of your telegram, and you should inform the Grand Vizier of our views as to amalgamation.

---

to adopt. He visits me almost every day, and has had a discreetly sympathetic reception. As he says he has no funds here, he has borrowed so far 3*l*.

I will report as soon as possible the result of the message contained in your telegram No. 9 of the 18th instant which will be delivered to-day.

In my despatch No. 16 sent by post on the 15th instant I reported the circumstance of differences with Turkish Government, but in view of Sir E. Grey's proposal I telegraph them now.

Sheikh and his brother represent 160 minor sheikhs of the same tribe and their adherents. Sheikh informs me that they killed their uncle (who represented the Turkish Government in the matter of the land contracts) two months ago, and seized, and still hold, nine large tracts of land on the Tigris belonging to the Government. I have received the names of these tracts for which they seem determined not to pay taxes unless the Government agrees to lease them for 15 years to the present holders. The sheikh informed me that they would kill anyone who interfered with them, so there will probably be bloodshed if Turkish troops try to evict them.

I should not rely on the promises of either the sheikhs or the Turkish Government in the matter, though the latter may be disposed to temporise, as they want money.

Enclosure 2 in No. 168.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Basra, March* 21, 1913.

SHEIKH expressed his gratitude and pleasure at the receipt of Sir E. Grey's message contained in your telegram No. 9, Secret, of the 18th instant.

Before the proposed action on his behalf is taken I have asked him to furnish me with satisfactory proofs of his identity, in view of my being previously unacquainted with him and of the secret nature of his application.

On receipt of the proofs with which he has promised to furnish me I will report further.

[14471] No. 169.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 233.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1913.

WITH reference to St. Petersburgh telegram No. 338 of the 15th September, 1912, and to previous correspondence, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Basra, respecting Russian enquiries about arrangements for forwarding Bagdad Railway material.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 169.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Basra, February* 11, 1913.

THE acting Russian consul called to-day to ask if I could inform him whether a company had been formed by Messrs. Lynch, the Deutsche Bank, and the Ottoman Government for forwarding the Bagdad Railway material, and whether the Turkish river steamers were assisting in the present operations.

I replied that I had seen some mention in the newspapers of the probability of a subsidiary company being formed, such as he suggested, but that I had no definite information on the subject. I said I understood the Turks were offering no objection to the present arrangements, by which the material was forwarded in the vessels of the Compagnie des Transports fluviaux en Orient, and that Lynch Brothers were acting solely as agents for the Bagdad Railway Company in the management of this fleet, and were not employing their own steamers for the purpose. I added that, as far as I was aware, both the Idareh Nahrieh and Aga Jafer Companies had participated in the

transport till the end of January last, and that the new arrangements began in February.

The Russian authorities seem to be following the matter with close attention. My Russian colleague, M. Toukholka, who has recently been transferred to Crete, made several references, before his departure, to the formation of a subsidiary company for the purpose, in which the Turks were to take shares.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[14472] No. 170.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 234.)
Sir,

Constantinople, March 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1085 of the 18th December, 1912, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Basra, respecting the arrangements for forwarding the Bagdad Railway material up the river.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)
Sir,

Basra, February 25, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 51 of the 29th October last, regarding arrangements at Basra for forwarding the Bagdad Railway material up-river, I have the honour to report that Messrs. Lynch Brothers began work on the 1st February with the tug "Shirin," which arrived on the 27th October. They are unable, however, to carry out the full terms of their agreement pending the arrival of the other four tugs.

Under these circumstances, as the railway company are pressing for the delivery of their material, the steam tugs "Pionier," "Samarra," and "Tekrit," brought out by Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co., agents for the Hamburg-American line, are assisting in conveying the material provisionally from Basra to Bagdad, and will, I understand, continue to do so until the Société des Transports fluviaux en Orient provide the necessary vessels under their agreement. These three tugs, like the "Shirin," carry the Turkish flag.

It is not quite clear to me whether these three vessels belong to the Bagdad Railway Company or to Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. I am told the "Pionier," the largest of the three, belongs to the German firm, and that the other two were brought out for the Bagdad Railway Company.

The second tug, built by the Belgium Company, is expected in the steamship "Lungdale" in the course of next month, as stated in the agreement with Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW

[14248] No. 171.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 236.)
Sir,

Constantinople, March 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 156 of the 25th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by His Majesty's consul at Basra on the subject of a mazbata which is being circulated among the Arab notables of the vilayet.

On the 1st of March Mr. Crow telegraphed that the mazbata bore about 300 signatures, and had been telegraphed on the 22nd February to the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 171.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11.)
Sir,

Basra, February 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the mazbata, now being circulated for signature among the Arab notables, copies of which are to be handed to the Acting Vali and telegraphed to the Grand Vizier and Minister of the Interior.

This document should be read by the light of my telegram to your Excellency No. 4 of the 27th January last. I am informed that the Arabs in this vilayet contemplate some sort of self-government and that, if the permission now asked for is granted, one of their primary demands will be to claim the right of employing local revenue for local purposes, the balance only, if any, being remitted to Constantinople after these requirements have been satisfied.

I have not heard any further details of their programme, and it would be premature to anticipate the exact form their local requirements may assume, but one thing seems clear, and that is that the tide of local feeling is set strongly against the régime and methods of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I do not know the nature of the alleged charter of reforms referred to in the "mazbata" as having been granted to Syria, but I presume it concerns the "laiha" of reforms presented by the General Council of Beirout, which is mentioned in the Turkish news agency's telegrams of the 6th (19th) February, as having been submitted to the Cabinet for examination.

A copy of this despatch and enclosure has been sent to the Acting Resident at Bagdad for the information of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Enclosure 2 in No. 171.

Mazbata of Basra Notables addressed to Acting Vali, Grand Vizier, and Minister of Interior.

(Translation.)

OUR greatest national wish is to assure the future of the country and to advance the condition and affairs of the community. Impelled by our national and social needs we submit with deep concern for your consideration the following matters:—

Under the impact of the deepest sorrow and emotion we beg to state that we have wept till we can weep no more over the present ruin of our beloved country, the coveted prey of our enemies who are ever endeavouring to wrest it from us. Wherever we look the dark clouds of ruin, misfortune, deaths, and certain calamity are plainly seen settling over us like a pall. Both great and small, afflicted, enlightened or mute we are to-day all in one condition of existence. Science, education, commerce, agriculture, and art in all their branches have perished and are buried deep in the misfortunes of ignorance. Poverty and indigence have seized our whole community in their grasp, and are dragging us along to our destruction. Families which once supported large numbers of the poor and needy are to-day themselves in poverty and distress. In short, we are crushed and weighed down by the burden of an abasement which we cannot endure. What is the sole reason for this condition, this abject humiliation? We have pondered and found one basic source of it from which spring causes as widely ramified as they are beyond computation, and this is—the fact that, in our sphere, science and education and all they mean are utterly obliterated.

Consequently, as the treatment of a malady is indubitably rendered easier by an accurate diagnosis, we beg and request you, in the name of the country and the nation, to grant us permission to convene in extraordinary session and without a moment's

delay a General Council of the vilayet, the formation of which is not merely necessary, but of paramount and pressing importance in order to arrest once and for all the ruin, the misfortunes, the poverty, and the needs which oppress us in the way I have stated, and while indicating the definite necessity which exists for the discussion of all matters affecting the knowledge, education, wealth, and prosperity of our people and country for passing our decisions thereon and for taking such steps as may be necessary to carry them out, we beg you, in view of the urgency of these concerns, which are matters of life or death to our people and our country, to authorise the issue of a summons to assemble the General Council of the vilayet in immediate and extraordinary session without regard to the usual time fixed for its meeting.

[14474] No. 172.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 31.)

(No. 238.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith Mr. Consul-General Cumberbatch's No. 26 of the 12th instant, enclosing, with comments, copies of schemes of reform on a decentralisation basis for the vilayet of Beirout.

As will be noticed, these schemes, which it is intended to extend to other Arab-speaking provinces, aim at a cessation of Turkish direct administration, and the substitution for it of Arab self-government within certain limits.

Before the advent to Turkey proper of the Committee of Union and Progress the Turkish conception of government of the Arab provinces was based on the religious tie binding them to the Turkish *de facto* caliphate, combined with an administration composed of Turkish functionaries, backed in case of necessity by the Turkish military forces.

The last five years of government of Turkey proper by the Committee has alienated the sympathies of the Arabs, destroyed their belief in the ability of Turkey to maintain her rule in those or other non-Turkish provinces, and forced them to begin to look after Arab as opposed to Turkish interests. The result of this mental process is the formation of the projects of so-called "decentralisation," the realisation of which will mean that, though the Arab provinces may remain "Ottoman" in name, they will cease to all intents and purposes to form part of what has hitherto been styled "Turkey."

The Central Government, feeling the necessity of going a certain way to meet the desires of the Arabs and others, is considering schemes of decentralisation, but it remains to be seen whether it can rid itself of the "Turcification" tendency of which the present movement is in great part a reflex, and thus prevent the Arab movement from assuming a more far-reaching and dangerous anti-Turkish form. The Committee of Union and Progress by its anti-clerical policy has undermined the moral force and prestige of the Caliph to such an extent, both in the capital and the provinces, that the old religious tie binding the Arabs to the Turkish Central Government has been weakened almost to vanishing point, and the whole position of the Turkish caliphate has perhaps been irremediably compromised.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 172.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Beirout, March* 12, 1913

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 24th January, on the subject of the various projects of reforms under discussion, I have the honour to transmit translation of the two projects,* the one drawn up by the specially elected representative committee of eighty-six members of the various communities, and the other by the Governor-General assisted by members of the general provincial council and others specially invited to attend.

The main drift of both these schemes is towards administrative decentralisation, and the most interesting proposal is the appointment of foreign advisers or inspectors.

* Not printed.

To all intents and purposes the general councils would replace the Central Government, and would even regulate the disposal of those revenues of the province which are not allotted to the Imperial Treasury.

In the first-named scheme the Arabic language is made the official language with which every official but the vali must be acquainted, and the vali too after five years.

The second scheme makes Arabic admissible in Government offices, but Turkish remains the official language.

Appointments and revocations of officials are to be in the hands of special committees presided over by the vali.

Both these projects have been duly transmitted to the Sublime Porte, but no hope is entertained of any final decision as regards either of them until the Government is in a position to attend to this important question of provincial reforms, the general opinion upon which is that unless the appointment of foreign advisers with something more than mere consultative powers are provided for by the Sublime Porte, the success of any scheme of reforms is very problematical owing to the incapacity and corruption of the official class as a whole.

In the meantime the proclamation and programme of the "Parti de la Décentralisation administrative ottomane," emanating from the "Comité supérieur" at Cairo, is being disseminated.

I do not forward a copy, as I presume it must have reached His Majesty's Embassy too. On the whole it is perhaps milder in its proposals, but does not provide for foreign advisers. It insists on the use of the local language as the official language along with Turkish.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[14250] No. 173.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 29.)

(No. 239.)

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 139 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that I again to-day approached the Grand Vizier on the subject of the D'Arcy Petroleum Concession, and I asked him whether he could now tell me who was the competitor to Messrs. D'Arcy to whom he had previously alluded, and explain to me why the Minister of Commerce had not, as I had been informed by Mr. Stock, been able to obtain any reply from the Sublime Porte as to how the matter stood.

The Grand Vizier came out into the open and said that the competitor was the British Petroleum Syndicate, a company in great part supported by British capital, but to some extent by German and Dutch, and as the greater part was British, he did not see why it had not the support of His Majesty's Government. I again explained to him that D'Arcy's had received promises and assurances from a previous Turkish Government, when it was clearly understood that the German claims had been forfeited, and that D'Arcy's were therefore really the only company in the field. Indeed, the then Grand Vizier could not have gone so far as he did had he not considered that D'Arcy's had absolute rights in the matter.

The Grand Vizier did not agree with or deny this argument, but went on to explain the advantages there would be in bringing about an amalgamation of the conflicting interests, much in the same language as that used by Mr. Whittall, as reported in my despatch No. 227 of the 20th instant. His Highness said that, even if the concession were given to D'Arcy's, he did not see how they could utilise it. The Bagdad Railway had preferential rights over 20 kilom. on either side of the line, and he understood that this would cover the best petroleum fields, and the carrying rights on the railway would always be in the hands of the Bagdad Railway. He gave me clearly to understand that he dreaded a conflict between the two embassies which would place the Turkish Government in an embarrassing situation, and he reminded me of a conversation he had had with me two years ago, in which he deprecated competition in the country between British and German interests, and repeated the hope that means would be found for them to work together and not in opposition.

He appeared to have some hopes that the solution might be found in amalgamation. It was clear to me that strong pressure had been brought to bear upon him from the other side.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[14277] No. 174.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 28, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Bussorah, No. 15 of to-day :—

"Your telegram of 26th March.

"Sheikh has not visited me again, and has not yet furnished me with required proof of his authority to represent Benilam in the matter. I understand that he is communicating with his brother Ghadban before doing so.

"As reported in my telegram No. 12, I informed him on 11th March that his application was forwarded with all reserve, and that I could not hold out any hope of a favourable reply."

His Majesty's consul's telegram No. 12 was repeated in my telegram No. 145 of 14th March.

[14408] No. 175.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, March 29, 1913.*

CONSUL at Bussorah asks whether, in view of your telegram No. 152 of 25th March, he should inform sheikh when the latter next approaches him that, considering the line the tribes have taken in killing their uncle [*sic*], &c., you would find it difficult to help them in way proposed.

[14475] No. 176.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 241.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 26, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 198 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem reporting further on the dissatisfaction among the Bedouins in the Beersheba district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 176.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20. Confidential.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, March 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 14, Confidential, of the 24th ultimo on the subject of the state of affairs in the Beersheba district, I have the honour to report that, according to information which has reached me from various sources, native and foreign, there is an undeniable recrudescence of discontent among the Beersheba Bedouins on account of the general arbitrariness of the gendarmerie and judicial authorities with respect to the land and tithe problems, the standing sources of trouble in these regions.

It appears that the immediate cause of the present dissatisfaction was the maltreatment by gendarmes some weeks ago of a sheikh belonging to the important Tarabin tribe inhabiting the country south of Beersheba. This tribe has an old grievance against the Government, which took possession some ten years ago of certain lands regarding which a dispute had arisen among two sections of the tribe, promising to return them as soon as the parties should have become reconciled, with the proviso that the tithe and one-third of the produce should be levied in the meantime for the benefit of the Treasury. An agreement was recently arrived at, and the Bedouins asked that their full rights of ownership should be recognised as of old;

but the authorities at Jerusalem refused to do so, notwithstanding the urgent representations of the present kaimakam. Gendarmes were accordingly sent to collect the produce as usual, and on finding the sheikh recalcitrant they proceeded to beat him and use the customary methods of intimidation.

From the fact that no active resistance was offered, it may be inferred that the Bedouins of that district are not very warlike; but they immediately withdrew to the Sinai frontier in token of protest, and have only now returned to their usual camping grounds.

Information from the consular agent at Gaza corroborate the statements made to me regarding the poverty-stricken plight of the Bedouins in consequence of successive bad harvests, the corruption and rapacity of the officials, and the utter impotence of the Kaimakam of Beersheba, whose well-meant efforts in the cause of fair dealing are nullified by the attitude of the Jerusalem authorities.

In the course of a conversation with a Tarabin sheikh I was unable to elicit from him anything concerning a definite plan for aggressive action against the Government, and I am inclined to doubt whether, in their present condition, the Bedouins are capable of doing more than withdraw to the Egyptian frontier; but it is evident that they are thoroughly disgusted with the Turkish misrule, and would welcome any régime which would allow of their leading their traditional existence in peace.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[14478] No. 177.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Constantinople, March 27, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, on the subject of British influence in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 177.

Vice-Consul Hony to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4. Confidential.)
Sir, *Mosul, February 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a few remarks on the position of Mosul with regard to the future policy of Great Britain. If I shall seem to have presumed to speak of matters rather outside the scope of a junior consular officer, I beg to be excused on the ground that the views even of an inexperienced person, cognisant of the actual conditions of a district, may at least be useful to more competent persons in forming their own judgments about that district.

Recent events would tend to strengthen the idea that Turkey, if not about to die immediately, like Czar Nicholas's "sick man," will nevertheless continue gradually to disintegrate. The disintegrated portions are naturally inclined to fall into the hands of those whose interest in them is the greatest, as Bosnia to Austria, Tripoli to Italy, Crete to Greece.

Syria may be regarded as in the French sphere of influence, and the French Government has recently shown its intention of increasing that influence. English influence is certainly paramount in Southern Mesopotamia. This does not necessarily mean that either Power has definite territorial ambitions in those districts, but they would feel they had a prior claim to them should they be disintegrated.

Mosul cannot at present be said to belong to any sphere of influence, and it is still an open question whether it will be joined to the British sphere in Mesopotamia, to the French sphere in Syria, to the sphere which Germany is trying to create for herself, or to the Russian sphere, which is steadily enlarging itself to the north-east of Mosul.

Geographically Mosul would certainly belong to the same sphere as Bagdad and Basra, and the French seemed to have recognised this. They were for long the most influential nation here on account of their old-established mission, and the large numbers of Roman Catholics, who looked to them for protection; but signs are not wanting that their influence has declined, and that they are concentrating their forces

on Syria. The French Consulate-General at Bagdad has, I believe, been reduced to a vice-consulate.

The Russians take little interest in Mosul at present; their vice-consul habitually resides at Bagdad, only spending a fortnight in Mosul each year; but they are working hard to secure the allegiance of the Kurds in the country between Van and Rowanduz, and each day brings their sphere nearer to Mosul.

The Germans have not shown much activity here up till now. They have had a vice-consul for some years, but he has nothing to do. The Bagdad Railway engineers apply direct to the vilayet if they need assistance, and there are no other German subjects. German trade is insignificant, but it cannot be doubted that they will not long leave Mosul unattacked. Their outposts are at Urfa and Ras-el-Ain, where Baron Max Oppenheim has been working assiduously at other things than archæology. It would not be surprising to hear any day that a large German school or hospital was to be opened here.

British interests are at present in a favourable position. British trade is predominant, and the great Bagdad houses of Lynch and Blockey Cree are doing an ever-increasing business. There is a small school and a hospital run by the Church Missionary Society. But we are fortified against no attack. Beyond the little Church Missionary Society school, which is only for small children, there is no place where English can be learnt. Again, the coming of the Bagdad Railway may mean that much trade, which has hitherto come by the Persian Gulf and Bagdad, may be diverted to the Mediterranean–Aleppo route.

It remains to be considered what steps might be taken to fortify our position.

As regards the teaching of English, this vice-consulate recently started classes for that purpose. The greatest enthusiasm was shown, and many applicants had to be turned away because there was no room for them. The Roman Catholic schools punished any of their boys who attended these classes, in terror lest they should be perverted from the true faith; but many boys came, nevertheless, and in self-defence the Roman Catholics began to take steps towards the teaching of English in their own schools. The head of the Dominicans asked the French vice-consul if he saw any objection to it, and the latter replied that he did not. Unfortunately, one of my teachers got a post elsewhere, and another is likely to leave Mosul soon. I cannot afford to pay a sufficient salary to enable a teacher to devote his whole time to the classes, nor is it right or expedient that such an undertaking should depend entirely on the private resources of the vice-consul. I would suggest that—

1. The Church Missionary Society should be urged to enlarge their school, and, if possible, aided financially to do so.

2. That the Jewish school should be encouraged to teach English. I have already approached the Director of the Alliance Israélite on the subject, and he has written about it to the head-quarters of the Alliance in Paris. The chief difficulty is the expense. I understand, however, that the Jews' Colonisation Society of London is willing to subvention schools on condition that English is taught in them. The difficulty might thus be solved if Sir Edward Grey could see his way to approach that institution on the subject.

3. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission to the Nestorians has had ideas of sending a similar mission to the Jacobites. If Mar Shimun eventually throws in his lot with the Russians, as seems most probable, the Archbishop's mission will very likely be compelled to withdraw, and should this be the case it is certainly to be hoped that they will turn their attention to the Jacobites. They would, I think, find it a more grateful task; moreover, the Jacobites are a well-to-do community, and would bear the greater part of the expense themselves; they only want Englishmen as organisers and teachers.

If any of the above projects were carried out, the Roman Catholics would be obliged to introduce English into their schools, for so great is the desire to learn English that the parents would not hesitate to send their children to Protestant, Jacobite, or even Jewish schools, if English were taught there and not in their own schools.

The Government of India might be inclined to help in this matter, for India could not but benefit by an increase in the number of persons knowing English.

I believe that a word or two from the Foreign Office in the right quarters might bring about a great success on the lines above mentioned.

If we do not take some steps to enable the people of Mosul to learn English, the

Germans will certainly take steps to enable them to learn German, to the benefit of German, and the detriment of English, trade and influence.

As regards the change of trade route, I should not be apprehensive of it being detrimental to English interests but for the fact that British houses are so strongly established in Bagdad, whereas German houses are probably better established at Aleppo. The only suggestion I have to make in this respect is that we should be ready to assist Lynch or any other British company in securing a concession for the navigation of the Tigris up to Mosul; trade would then be water-borne from England to Mosul, and the lower freights ought to assure the pre-eminence of that route over any other.

There is one point further to which I would beg to call your Excellency's attention. I quote from Dr. Röhrbacher's "Die Baghdadbahn," pp. 43, 44:—

"I have personally visited the naphtha springs of Kerkuk and the neighbouring springs of Baba Gurgur. Both one and the other are more considerable than similar phenomena in the peninsula of Aspcheron, in Russian Transcaucasia, before boring was begun. When we have seen what an important rôle naphtha products have played in Russia as fuel for railways, steamships, and many industrial undertakings, and consider the tremendous importance of petroleum in these days as a material for burning and lighting, we ought to attach the greatest importance to the circumstance that the Bagdad Railway will pass close to petroleum districts. The only thing to be feared is that foreign gold and foreign speculators should succeed in securing a preferential right over the exploitation of Mesopotamian naphtha before any effective German initiative has been taken."

Everything possible should be done by the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade to ensure that English capital does what Dr. Röhrbacher fears.

I have, &c.
HENRY C. HONY.

[14674] No. 178.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received March 31.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street,
London, March 29, 1913.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter of the 26th instant, we must repeat that we know of no foundation for reports to the effect that the company formed by ourselves and the Deutsche Bank is unable to cope with the work of carrying the railway material.

We know of no outline of a scheme for the formation of a permanent river transport company put forward by the Bagdad Railway Company; no such scheme has been submitted to our company. We have therefore not had occasion to express an opinion favourable or otherwise. We have a letter from the Deutsche Bank, dated the 18th instant, informing us that the Turkish Government now seems disposed to enter into the combination for the transport of railway material. You are aware that it is part of our agreement with the Deutsche Bank that the Turkish Government shall have the right to participate to the extent of one-third. The Deutsche Bank add that the Turkish Government seem inclined to convert the proposed Anglo-German-Turkish company into a general shipping company, absorbing this company and the Turkish River Company. To this letter we have replied to-day, as per copy enclosed, and we will keep you closely in touch with any further development.

I have, &c.
FRED. W. PARRY, *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 178.

Copy of Letter addressed to the Deutsche Bank (Berlin), dated March 29, 1913.

IN reply to your letter of the 18th instant, we are very glad to hear that the question of the participation of the Turkish Government in the railway transport company is now seriously coming forward. At the same time you inform us that you

have reason to believe that the Turkish Government would be inclined to convert the railway transport company into a general shipping company.

It must be obvious that a great many questions would arise in connection with the latter proposal, the solution of which will take considerable time. We should also consider it necessary as a matter of courtesy to consult our Government before embarking on such negotiations. We must therefore beg you to adhere to the arrangement in force between us, and to endeavour to obtain at the earliest moment the adhesion in principle of the Turkish Government to participation to the extent of one-third in the railway transport company. Directly that has been effected, we would suggest a board meeting of the société to take into consideration the particulars of transfer to the Anglo-German-Turkish company and the framing of any additional statutes.

[13760] No. 179.

Foreign Office to Mr. Greenway.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 31, 1913.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to concessions for the exploitation of the oil-fields of Asiatic Turkey, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, for your confidential information, copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople recording a conversation with the sub-manager of the Anatolian Railway Company on the subject.*

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to be favoured with any observations which you may have to offer on the contents of this despatch.

You are aware that, in compliance with the request made on your behalf by Mr. Nicolls on the occasion of a visit to this Office on the 25th instant, a telegram was addressed to Sir G. Lowther instructing him to support in every possible way your syndicate's local agent in his efforts to obtain the concession which they desire, and to urge the Turkish Grand Vizier in the strongest manner to fulfil the assurances given in the past.

I am to state that, in a telegram which has since been received, his Excellency reports that the Grand Vizier has declared that the most valuable oil districts would in any case go to the German group in virtue of the Bagdad Railway concession, and presumes that your group are satisfied that the concession is worth acquiring without those districts.

You are aware of the rights possessed by the Bagdad Railway Company under article 22 of their convention with the Turkish Government, and I am to enquire whether, in the light of that knowledge, your views are in accordance with this presumption.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

---

o

* Not printed.